Arkansas Cases September 23, 2024: Morris v. Coleman

Case Description

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RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

This Recommended Disposition (“RD”) has been sent to United States District Judge Brian S. Miller. You may file objections if you disagree with the findings and conclusions set out in the RD. Objections should be specific, include the factual or legal basis for the objection, and must be filed within fourteen days. If you do not object, you risk waiving the right to appeal questions of fact, and Judge Miller can adopt this RD without independently reviewing the record.

I. Summary

On April 18, 2024, Petitioner Monica Morris filed a § 2254 habeas petition, arguing that the “wrong Monica Morris” is in custody. Doc. 1 . For reasons

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explained below, her petition should be dismissed as time-barred and procedurally defaulted.

II. Background

On August 6, 2021, Ms. Morris pleaded guilty, in Poinsett County Circuit Court, to possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to 72 months of probation. Docs. 20-5, 20-6. On August 23, 2023, Ms. Morris' probation was revoked, resulting in a 72-month sentence in the ADC. Doc. 20-2 . She did not seek appellate or post-conviction relief on either her original conviction or probation revocation. Docs. 20-3.

Ms. Morris' petition asserts that the “wrong Monica Morris” is in custody because she has been mistaken for her similarly-named cousin. Docs. 1, 9.

Respondent argues that Ms. Morris' petition is time-barred, procedurally defaulted, and meritless. Doc. 20. On September 3, 2024, Ms. Morris replied but addressed none of Respondent's arguments for dismissal. Doc. 22.

The petition is now ripe for review.

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III. Discussion

Ms. Morris' petition is clearly time-barred (as to the original conviction) and procedurally defaulted (as to the revocation sentence). And Ms. Morris provides no evidence or legal argument to support equitable tolling or to excuse her procedural default.

A. Time Bar

Generally, a state prisoner challenging a state court conviction in federal court must file a petition for habeas relief within one year after the state “judgment of conviction becomes final” by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Under Arkansas law, a defendant who enters a guilty plea gives up the right to a direct appeal the conviction, so the conviction becomes final thirty days after the judgment is filed. Ark. R. App. P. Crim. 1 and 2(a)(1); Camacho v. Hobbs , 774 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 2015).

Ms. Morris entered a guilty plea on August 6, 2021, and the judgment was entered that same day. Doc. 20-3 . Thirty days later, on Monday, September 6, 2021, the conviction became final. Absent any applicable periods for statutory or equitable tolling, Ms. Morris had one year from that date - September 6, 2022 - to file her federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Ms. Morris filed her federal habeas petition on April 18, 2024. Because Ms. Morris did not file a Rule 37 petition in state court before the one-year limitations

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period expired, she is not entitled to any statutory tolling. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (providing that the one-year limitations period is tolled while a “properly filed” Rule 37 Petition for post-conviction relief is pending in state court).

This action is time-barred unless Ms. Morris can establish: (1) a legal basis for equitably tolling the one-year limitations period; or (2) her “actual innocence.” She has presented no legal basis for tolling, and, as discussed below, she fails to meet the actual innocence standard.

Ms. Morris' habeas challenge to her August 6, 2021 conviction is time-barred.

B. Procedural Default

Before filing a § 2254 habeas petition, a state prisoner must “fairly present” the substance of each federal habeas claim in state court. Murphy v. King , 652 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”); Perry v. Kemna , 356 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2004) (“To avoid a procedural default, a habeas petitioner must ‘present the same facts and legal theories to the state court that he later presents to the federal courts.'”); Miller v. Lock , 108 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[B]oth the factual grounds and legal theories on which the claim is based must have been

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presented to the highest state court in order to preserve the claim for federal review.”).

The judgment was entered for Ms. Morris' revocation sentence on August 24, 2023. Tr. 20-3. Ms. Morris did not appeal. To date, Ms. Morris has not filed a Rule 37 petition, and the time to do so has expired. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c)(i) (requiring a Rule 37 petition from judgment of conviction to be filed within 90 days of the entry of judgment).

When a petitioner fails to fully exhaust her claims in state court and the time for doing so has expired, her claims are procedurally defaulted. Murphy , 652 F.3d at 849. Federal review of procedurally defaulted claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate: (1) “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law”; or (2) “that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,” that is, a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction and continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent. Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).

Ms. Morris makes no effort to establish “cause and prejudice” and, for reasons below, her conclusory claim that she is the “wrong Monica Morris” does not support the “actual innocence” exception to procedural default.

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Ms. Morris' habeas challenge to her August 23, 2023 probation revocation and sentence is procedurally defaulted.

C. Actual Innocence Exception

The only possible gateway for consideration of Ms. Morris' time-barred and procedurally defaulted claims is a reliable showing of actual innocence. McQuiggin v. Perkins , 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013) (holding that actual innocence “serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or [the] expiration of the statute of limitations.” However, a threshold showing of actual innocence requires new, credible evidence sufficient enough that no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 393. Ms. Morris fails to present new, credible evidence.

First, since the day she was charged, Ms. Morris has known and could have argued that the state was prosecuting the wrong person. Doc. 20-4 . The only evidence Ms. Morris presents is her conclusory statement that the “wrong Monica Morris” is in custody. This argument has been available to her for years.

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Second, Ms. Morris' claim is unreliable. If Ms. Morris were, in fact, the “wrong Monica Morris,” surely she would have raised the issue: (1) before pleading guilty in 2021; (2) while she was on probation for two years; or (3) before her probation was revoked and she was sentenced to prison. Instead, Ms. Morris makes this assertion, for the first time, over three-and-a-half years after she was originally charged and eight months after receiving a prison sentence. Finally, despite lodging many complaints while on probation, Ms. Morris never told her supervising officer that she was the “wrong Monica Morris.” Ms. Morris' lack of diligence and inexcusable delay “seriously undermine the credibility of [her] actual-innocence claim.” McQuiggin , 569 U.S. at 400.

Nothing in the current record comes close to suggesting “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Brownlow v. Grouse , 66 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Schlup v. Delo , 513 U.S. 298, 322 (1995)).

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IV. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Monica Morris' petition and amended petition for writ of habeas corpus ( Docs. 1, 9 ) be dismissed.