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Election Law Manual
Chapter 12: Special Considerations

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Table of Contents

Subchapter 1: Introduction

Election law cases are frequently faced with considerations not present in other types of civil litigation. The following are among the unique challenges that may require special judicial consideration:

  • Pre-Argument Remedies
  • The Purcell Principle
  • Redistricting / Reapportionment Plans & Looming Elections
  • Independent State Legislature Doctrine
  • Immunity for Election Officials
  • Preclearance Mechanisms

Subchapter 2: Pre-Argument Remedies

Although pre-election challenges are strongly favored over post-election contests, the shortened time frame in which they can be brought may deprive a court of the ability to offer a meaningful remedy to a prevailing plaintiff. In these circumstances, the plaintiff is successful in name only.

In an acknowledgment of this potential outcome, when a challenger appears to have a likelihood of prevailing, the court may opt to issue a pre-argument injunction that preserves a meaningful remedy should a challenger ultimately prevail. For example, in Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Boockvar, the Supreme Court ordered Pennsylvania county boards of election to segregate absentee ballots received after the legally prescribed deadline as it was unable to reach the merits of the case before the election.1 In another example, as the Supreme Court prepared to hear Williams v. Rhodes, 2 the Chief Justice took the unusual step of issuing a pre-argument injunction that required the challenger’s name to be added to a set of ballots to ensure a meaningful remedy was available should the challenger prevail.3

Subchapter 3: The Purcell Principle

When litigants wait to challenge election regulations until right before an election, despite the opportunity for an earlier challenge, laches may apply.4

The closer an election looms, the more likely a federal court order will cause voter confusion and administrative error.5 When cases come before federal courts seeking a change to election rules shortly before an election is held, the Supreme Court has imposed a presumption against granting the requested relief if doing so would cause voter confusion or make it difficult for election officials to administer the election. This theory is sometimes referred to as the “Purcell principle.”6 The Supreme Court first identified this idea in its per curiam opinion in Purcell v. Gonzalez. 7 The case—which was filed four months before the primary election and six months before the general election—dealt with an Arizona ballot initiative which required voters to present proof of citizenship when registering to vote and to present identification when voting on election day.8 The lower court denied plaintiffs request for preliminary injunction to prevent Arizona from enforcing it,9 which the appellate court overturned without explanation a month before the election.10 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, based not on the merits but because the election was a little more than two weeks away.11 The Court stressed its concern that federal court action so near an impending election would “result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.”12 The Court has continued to apply this principle in subsequent cases.13

Because of its focus on preventing voter and official confusion about election rules close to an election, the Purcell principle is not “an ironclad rule.”14 Instead, federal courts have interpreted it as a presumption against judicial interference with election regulations that may be overcome even when an election is imminent.15 Some factors courts have used to determine if judicial interference is appropriate include:

  • if a court’s remedy will cause voter confusion;16
  • if the failure of a court to intercede will lead to significant disenfranchisement;17
  • if plaintiffs have diligently pursued their claim;18 and
  • election proximity.19

When federal courts weigh if the remedy will cause voter confusion, they generally make an assessment based on the type of policy being challenged and the implications of their choices.20 For example, a U.S. District Court in Alabama held that the Purcell principle did not prevent it from enjoining enforcement of several state election laws in light of the COVID-19 pandemic where the suit was timely and the ruling would not create voter confusion.21 The court found that the election laws—requiring notary or two witnesses sign absentee ballot affidavits, requiring absentee voters to submit a copy of their photo identification with absentee ballot application, and imposing a de facto curbside voting ban—as they stood created voter confusion due to pandemic conditions.22 The court’s decision to enjoin enforcement of some of the challenged laws, the court found, did not require more action from voters, but rather relieved some voters of providing additional information or voting in person during a pandemic.23

Courts almost never make decisions that upset policies greatly affecting the election process—such as changing or adding a polling location—shortly before an election because of a high likelihood of that decision creating significant voter and election official confusion.24 However, courts have found that policy changes close to elections that only affect administrators—such as changes to signature match requirements—fall outside of Purcell’s ambit.25 Courts are also not typically concerned if resolving legal violations would merely result in more work for election administrators.26

In addition to considering if court interference will cause voter disenfranchisement, courts also consider if inaction could lead to voter disenfranchisement.27 Judges must balance the harm of potentially creating voter confusion if they do interfere against the disenfranchisement that may occur if they do not.28 For example, while determining if whether or not to issue an injunction barring a consent decree to extend the deadline for counting absentee ballots beyond Election Day, the Eighth Circuit determined that inaction would lead to more disenfranchisement. In issuing the injunction, the court believed it was preventing “a post-election scenario where mail-in votes, received after the statutory deadline, are either intermingled with ballots received on time or invalidated without prior warning.”29

While the Purcell principle concerns federal court rulings, traces of the doctrine can be found in state court holdings as well.30

Subchapter 4: Redistricting / Reapportionment Plans & Looming Elections

Although redistricting is covered more fully in another chapter, special consideration is included here because of unique timing questions in redistricting cases. Legal challenges that arise in redistricting cases often run up against hard federal and state statutory deadlines for when candidates must file and elections must be held. State courts may hear election challenges relating to delayed or obsolete state or local redistricting schemes. If a redistricting plan is determined unconstitutional and the state legislature cannot create a constitutional plan before the election, courts are often asked to decide among the following courses of action:

  • proceed with the election under the invalid districting scheme,31
  • postpone the election until the redistricting is complete,32 or
  • impose a court-created redistricting plan and then proceed with the election.33

The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld a federal district court’s decision to allow an election to proceed under an existing apportionment plan that became unconstitutional by the operation of time.34 A significant factor in the outcome was the Court’s assumption that a constitutional plan would be in place before the next election.35

When evaluating a constitutional challenge to an apportionment plan, courts consider the following factors:

  • whether the legislative body has sufficient time to draw a new plan before the next election,
  • whether an election will be delayed while the new plan is being designed or implemented,
  • whether an interim at-large election is feasible,
  • how many legislative seats are involved in the upcoming election, and
  • the reason the plan is unconstitutional. 36

After considering those criteria, courts generally evaluate options under a “lesser evils” approach.37 The court may also reserve the right to substitute its own reapportionment plan if the legislative body fails to make progress on a constitutional plan by a court-imposed deadline.38 For example, in 2018 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the state’s congressional map,39 giving the legislature eighteen days to create a map that complies with the state constitution and giving the governor five days to approve it.40 When the legislature failed to pass a new map, the court issued its own.41 Similarly, a Texas district court had to issue an interim district map before the 2012 midterm elections as the legislature drawn redistricting map awaited preclearance.42 There, the court acted because it appeared unlikely the preclearance process would be complete before the midterm elections and using the previously drawn map would contravene the constitutional requirement of one-person, one-vote due to a significant increase in the state’s population.43

Subchapter 5: Independent State Legislature Theory

Article II, Section I of the U.S. Constitution explicitly grants state legislatures independent authority in how they administer federal elections.44 Litigants have advanced the theory that courts and state executives cannot infringe upon legislative power in this area because of the direct constitutional grant of authority to the state legislature exclusively.45 This theory is known as the Independent State Legislature Theory (ISLT).

Scholars diverge on whether this theory is supported by historical practice but agree that its recent notoriety is a result of a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases emanating from litigation surrounding the 2000 presidential election.46 In Bush I, the Supreme Court gave a brief outline of the doctrine but left open the question of “how much independence an Article II legislature has from its constitution.”47

In Bush II, although the Court did not decide the case on the basis of Article II, three justices alluded to the ISLT in concurrence.48 The concurrence expressed the belief that Article II grants state legislatures the power to choose the manner in which they appoint presidential electors and state courts must therefore be “deferential to those bodies expressly empowered by the legislature to carry out its constitutional mandate.”49 The concurrence concluded that the Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted state election law and interfered with the state legislature’s Article II authority. The concurrence argued that overruling Florida courts’ interpretation of state law preserved the “constitutionally prescribed role of [the] state legislature.”50 Following this reasoning, the concurrence maintained that the remedy issued by the Florida Supreme Court—to recount thousands of ballots within a four-day period—was not appropriate given the “safe harbor” deadline.51

In 2003, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Colorado General Assembly v. Salazar, a case involving the state supreme court’s invalidation of a legislatively drawn congressional district map.52 The three dissenting justices believed the court should have heard the case and held that the court here treated itself as part of the “Legislature” under the Elections Clause, an action that the dissenters argued is impermissible.53

In the 2020 election cycle, courts wrestled with the ISLT. One example involved a Pennsylvania case in which the Republican Party sought to overturn the state supreme court’s decision allowing absentee ballots to be counted when received three days after Election Day.54 Plaintiffs argued that only the legislature, not a state court, had the authority under Articles I and II to set absentee ballot deadlines in presidential elections.55 The Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs’ claim in a 4-4 decision, issuing no opinion.56 In 2022, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Moore v. Harper which could have significant implications for the balance of power between state legislatures and other actors in relation to federal elections. 57

Subchapter 6: Immunity for Election Officials

Electoral boards or election officials who are defendants may have immunity from damage awards for alleged constitutional violations. For example, courts have found that state boards of elections acting in their official capacity enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.58 Absolute immunity may protect members of local boards of elections operating under a statutory grant of authority and exercising quasi-judicial powers in trial-like settings, such as when they consider and rule on nominating petitions.59 Absolute immunity’s applicability depends on the nature of the official’s responsibilities, not rank or job title.60 The availability of absolute immunity insulates board members’ decision making from harassment and intimidation and ensures board members are not influenced by a fear of litigation or personal financial liability.61 An official who asserts a right to absolute immunity must prove the challenged conduct qualifies for protection.62

Some courts have held that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act “effects a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”63 In 1999, the Sixth Circuit held that Congress (1) intended to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity under the Voting Rights Act by explicitly prohibiting states and political subdivisions from discriminating against voters on the basis of race, and (2) that Congress has the power to abrogate sovereign immunity by passing legislation under the Fifteenth Amendment.64 Since this decision, some courts permit plaintiffs to sue state election officials under the VRA.65

Election officials can be criminally penalized for interfering with federal elections.66 State statutes impose penalties on election officials for a variety of infractions, such as failing to perform their duties, drinking alcohol on the job, interfering with voters or the voting process, or breaking election laws.67 Following the 2020 election, several states passed laws penalizing election officials for acts such as committing technical infractions,68 leaving ballot boxes unsupervised or accessible outside of early voting periods,69 and intentionally or knowingly miscounting votes.70

Subchapter 7: Preclearance Mechanisms

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) requires legislatures in covered jurisdictions to seek preclearance before implementing any change to a state’s elections practices or procedures.71 There are two means by which a jurisdiction is covered—Section 4(b) which contains a formula to determine covered jurisdictions 72 and Section 3(c) which allows federal courts to “bail-in” jurisdictions found to have violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. 73 Shelby County v. Holder effectively removed the preclearance requirement when it held the Section 4(b) coverage formula unconstitutional in 2013.74 Unless and until Congress elects to create a new Section 4(b) coverage formula based on “current conditions,” only jurisdictions bailed in by a court under Section 3 must preclear voting changes. 75 Very few courts have used the bail in process.76

Despite the largely dormant federal VRA preclearance process, individual states have considered state-level preclearance procedures. In 2021, for example, Virginia enacted the Voting Rights Act of Virginia.77 In a process similar to the federal Voting Rights Act construct, the statute requires certain Virginia localities to request pre-approval from the state attorney general for certain changes to the voting process.78

Subchapter 8: Conclusion

Because of the unique nature of election disputes and the external constraints often not present in other types of litigation, special considerations such as those suggested in this chapter may apply.

Footnotes

  1. Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Boockvar, 208 L. Ed. 2d 293 (Nov. 6, 2020); Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2020).
  2. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
  3. Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 121 n.5 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that this just-in-case remedy, combined with an expedited oral argument schedule, were the only reasons the appellant’s later victory was not hollow as without this action no time remained after the decision and before the election for any corrective action to occur).
  4. See Crookston v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2016) (staying a motion for preliminary injunction because the plaintiff had no reasonable explanation for filing his action so close to the election).
  5. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-5; Thomas v. Bryant, 919 F.3d 298, 315 (5th Cir. 2019); Common Cause v. Rucho, 284 F. Supp. 3d 780, 791 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
  6. See Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 427 (identifying the terming the “Purcell principle” while analyzing the seemingly disparate outcomes of four election law cases heard by the Supreme Court).
  7. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006).
  8. Gonzalez v. Arizona, No. CV 06-1268-PHX-ROS, 2006 WL 8431038, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 12, 2006), aff'd, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Gonzalez v. State of Arizona, No. CV 06-1268-PHX, 2006 WL 3627297 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2006), aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
  9. Gonzalez v. State of Arizona, No. CV 06-1268-PHX, 2006 WL 3627297 at *9-*10 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2006), aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
  10. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5-6.
  11. Id. at 4-5.
  12. Id.
  13. See Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 427 (citing to following cases: Husted v. Ohio State Conference of NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014); North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014); Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014); and Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014)). See also Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020).
  14. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Freeing Purcell from the Shadows, TAKE CARE (Sept. 27, 2020), https://takecareblog.com/blog/freeing-purcell-from-the-shadows.
  15. Id.
  16. See People First of Alabama v. Merrill, 491 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (N.D. Ala. 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom. People First of Alabama v. Sec'y of State for Alabama, No. 20-13695-GG, 2020 WL 7038817 (11th Cir. Nov. 13, 2020), and appeal dismissed sub nom.; Rangel-Lopez v. Cox, 344 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1290-91 (D. Kan. 2018).
  17. See Common Cause v. Thomsen, No. 19-CV-323-JDP, 2020 WL 5665475, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2020).
  18. See Crookston v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2016) (Purcell principle concerns are “especially true when a plaintiff has unreasonably delayed bringing his claim.”)
  19. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-5 (2006) (“Faced with an application to enjoin operation of voter identification procedures just weeks before an election, the Court of Appeals was required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional procedures. Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.”).
  20. Id.
  21. People First of Alabama, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 1140.
  22. Id. at 1128.
  23. Id. at 1142.
  24. See Rangel-Lopez v. Cox, 344 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1290-91 (D. Kan. 2018) (holding that adding an additional polling location days before an election would cause voter confusion and violate the Purcell principle).
  25. See, e.g., Self Advoc. Sols. N.D. v. Jaeger, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1055 (D.N.D. 2020) (“The concerns that troubled the Supreme Court in Purcell are not present in this instance. A voter filling out an absentee ballot will be entirely unaffected by an order enjoining the signature-matching requirement—a requirement that applies only after a ballot is submitted. In other words, there is no potential for voter confusion or dissuasion from voting because the process for submitting an absentee ballot will remain unchanged.”).
  26. See People First of Alabama v. Sec'y of State for Alabama, 815 F. App'x 505 (11th Cir. 2020) (concurrence) (stating that the possible need to provide more training to election workers is not barred by the Purcell principle).
  27. See Common Cause v. Thomsen, No. 19-CV-323-JDP, 2020 WL 5665475, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2020) (“Purcell would not inhibit my granting immediate relief if qualified student voters would actually be disenfranchised, but plaintiffs haven't made that showing.”).
  28. Carson v. Simon, 978 F.3d 1051, 1061 (8th Cir. 2020).
  29. Id. at 1062.
  30. See, e.g., Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Pate, 950 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2020) (concurrence); All. for Retired Americans v. Sec'y of State, 2020 ME 123, 240 A.3d 45 (Maine 2020); League of United Latin Am. Citizens of Iowa v. Pate, 950 N.W.2d 204 (Iowa 2020); Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233, 250, 919 A.2d 1276 (2007); In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 479 Mich. 1, 740 N.W.2d 444 (2007).
  31. See Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018).
  32. See Thomas v. Bryant, 938 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2019).
  33. Id.
  34. Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 112 (1971) (finding no error in court’s decision to allow the election to proceed under an existing court-ordered plan that population shifts had rendered obsolete when the legislature’s proposed plan was unconstitutional and the only other option was to postpone the election until a new court-ordered plan could be devised).
  35. Id. at 113.
  36. Id. at 112.
  37. Id. at 113.
  38. Id.
  39. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018).
  40. League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083, 1083-86 (Pa. 2018).
  41. Id.
  42. As a result, the district court received proposals and held hearings before issuing an interim districting plan. Perez v. Perry, 835 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211-13 (W.D. Tex. 2011). At the time, Texas was a covered jurisdiction subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act which required it to see federal preclearance of its electoral map before it could be used in the upcoming midterm election. Perez, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 211. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the coverage formula in Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
  43. Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 390-91 (2012).
  44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors [to elect the President and Vice President].”). Article I of the Constitution also deals with state authority over election administration. U.S. CONST. art. I, §4, cl. 1 (“[t]he Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof,”). For a more detailed explanation of the difference between these two doctrines, see Michael T. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, 55 GEORGIA L. REV. 1 (2020).
  45. See Morley supra note 44; Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. STATE L. REV. 2 (2001).
  46. See Morley supra note 44 and Smith supra note 45.
  47. Smith supra note 45 at 734 (emphasis in original).
  48. Id. at 736.
  49. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 114 (2000).
  50. Id. at 115.
  51. Id. at 121.
  52. Morley supra note 44 at 86.
  53. Id. at 87.
  54. Scarnati v. Boockvar, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5182 (2020); Republican Party v. Boockvar, 208 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2020); Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2020); Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 2020 Pa. LEXIS 4685 (Pa. 2020).
  55. Scarnati v. Boockvar, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5182 (2020); Republican Party v. Boockvar, 208 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2020).
  56. Id.
  57. Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 1089 (2022).
  58. Tobin for Governor v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 2001).
  59. Id. at 521 (granting absolute immunity to individual members of the state elections board who denied the gubernatorial candidacy nominating petition of a Libertarian Party member because of an insufficient number of qualifying signatures).
  60. Id.
  61. Id. at 522.
  62. Id.
  63. Fair Fight Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger, 413 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1278 (N.D. Ga. 2019); OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 614 (5th Cir. 2017); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398–99 (6th Cir. 1999); Ga. State Conference of NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1275 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
  64. Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398 (6th Cir. 1999).
  65. See, e.g., OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 614 (5th Cir. 2017); Fair Fight Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger, 413 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1278 (N.D. Ga. 2019).
  66. 52 U.S.C.A. § 20511; Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, DEPT. OF JUSTICE 1, 24 (Richard C. Pilger ed., 8th ed. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download (“The following activities provide a basis for federal prosecution under the statutes referenced in each category: …Malfeasance by election officials acting “under color of law” by performing such acts as diluting valid ballots with invalid ones (ballot-box stuffing), rendering false tabulations of votes, or preventing valid voter registrations or votes from being given effect in any election, federal or non-federal (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242), as well as in elections in which federal candidates are on the ballot (52 U.S.C. §§ 10307(c), 10307(e), 20511(2)).”). See also 52 U.S.C.A. § 20701; Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, DEPT. OF JUSTICE 1, 77 (Richard C. Pilger ed., 8th ed. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download (“The retention requirements of Section 20701 are aimed specifically at election administrators. In a parochial sense, these laws place criminally sanctionable duties on election officials.”).
  67. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-46-132; CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18562-3 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5139 (West); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-14-4-1–10 (West); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-14-3-3 (West); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.995 (West); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 119.225 (West); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 119.145 (West); 25 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3525 (West); 25 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3548 (West); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-106 (McKinney); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-106 (McKinney); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.16(a) (West); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.32 (West); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.19(A)(13)-(14), (B) (West) TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-113 (West); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-114 (West).
  68. 2021 Iowa S.F. 413, 98th G.A.; see also Iowa Code Ann. § 721.2 (West 2021).
  69. S.B. 90, 123rd Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021).
  70. H.B. 574, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
  71. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
  72. 52 U.S.C.S. § 10303.
  73. 52 U.S.C.S. § 10302.
  74. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
  75. See Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 673.
  76. See Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 8, 1992 (June 2010).
  77. Governor Northam Approves Voting Rights Act of Virginia, VIRGINIA,GOV (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.governor.virginia.gov/newsroom/all-releases/2021/march/headline-894132-en.html.
  78. Id.

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