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Election Law Manual
Chapter 4: State Regulation of Ballot Measures

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Table of Contents

Subchapter 1: Introduction

Twenty-six states confer on voters the ability to engage in direct democracy through initiative or popular referendum.1 These measures are typically drafted by citizens or organizations and are regulated as to form and content by state statute. This chapter discusses the varied kinds of ballot measures available in different states, how ballot measures are regulated, and common challenges to ballot measures.

Subchapter 2: General Overview

A. Nature of Ballot Measures

Many, but not all,2 states recognize a citizen’s right to place measures on the ballot by one or more of the processes known as initiative,3 referendum,4 and recall.5 In some states, these exercises in direct democracy are a reserved power of the people recognized by the state constitution,6 while in others the ability to propose ballot measures exists only through a legislative grant of authority. 7

The U.S. Constitution does not mandate that states allow their citizens to propose ballot measures,8 but neither does the Constitution prohibit these powers.9 If states offer their citizens the right to propose ballot measures, then the right receives federal constitutional protections because it implicates core political speech. 10 Any subsequent state regulation of the ballot measure process is subject to due process, equal protection, political association, and free speech-based constitutional challenges.11

In general, states regulate ballot measures to further their interests in:

  • preventing fraud,12 and
  • promoting electoral integrity. 13

 

B. Types of Ballot Measures

States offer up to three types of ballot measures: initiative, referendum, and recall. Initiatives are the most common type of ballot measure and the information in this chapter is primarily based on requirements for and challenges to the initiative process.14

Voters can usually use their initiative power to propose legislation,15 amendments to existing legislation,16 or amendments to the state constitution.17

Citizens’ initiative-based legislative power is frequently considered “coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and of equal dignity” with state legislative power.18 Courts that review challenges to these powers generally construe the powers liberally and resolve doubts in favor of granting them to citizens if it is reasonable to do so.19

Citizens use their power of referendum to challenge legislative enactments. A successful referendum prevents the targeted legislation from taking effect. If a referendum petition is not filed within the limited time available for it, or if the referendum fails to pass, the legislation becomes effective.20

Voters use their recall power to hold an election whose goal is unseating an elected official whose term has not yet expired.

Subchapter 3: State Regulation of Ballot Measures

States have great leeway in regulating ballot measures to protect the integrity and reliability of the ballot measures.21 States commonly regulate the process required for the proposed measure to qualify for the ballot and also specify the amount of electoral support a ballot measure must receive in order to pass. To pass, the ballot measure may need to receive:

  • a majority of the total votes cast specifically for or against the ballot measure,22
  • a super-majority of the votes,23
  • approval from a majority of voters who voted on any issue or race on the ballot, not necessarily the specific ballot measure,24 or
  • approval in two election cycles.25

States usually establish a multi-step process that ballot measure proponents must follow to place their proposed measure on the ballot. This section provides a generic overview of the most common requirements to qualify an initiative proposal for the ballot. Referendum or recall proponents may need to follow slightly different processes.

In general, ballot measure proponents must:

  • present election officials with their intent to propose a ballot measure,
  • receive official approval for the proposal, assign a title to the proposed measure, and create a signature petition,
  • meet public support requirements,
  • receive certification for ballot access, and
  • provide election officials with voter education information about the proposal.

Ballot access requirements are challenged on compliance or constitutional grounds. In this section, the legal issues specific to a particular ballot qualification requirement are discussed along with the requirement.26

 

A. Presentation of Intent

State statutes commonly require ballot measure proponents to notify election officials of their intent to propose a ballot measure. Proponents may also be required to register the proposal or classify its operation as:

  • creating a new law,
  • amending the state constitution, or
  • amending an existing law.27

Because a referendum seeks to void legislative enactments, state statutes governing them typically allow only a short time after the legislation’s passage during which its opponents must use the referendum process to overturn the legislation.28 If the referendum proponents’ fail to gather and present the requisite number of petition signatures in the allotted time, no referendum is held, and the legislation becomes effective as scheduled. 29

 

B. Measure Approved/ Title Assigned/ Petition Created

Registered ballot measures are given a title that should convey the proposal’s function,30 but generally does not need to outline every provision.31 Once the title is assigned, ballot measure proponents create and circulate signature petitions.

State statutes usually specify the signature petitions’ format, including their size, structure, wording, layout, and contents.32 In addition, signature petitions generally must provide prospective signers with enough information about the proposal to allow them to understand what they are being asked to support.33

Petitions are frequently invalidated if they fail to follow form and content requirements.34

 

C. Petition Circulation

The power to propose initiative, referendum, or recall measures is meaningless if the proposals never gain ballot access.35 Circulating petitions to gather voters’ signatures is usually an essential step to qualify a ballot measure for the ballot because it is the most common method ballot measure proponents must use to demonstrate the public’s support for their proposal.36 A state’s interest in electoral integrity and preventing fraud allow it some latitude to regulate petition circulation. Common petition-related state regulations include those that govern the following:

  • A. circulators,
  • B. signatures, and
  • C. petition witnesses.

State laws that substantially restrict ballot access by imposing burdensome petition requirements are subject to strict scrutiny 37 because petition signature gathering is constitutionally protected “core political speech.”38 Strict scrutiny requires the state to demonstrate that its regulation is narrowly drawn and the least restrictive means possible to achieve a compelling state interest.

State statutes that cannot meet this test are unconstitutional.39

 

1. Circulator Requirements

The Constitution protects petition circulation because petition circulators engage in one-on-one political communication when they ask individuals to sign a petition supporting a proposed ballot measure.40 State regulation of petition circulation that discourages or limits the number of potential petition circulators directly impact the ballot measure proponent’s ability to communicate its message, and may be unconstitutional.41 Courts analyze the impact of a state’s petition circulator regulations by considering how many potential petition circulators would be disqualified if the regulation is given its full force and effect.42

Petition circulators are nonetheless subject to some state regulation and can be held personally accountable if they fail to comply with legitimate controls.43 To date, the Supreme Court has ruled on the following state petition circulation regulations:

  • limitations on payments to petition circulators,44
  • identification requirements,45
  • registered voter requirements,46 and
  • age requirements.47

The Supreme Court has ruled that states may not prohibit all payment to petition circulators,48 but has not specifically addressed whether states can prohibit per signature payments. One federal court held a state’s per signature payment ban constitutional because it alleviated known fraud.49 Another federal court overturned a state ban on per signature payments because the state could only speculate that allowing per signature payment would increase fraud.50

Because the First Amendment protects the right to engage in anonymous political speech, states may not require petition circulators to wear name tags.51

States also cannot require petition circulators to be registered voters.52 Those who are not, however, cannot sign the petition’s validating affidavit if state law requires validation by a registered voter.53

States may require petition circulators to be adults because age is a common proxy for maturity, and the circulator’s maturity is reasonably related to a state’s interest in preserving electoral integrity.54 In addition, age is a neutral standard that only temporarily postpones an individual’s petition circulation opportunities.55

 

2. Signature Requirements

State petition signature-related regulations commonly include the following:

  • numerical requirements,
  • geographic distribution requirements, and
  • restrictions on who may sign the petition.

 

a. Numerical Requirements

State law specifies how many signatures ballot measure proponents must gather to gain ballot access for their proposal. The number is commonly a specified percentage of registered voters 56 or a percentage of those who voted in a recent election 57 of the last gubernatorial election. Ballot measure proponents may be prohibited from filing amended or supplemental petitions after the initial deadline to submit signatures passes,58 so it is essential they initially submit the proper number of signatures.

Ballot measure proponents who must submit a number of signatures equal to a percentage of voters who participated in a past election may ask the court to determine the appropriate measuring election when the signature collection period extends over more than one election. One court held that the measuring election was the one that occurred directly preceding the petition submission date, rather than the election held directly preceding the date the petition process began.59 In this case, voter turnout had significantly increased during the second election, the ballot measure’s proponents did not submit enough signatures to meet the higher requirement, and the proposed ballot measure failed to earn ballot access.60

 

b. Geographic Distribution Requirements

Some states require ballot measure proponents to gather supporting signatures from throughout the area that would be affected by the enacted measure.61 These geographical distribution requirements are vulnerable to Equal Protection Clause challenges,62 especially if the signature distribution requirements give sparsely populated rural areas a disproportionate veto power even when the measure enjoys widespread overall support.63 For example, an Equal Protection violation occurred when ballot measure proponents were required to submit supporting petitions from half the state’s forty-four counties, notwithstanding the fact that sixty percent of the state’s population was concentrated in only nine counties.64

When reviewing geographic signature distribution requirements for potential constitutional violations, a court analyzes:

  • the number of political subdivisions that must be represented,
  • the signature requirements for each subdivision compared to the total statewide requirement, and
  • the state’s population distribution. 65

 

c. Restrictions on Who May Sign the Petition

States commonly require petition signers to be legal voters. Courts may be asked to determine the qualifications a legal voter must possess. One court held that a newly registered voter was not a legal voter until the permanent voter registrar received and acknowledged the voter registration form.66 Under this definition, individuals who signed a petition at the same time they completed their voter registration applications were not legal voters, hence their petition signatures were invalid.67 Another court held that a voter who moved without updating his voter registration application was not qualified to sign a petition because he was no longer a “registered qualified voter.” Although registered at his old address, he was no longer qualified to vote there and though he was qualified to vote in his new precinct, he was not registered there.68

 

3. Witness/Attestation Requirements

Individual petition signatures or the petition as a whole may need to be witnessed or attested. State statutes may set qualification requirements for the individual who serves as a witness.69 Failure to comply with these requirements may invalidate individual signatures or the entire petition. 70

 

D. Certification for Ballot Access

If timely submitted petitions meet all format, content, circulator, signature, attestation, and other requirements, then the ballot measure should be certified and placed on the ballot.

 

E. Required Ballot Information

State laws usually specify the information voters must receive about ballot measures before they vote.71 States generally require this information to be printed on the ballot and posted or otherwise available at the polling place.72

Subchapter 4: Court Involvement in Ballot Measure Issues

Ballot measure-related challenges come before the court as procedural or substantive challenges. Before courts evaluate ballot measure challenges, however, they must first consider whether review is appropriate.73 In general, pre-election review of procedural challenges is appropriate.74 Many courts take a different approach to pre-election review of substantive challenges, although the majority of them conduct pre-election review under some circumstances.75

 

A. Procedural Challenges

Procedural challenges to a state’s ballot measure process generally take one of two forms:

  • disputes over whether the proponents met the compliance requirements, and
  • constitutional challenges to the requirements themselves.

A ballot measure’s proponents or opponents 76 may file a compliance-based procedural challenge to an administrative decision permitting or denying initial approval of a ballot measure or a subsequent decision on ballot access.77 In such instances, ballot measure proponents usually claim that the ballot measure satisfied all applicable requirements for approval or ballot access but was nonetheless denied a spot on the ballot. The ballot measure’s opponents, on the other hand, claim the ballot measure failed to qualify for ballot access and should be denied ballot access or be removed from the ballot.78 Unless election officials’ decisions to grant or deny ballot access to a ballot measure is administratively unreviewable, states may require plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative review avenues before filing a compliance-based lawsuit.

Occasionally, even if all administrative review is exhausted, court review may be limited or unavailable.79 Compliance-based procedural ballot measure challenges may be subject to laches, even when they are filed before the election. Laches arises when the plaintiff’s delay in suing prejudices another party.80 For example, a court applied laches to dismiss a lawsuit because the plaintiff waited more than two months before challenging election officials’ decision that the referendum petition contained too few valid signatures to qualify for the ballot. 81 In addition, compliance-based procedural disputes may be mooted if they are not filed until after the election.82

When courts hear these compliance-based procedural challenges, they may issue an order to compel ballot access for a measure that was wrongfully denied or to compel denial of approval or removal of a measure from the ballot where approval was granted in error.83

A second type of procedural challenge attacks the constitutionality of the procedural requirements. Constitutional challenges to specific requirements are addressed in the discussion of individual ballot measure requirements, above.84

Additionally, some courts have granted procedural relief in the face of emergencies, such as with the COVID-19 pandemic.85

 

B. Substantive Challenges

Many states do not allow their citizens to propose initiatives on the full range of issues addressable by state legislators. States that restrict their citizens’ legislative authority frequently impose subject matter requirements that limit initiatives to defined arenas, such as enacting laws or proposing constitutional amendments, or limit proposals to a single subject or amendment.86 Substantive challenges usually allege that the ballot measure’s topic or function oversteps these state-imposed boundaries. Although ballot measures should generally receive ballot access if their proponents satisfied all necessary procedural requirements, the measure’s substantive validity may be considered separately, and ballot access may be denied for substantive flaws.87

Unlike most other areas of election law where pre-election review is universally favored, pre-election review of an initiative’s substance may be disfavored. In many, but not all, states substantive or content-based challenges are commonly reserved for post-election review,88 unless the measure is clearly invalid 89 or serious consequences “will result” if the review were postponed until after the election.90

A measure may be clearly invalid because its proposal is unconstitutional under the state or federal Constitution or because the proposal strays outside the recognized topics for ballot measures.91 Thus, courts may deny ballot access to ballot measures that do not propose laws, constitutional amendments, or referenda, especially where the proposed measure is primarily designed to allow voters to “express themselves”92 in a straw poll.93

Courts that conduct pre-election substantive reviews of proposed initiatives sometimes highlight the distinctions between the initiative process and the legislative process to distinguish why the court will conduct a pre-enactment review of the initiative although it would defer a pre-enactment review of pending legislation. One difference courts have mentioned is that once an initiative has been submitted to the voters, its language is unalterable, but legislation can be amended at any point in the legislative process until it is enacted.94 Courts may also conduct pre-election review because of institutional concerns, particularly—as mentioned above—when the initiative is advanced to assess popular opinion.95

  • When courts defer their review until after the election, they commonly do so based on the following grounds:
  • a pre-election opinion would be advisory only,96
  • judicial economy is preserved by waiting to see if the measure passes before reviewing it,97 or
  • separation of powers requires the court to limit its pre-election review of initiatives just as the court does not conduct a pre-enactment review of the legislature’s actions.98

The most frequently alleged substantive violations of the citizenry’s initiative power are discussed below.

 

1. Single Issue

States frequently require that initiative proposals create a single statute or constitutional amendment.99 Single-issue 100 requirements prevent logrolling by allowing voters to separately approve or reject each proposition or amendment.101 Single-issue rule violations occur when multiple amendments or statutes masquerade as one. A single-issue rule violation is suggested when a proposed amendment or statute’s subparts:

  • do not need to stand or fall as a whole,
  • do not add to the consistency or workability of the entire constitution, or
  • do not appear likely to gather equal voter support if separately presented.102

Some states allow pre-election review for single-issue violations 103 and some do not.104 In states that allow review, courts can order initiative proposals that violate single-issue requirements kept off or removed from the ballot.105

 

2. Constitutional Amendment vs. Revision

Citizens can generally use their initiative power to amend, but not revise, the state constitution. 106 Amendment and revision are two distinct procedures.107 Amendments operate “within the line” of the original constitution 108 by bringing changes that must logically stand or fall as a whole and make the amended constitution consistent and workable in its entirety.109 Amendments improve or better carry out the constitution’s original purpose.110 Constitutional revisions, in contrast, operate “beyond the line” of the existing constitution 111 by substantially altering the original constitution’s purpose or objective.112

A court may need to determine whether a proposed initiative would amend or revise the state constitution. One court determined a challenged proposal—which ran to fifty-six pages—was either a revision or a new constitution and not an amendment because the proposal thoroughly overhauled the existing constitution and was a complete constitution in itself.113 Another court determined a challenged proposal was not an amendment in part because the proposal would have entirely repealed or substantially altered fifteen of the twenty-five articles in the existing constitution.114

 

3. Measure Exceeds Legislative Authority

Many states limit their citizen’s legislative power. Depending on an individual state’s constitution and statutes, a proposed initiative may exceed the citizenry’s legislative ability when it:

  • appropriates funds,115
  • performs administrative tasks,116
  • expresses wishes rather than directly enacts legislation,117
  • renders an administrative decision,118
  • adjudicates a dispute,119 or
  • seeks to repeal or rescind existing legislation.120

In states that recognize pre-election administrative or judicial review of an initiative to ensure it remains within legal limits, courts can remove a non-complying measure from the ballot or uphold an administrative decision denying ballot access.121

 

4. Constitutionality

State courts differ in whether they have the authority to conduct a pre-election review of a proposed ballot measure’s constitutionality. Although a majority of courts will only review the constitutionality of an initiative after it has been enacted,122 other courts have decided they will:

  • review, but allow the ballot measure to appear on the ballot even if the court believes the ballot measure to be unconstitutional in whole or in part,123
  • review and prohibit a clearly unconstitutional ballot measure from appearing on the ballot.124

Whether courts may review a proposal’s constitutionality may also depend on whether it is alleged to violate the state or the federal Constitution.125

Subchapter 5: Conclusion

Direct democracy states regulate the ballot measure process, often extensively, and at every stage. Regulations vary state by state. These nuances impact the nature of litigation—procedural or substantive—brought before the courts.

Footnotes

  1. See NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, Initiative and Referendum States, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states.aspx, (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (listing state-by-state information on the initiative and referendum processes available).
  2. Id.
  3. A voter-proposed statute or constitutional amendment that is placed on the ballot by petition. Citizens use initiatives to bypass their governmental representatives and enact change directly.
  4. A process by which voters may petition to demand a popular vote on a new law passed by the legislature.
  5. A process where citizens may attempt to remove an elected official from office at any time. Typically, the recall process consists of gathering a certain number of signatures on a petition in a certain amount of time.
  6. MONT. CONST. ART. 5, § 11.
  7. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.040; see, e.g., Hoyle v. Priest, 59 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835 (W.D. Ark. 1999) (After removal of amendment from ballot for insufficient signatures, plaintiff sued secretary of state for alleged deprivation of right to petition government, violation of Voting Rights Act, and violations of U.S. Const. Court dismissed, holding claims did not implicate Voting Rights Act because signing petition was not tantamount to voting. No violation of Const. because laws requiring petition signers be voters did not restrict core political speech).
  8. Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1997). See Pac. States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (challenging the initiative process as a violation of the Guarantee Clause because it was an exercise in direct democracy, not republican government, and holding that whether initiative powers violate the Guarantee Clause is a non-justiciable political question).
  9. See Pac. States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 223 U.S. at 118 (finding legal challenges to state’s recognition of ballot measures premised on the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause are non-justiciable political questions).
  10. See Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1101 (Utah 2002) (Thorne, J., dissenting).
  11. Id.
  12. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. 525 U.S. 182, 204 n.23 (1999).
  13. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 197 (2010).
  14. See NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 1.
  15. See, e.g., ME. CONST. ART. IV, pt. 3, § 18(1) (“The electors may propose to the Legislature for its consideration any bill …”).
  16. See, e.g., NEV. CONST. ART. 19, § 2 (“[T]he people reserve to themselves the power to propose, by initiative petition, statutes and amendments to statutes…”).
  17. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. ART. 21 § 1 (“Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either house of the legislature, or by initiative petition signed by a number of qualified electors equal to fifteen per centum of the total number of votes for all candidates for governor at the last preceding general election…”).
  18. Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1080 (citation omitted).
  19. Legis. Of State of Cal. V. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 35 (Cal. 1983) (per curiam) (Richardson, J., dissenting).
  20. See Initiative and Referendum Process, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES. https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-and-referendum-processes.aspx#/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).
  21. Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191 (1999) (noting agreement with Am. Const. Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092 (1997), which upheld Colorado’s age restriction, six-month circulation limit, and affidavit requirements on initiative petitions).
  22. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-1801C.
  23. M.G.L.A. CONST. AMEND. ART. 48, Init., Pt. 4, § 5.
  24. ILL. CONST. ART. 14, § 3.
  25. NEV. CONST. ART. 19, § 2.
  26. Common general procedural and substantive ballot measure legal challenges are discussed in Section III of this chapter.
  27. If ballot measure proponents fail to classify their measure when required to do so, the failure may be fatal to their efforts because the lack of classification prevents petition signers from knowing what they are supporting. See Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 124 (Nev. 1992) (finding that the ballot measure proponent, not the Secretary of State, is responsible for crafting the proposal into proper legislative or constitutional form).
  28. See Initiative, Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).
  29. See State ex rel. Alexander v. Brown, 554 N.E. 2d 125 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
  30. See Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 290 (Wyo. 1994).
  31. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 19-102.
  32. OKLA. CONST. ART. 5, § 2; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2; MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-17-17; § 23-17- 19; WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-24-304, 310-11 (1977).
  33. See Stumpf, 839 P.2d at 124 (holding that proposed state constitutional amendments must be presented to would-be petition signers as amendments and not as “mere laws nor as a loosely worded aggregate of ideas and philosophical ruminations.”).
  34. See State ex rel. Vickers v. Summit County Council, 777 N.E.2d 830, 834 (Ohio 2002) (per curiam) (holding that the city council was not legally required to submit the measure for voter approval where the petition’s obsolete election falsification statement was more than mere technical non-compliance).
  35. See Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1081 (Utah 2002) (finding that signing a petition is “inextricably connected” to the voter’s right to vote because signing the petition serves a “gate keeping function” on the right to vote).
  36. See NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 20.
  37. Hoyle v. Priest, 59 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836 (W.D. Ark. 1999) (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988)).
  38. Meyer, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988). But see Hoyle v. Priest, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (finding petition requirements that do not impact the ability to communicate a message, restrict petition circulation, impact the ability to communicate with voters, or regulate the content of speech do not impact core political speech).
  39. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (Laws that burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest); see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 206 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring).
  40. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 415 (1988).
  41. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 199.
  42. See Meyer, 486 U.S. 414 (striking down a ban on the use of paid petition circulators under threat of criminal penalty because, among other things, it would limit the number of voices who could speak on behalf of the proposed measure.); Buckley, 525 U.S. at 193 n.15 (striking down requirements that petition circulators be registered voters and wear name tags because the requirements would limit the pool of potential circulators by 400,000–964,000 individuals, and thus the voices who could convey the proponent’s message).
  43. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 192 n.11.
  44. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 415.
  45. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 186.
  46. Id. at 195-96.
  47. Id. at 191.
  48. Meyer, 486 U.S. 414 (striking down a statute criminalizing the use of paid petition circulators for ballot measures and noting that no such ban was in force for candidacy petition circulators).
  49. See Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the prohibition on per signature payment served the important state interest in preventing forgery and fraud).
  50. See Term Limits Leadership Council, Inc. v. Clark, 984 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (granting summary judgment to plaintiffs and finding a constitutional violation in prohibition on per signature payments and requirement that petition circulators be qualified electors of the state because the state offered only speculation and not proof that these requirements were necessary to deter fraud).
  51. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 197-98 (opining that the desire to engage in anonymous speech is greatest when the ballot proposal is controversial).
  52. Id. at 194 (requiring the circulator to be a registered voter diminishes the potential for political speech and the state’s interest in deterring lawbreakers among circulators can be accomplished in other ways, but not addressing whether the state could require petition circulators to be state residents because the issue was not raised).
  53. Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 124 (Nev. 1992).
  54. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 191 n.10 (noting Am. Const. Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092 which upheld the state’s requirement that petition circulators must be at least eighteen years old was not appealed).
  55. Id. at 191 n.10 (noting this portion of Am. Const. Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092 was not appealed).
  56. ARK. CONST. ART. 5, § 1.
  57. ARIZ. CONST. ART. 21 § 1.
  58. IDAHO CODE § 34-1813.
  59. See Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281 (Wyo. 1994) (finding the ballot measure proponents failed to meet higher petition signature requirements because the date of final petition submission controlled the election to which the signature requirement was benchmarked, which here enjoyed greatly increased voter turnout).
  60. See id.
  61. OHIO CONST. ART. II, § 1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-201 (LexisNexis 2021).
  62. The state constitution may provide greater Equal Protection guarantees than the U.S. Constitution.
  63. See Idaho Coal. United for Bears v. Cenarrussa 342 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003); Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1095 (Utah 2002).
  64. Idaho Coal. United for Bears, 342 F.3d 1073. See also Gallivan, 54 P.3d at 1088 (finding state Equal Protection and uniform operation of laws violations in a petition signature requirement that gave disproportionate power to lightly populated rural counties).
  65. See Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding no valid distinction between ballot access for a candidate and ballot access for an initiative measure when determining if an equal protection violation exists).
  66. See Hoyle v. Priest, 59 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830 (W.D. Ark. 1999).
  67. See id.
  68. See Schaaf v. Beattie, 265 Cal. App. 2d 904, 910 (Ct. App. 1968) (noting voter’s remedy was to register in his precinct and then to sign the petition).
  69. OR. REV. STAT. § 250.045 (2021).
  70. See State ex rel. Newell v. Tuscarawas County Bd. of Elections, 757 N.E.2d 1135, 1142 (Ohio 2001) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (holding where wife signed petition for her husband, witness’s claim to have witnessed both signatures was incorrect and entire part-petition was stricken for failure of proper witnessing); Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 124 (Nev. 1992) (finding where a petition circulator did not have to be a registered voter, but all “signers” did, when circulator signed the validating affidavit, his signature invalidated the entire petition).
  71. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-7-207–09; § 20A-6-107.
  72. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9004 (West 2021).
  73. State ex rel. Fidanque v. Paulus, 688 P.2d 1303 (Or. 1984) (discussing the ballot qualification process for initiatives and limitations on the court’s pre-election review of initiatives); see Tilson v. Mofford, 737 P.2d 1367 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) (noting the court’s pre-election authority to intervene and enjoin a ballot measure is limited to situations where the measure is defective in form, fails to meet signature requirements or is procedurally deficient).
  74. Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224, 1228 (Nev. 2006).
  75. Calzone v. Ashcroft, 559 S.W.3d 32, 34 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).
  76. In some states, any registered voter may object to a ballot measure. See Ellis v. Roberts, 725 P.2d 886, 889 (Or. 1986) (noting that because the potential plaintiff pool exceeded one million registered voters, determining if any individual plaintiff had standing was a waste of time).
  77. In addition to the procedural steps outlined earlier in this chapter, any additional procedures the state requires can also provide the basis for a compliance-based challenge.
  78. Note that opponents sue the state officer, generally the Secretary of State, who authorized the ballot measure, and not the ballot measure proponents, although they may be able to intervene.
  79. See Hoyle v. Priest, 59 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (W.D. Ark. 1999) (finding that the court could not review the decision of the Secretary of State to deny to the petition on insufficient signature grounds because the court only had authority to do so after the petition was fully certified in all respects, including signature requirements and ballot title, and that the court could not offer the requested relief).
  80. Laches occurs when the plaintiff’s delay in bringing a lawsuit prejudices—harms—another party. In an election context, prejudice may occur when election deadlines pass. See State ex rel. Fidanque v. Paulus, 688 P.2d 1303, 1307-08 (Or. 1984) (expressing a wariness of last-minute challenges because of prejudice to the defendant and petition circulators and the unreasonable burden placed on the court, which is placed in the position of having to “steamroll” through “delicate legal issues,” so the deadline for fixing the ballot can be met) (citation omitted). See infra Chapter 10: Statutes of Limitations and Laches for additional information on laches.
  81. See State ex rel. Alexander v. Brown, 554 N.E.2d 125, 127-28 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (finding the ballot creation deadlines and immovable election date justified laches).
  82. See, e.g., Quarles v. Kozubowski, 507 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (noting the validity of petitions is supposed to be challenged pre-election so that the trouble and expense of an election is spared if the petition fails and to ensure the challenger does not gamble on the outcome of the election, but allowing the post-election challenge to a liquor control petition to proceed because its passage damaged the challenger and the case had substantial public interest).
  83. See, e.g., Election Litigation: Ballot Measures, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, https://www.fjc.gov/content/ballot-measures (showing a variety of federal cases that both grant and deny ballot access for ballot measures).
  84. See Montero v. Meyer, 13 F.3d 1444, 1448 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluded appellees lacked any legitimate liberty interest entitlement to participate in title board hearings); and Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1997) (Appellants had no constitutionally protected right to place issues before the electorate or any state right to prior notice of exact number of signatures required to place an initiative on ballot); Hoyle v. Priest, 59 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837 (W.D. Ark. 1999) (finding no federal constitutionally protected right to have one’s own ballot title used).
  85. The requirement for ballot qualification for initiatives and referendums became more difficult to satisfy in light of COVID-19 and the related shutdowns and restrictions. Many groups asked for relief in light of the pandemic, yet the courts, often applying the Anderson-Burdick test, have lacked sympathy, disregarding pleas for leniency for the most part. See Sinner v. Jeager, Case No.3:20-cv-00076 (D. N. Dakota 2020); Morgan v. White, 964 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2020); Miller v. Thurston, 967 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir. 2020).
  86. See MICH. CONST. ART. 2, § 9 (initiative power extends only to laws which the legislature may enact); NEB. REV. ST. § 32-1408 (no measures that interfere with the legislature’s ability to direct taxation of necessary revenues); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (single-subject restriction).
  87. See State ex rel. Fidanque v. Paulus, 688 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Or. 1984); Lowe v. Keisling, 882 P.2d 91, 99 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc); Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 286 (Wyo. 1994) (finding pre-enactment challenges are justiciable “if the initiative addresses subject matter that is excluded from or proscribed by the initiative process as delineated in the constitutional measure”); Foster v. Citizens for Union Avenue, 790 P.2d 1, 4 (Or. 1990) (finding proper compliance alone is insufficient to place a measure on the ballot where it is otherwise legally insufficient to qualify, here because the measure proposes an administrative, and not a legislative, matter).
  88. See Tilson v. Mofford, 737 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) (noting that a procedural violation must be reviewed pre-election, while substantive legality is reviewable only post-election and then only when it is an issue in a specific case).
  89. Legislature of the State of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 33 (Cal. 1983) (per curiam) (Richardson, J., dissenting); Am. Fed. of Labor-Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 615 n.11 (Cal. 1984) (finding that although the court based its review on the grounds that the initiative exceeded the people’s initiative powers, other cases have suggested that under its equitable discretion powers, courts may conduct a pre-election review “upon a compelling showing that the substantive provisions of the initiative are clearly invalid.”) (citations omitted). Note that the majority rule allows pre- election review under these circumstances. See also Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 286 (Wyo. 1994) (noting that courts with a history of denying ballot access to proposed initiatives because the electorate has no right to enact an unconstitutional law may review proposed initiative on that basis alone).
  90. See Legislature of the State of Calif., 669 P.2d at 20-21 (noting that if review of the proposed redistricting plan was postponed until post-election, upcoming elections based on the redistricting plan would be significantly impacted, the special election called to vote on the plan would cost fifteen million dollars and the proposed changes would be difficult to implement and publicize in time for orderly elections).
  91. See Am. Fed. of Labor-Congress of Indus. Orgs., 686 P.2d at 615.
  92. See Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 122 (Nev. 1992) (holding term limits initiative did not fall into proper subject matter and thus was not qualified to appear on the ballot); American Federal of Labor-Congress of Indus. Orgs., 686 P.2d at 613 (noting that initiatives are the means to enact legislation and are not public opinion polls).
  93. Straw poll, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining a straw poll as a “nonbinding vote, taken as a way of informally gauging support or opposition but usu. without a formal motion or debate”).
  94. See Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League, 881 P.2d at 289 (noting the amendment processes and compromises inherent in the legislative process that are missing in an initiative because once the initiative has been enacted by the voters, its language is immutable).
  95. See Stumpf, 839 P.2d at 126.
  96. Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League, 881 P.2d at 286; Lowe v. Keisling, 882 P.2d 91, 99 (Or. App. 1994) (en banc); Foster v. Citizens for Union Avenue, 790 P.2d 1, 4 (Or. 1990).
  97. Foster v. Clark, 790 P.2d 1, 4 (Or. 1990).
  98. See Tilson v. Mofford, 737 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc).
  99. See id. at 1370 (state constitution contains a single-issue requirement). Note that closely related subparts may be included in the proposal.
  100. Sometimes known as “single subject” requirements.
  101. Tilson,737 P.2d at 1370; McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 797 (Cal. 1948) (en banc). Logrolling combines dissimilar propositions into a single statute or amendment in the hopes that voters will support the whole because they favor one distinct part of it.
  102. Id. at 1370.
  103. See Or. Educ. Ass’n v. Roberts 721 P.2d 833, 834 (finding that a change in the wording of the state constitution now requires the Secretary of State to determine whether an initiative complies with the single subject rule before voters adopt it).
  104. See Tilson, 737 P.2d at 1369 (stating court’s power to enjoin an initiative proposal is limited to cases where the petition 1) is defective in form, 2) contains an insufficient number of signatures, or 3) procedure was not followed).
  105. See Roberts, 721 P.2d 833, 834.
  106. Special rules may also apply when the state legislature wants to revise the constitution.
  107. McFadden, 196 P.2d at 797-98 (noting that the electorate may vote on amendments presented by initiative, but that constitutional revisions must first be articulated and ratified by a constitutional convention before they are presented to the electorate for final approval).
  108. Id. at 799.
  109. Tilson, 737 P.2d at 1370.
  110. McFadden, 196 P.2d at 799.
  111. Id. at 796 (noting that where fifteen of the twenty-five articles in the existing state constitution would be entirely repealed or substantially altered by the proposed amendment, at least four new topics would be added, and both the judicial and legislative branches would have powers extensively curtailed, the proposition was not an amendment as was claimed, but a wholesale revision of the state constitution that could not be presented via initiative).
  112. Id. at 799.
  113. Holmes v. Appling, 392 P.2d 636, 639 (Or. 1964) (en banc).
  114. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 796 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
  115. Dorsey v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 648 A.2d 675 (D.C. 1994) (seeking to reduce parking fines and providing amnesty for other parking violations).
  116. Foster v. Citizens for Union Avenue, 790 P.2d 1 (Or. 1990) (renaming a street). Although it may be difficult to distinguish legislative from administrative matters, as a rule, legislative matters make permanent laws of general applicability while administrative matters implement the general rules.
  117. Am. Fed. of Labor-Congress of Indus. Orgs v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 623 (Cal. 1984) (ordering the state legislature to apply for a constitutional convention). If the topic can be enacted directly through an initiative, citizens should do so directly rather than utilize an initiative to order the legislature to act on their behalf.
  118. Id. at 627.
  119. Id.
  120. Schaefer v. Vill. Bd. of Vill. of Potosi, Grant County, 501 N.W.2d 901, 902 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (using referendum powers that were no longer available to the electorate).
  121. Dorsey v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 648 A.2d 675 (D.C. 1994).
  122. See Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 286 (Wyo. 1994) (listing cases in which state courts have decided that pre-election challenges to an initiative’s constitutionality are not justiciable).
  123. See Greater Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce v. Del Papa, 802 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Nev. 1990) (noting the court has never voided a ballot measure because it might violate the U.S. Constitution in the future); Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League, 881 P.2d at 289 (finding proposed ballot measure needed to be unconstitutional in toto before it would be enjoined from the ballot, especially where it had a severability clause); Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 127 (Nev. 1992) (Steffen, J., dissenting) (finding that the court’s own prior decisions hold that it may enjoin the measure when it is unconstitutional, “nugatory,” or “incapable of being made operative,” but is not required to do so) (emphasis in original).
  124. See Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League, 881 P.2d at 286 (listing cases in which state courts have allowed pre-election constitutional challenges because the electorate has no right to enact unconstitutional laws).
  125. Stumpf, 839 P.2d at 122 (review federal and state); Legislature of State of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 26 (Cal. 1983) (per curiam) (review federal and state); Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League, 881 P.2d at 288 (review federal and state); Greater Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce v. Del Papa, 802 P.2d 1280, 1281-82 (Nev. 1990) (review state only as it is “unwise” to void a ballot measure that might be in violation of the federal constitution).

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