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California Cases September 10, 2019: People v. P.R. (In re P.R.)

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Court: California Court of Appeals
Date: Sept. 10, 2019

Case Description

In re P.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
P.R., Defendant and Appellant.

H046227

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

September 10, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court , rule 8.1115(a) , prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published , except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 17JV42302A)

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the minor, P.R., admitted that he willfully inflicted corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)); committed misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243, subd. (a)); committed misdemeanor exhibiting a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(1)); committed an assault with a deadly weapon and personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon during the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022, subd. (b)(1)); and made misdemeanor criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422). The juvenile court adjudged the minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation with a commitment to an enhanced ranch program for six to eight months.

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The minor contends on appeal that the juvenile court erred when it declined to seal his juvenile record after it dismissed the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition at a probation progress hearing. For reasons that we will explain, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter to afford the minor the opportunity to petition the juvenile court to seal his record pursuant to section 781.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Incidents

When he was 17 years old, on March 19, 2017, the minor accused his girlfriend, Irma F., of stealing from him. The minor knocked Irma to the ground and elbowed, choked, and bit her. The minor's mother intervened and Irma left.

Later that day, the minor's mother drove the minor to Irma's house. Irma's mother, Maria F., answered the door and told the minor to leave. The minor punched Maria F. and ran back to his car. He then approached Maria F. with a knife. Trying to intervene, bystander Shyrley G. got in between them and the minor stabbed her in the back. He yelled, "Come on you bitches, I'll kill all of you," and lunged at Becky A., a neighbor. Another neighbor approached and told the minor he would shoot him if he did not stop. Police arrived on scene, and the minor surrendered.

B. Petition , Findings , and Disposition

An amended section 602 petition was filed on April 5, 2017, alleging that the minor committed an assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1); willfully inflicted corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 2); committed misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243, subd. (a); count 3); committed misdemeanor exhibiting a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(1); count 4); committed an assault with a deadly

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weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 5); and threatened to commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 422; counts 6-8). It was also alleged that the minor inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of count 2 (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)) and that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, during the commission of count 5 (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1)).

On May 10, 2017, at the prosecution's request, the juvenile court struck counts 1 and 2, reduced count 6 to a misdemeanor, and dismissed counts 7 and 8. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the minor admitted counts 2 through 6 and admitted the allegation that he used a deadly and dangerous weapon during the commission of count 5. The juvenile court found the allegations in counts 2 through 6 true and sustained the petition.

At the disposition hearing on May 23, 2017, the juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court and placed the minor on probation with various terms and conditions, including a commitment to an enhanced ranch program for six to eight months.

III. DISCUSSION

At a hearing on September 11, 2018, regarding the minor's progress on probation, the juvenile court dismissed the section 602 petition but declined to seal the minor's juvenile record. The minor contends that the juvenile court erred when it failed to seal his record, asserting that his offense was not listed under section 707, subdivision (b) such that sealing was barred. Alternatively, the minor contends that even if the juvenile court correctly determined that he committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense, the court misapprehended its discretion to seal his record under newly amended section 781. The Attorney General counters that the circumstances of the minor's offense justified the juvenile court's finding that the minor had committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense and that the record does not reflect that the juvenile court misunderstood or misapplied the law.

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A. Juvenile Court Proceedings

On September 11, 2018, the probation department filed a "Domestic Violence Parte Review/Restitution Review" in the juvenile court. (Some capitalization omitted.) The report recommended that probation be dismissed, but that "the Petition(s) remain as any record sealing pursuant to Sections 781/786 WIC does not apply." The report indicated that the minor had been admitted to a ranch facility on June 1, 2017, and that he was released onto the Ranch Re-entry Assistance Program on February 5, 2018. The report stated that the minor's "general participation on the [re-entry program] was appropriate and on July 4, 2018, he was closed out of the [program] successfully." Although the minor had tested positive for marijuana, he was "no longer ingesting non[] prescribed medication" and had graduated from an aftercare service program. The minor had also successfully completed a 26-week domestic violence program, had begun making restitution payments, was working, and had obtained his high school diploma and enrolled in and started classes at a community college. The probation officer recommended probation be dismissed because the minor's "reformative efforts have become apparent."

A hearing on the report was held the same day. The juvenile court stated that it had read the report "and all is quite positive," and noted the minor's accomplishments. The court stated that "[t]he recommendations today are that I dismiss and seal." The probation officer interjected, "Your Honor, no sealing. There's a [section] 707(b) offense."

The minor "object[ed] in light of the fact that [Penal Code section] 245(a)(1) is not listed in [section] 707(b)." The minor stated that he "underst[ood] there have been some court decisions on that." The prosecution responded that there are "numerous cases supporting th[at] [Penal Code section] 245(a)(1) is, in fact, a [section] 707(b) offense." The prosecutor acknowledged that the offense "might not be enumerated," but argued that "[t]his is a situation in which case law dictates that it's a [section] 707(b) offense."

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The juvenile court determined: "Looking at the amended petition, . . . it is appropriate for the Court to dismiss but not seal." The juvenile court also found that the minor was never a dependent under section 300 or placed in foster care or under section 727. The court told the minor: "I would urge you, at some point in the future, to talk to the public defender about coming back and bringing a motion. It may be possible for you to get your record sealed at some later point, but I can't do it today."

B. Applicable Law

Sections 781 and 786 govern the sealing of juvenile records. Section 781 provides that a juvenile offender can petition the court to seal his or her record at any time after he or she reaches the age of 18. (§ 781, subd. (a).) The record may be sealed "[i]f . . . the court finds that since the termination of jurisdiction [the petitioner] has not been convicted of a felony or of any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court." ( Ibid .) However, before January 1, 2018, former section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(D) barred a juvenile court from sealing a record in any case where the person committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense when the person was 14 years of age or older. The list of offenses enumerated

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under section 707, subdivision (b) includes assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. ( Id ., subd. (b)(14).)

Effective January 1, 2018, the Legislature amended section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(D) and (E) to give the juvenile court discretion under certain circumstances to seal the records of offenders who committed a crime listed under section 707, subdivision (b). (Stats. 2017, ch. 679, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.) At the time of the minor's hearing on September 11, 2018, subdivision (a)(1)(E) of section 781 had been revised to provide that a juvenile offender could petition the court to have his or her record sealed even in cases where the offender had committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense after the age of 14 so long as the court had dismissed the offense or reduced it to a misdemeanor. "In those cases, the person may petition the court to have the record sealed, and the court may order the sealing of the record in the same manner and with the same effect as otherwise provided in this section for records that do not relate to an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 that was committed after the person had attained 14 years of age." (§ 781, subd. (a)(1)(E).)

Section 786, on the other hand, " 'is a broadly written statute, which requires sealing the records of certain juvenile offenders.' [Citation.]" ( In re A . V . (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 697, 709, italics added.) The statute "authorizes the juvenile court to employ a streamlined, court-initiated procedure for dismissing juvenile delinquency petitions and sealing juvenile records in the custody of the juvenile court, law enforcement agencies, the probation department, and the Department of Justice, when a ward 'satisfactorily completes' probation or supervision, as long as the offense is not one listed in section 707, subdivision (b). (§ 786, subds. (a), (d).) Upon the court's order dismissing the petition, the ward's arrest and other proceedings in the case 'shall be deemed not to have occurred,' allowing him or her to inform employers, educational institutions, or other persons that he or she has had no arrests or delinquency proceedings. (§ 786, subd. (b).)" ( Id . at p. 705.)

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C. Standard of Review

"Although appellate courts normally review a juvenile court's denial of a petition to seal juvenile records for an abuse of discretion, where, as here, the review involves determining the proper interpretation of a statute, we utilize the de novo standard of review." ( In re David T . (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 866, 871.)

"Our fundamental task in construing a statute 'is to ascertain the Legislature's intent [and] effectuate the law's purpose. [Citation.] We begin our inquiry by examining the statute's words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] In doing so, however, we do not consider the statutory language "in isolation." [Citation.] Rather, we look to "the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . [Citation.]" [Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question " 'in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute . . . .' [Citation.]" [Citation.] We must harmonize "the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole." [Citations.] We must also avoid a construction that would produce absurd consequences, which we presume the Legislature did not intend. [Citations.]' " ( In re Greg F . (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 406.)

D. The Juvenile Court Properly Determined at the Probation Progress Hearing that the Minor Had Committed a Section 707 , Subdivision (b) Offense

The minor first contends that the juvenile court erred when it determined that he had committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. The minor argues that In re Pedro C . (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 174, 182 ( Pedro C .), which held that the offense of assault with a deadly weapon "necessarily includes assault by means likely to produce

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great bodily injury," was wrongly decided because the "use of a weapon that is deadly as a matter of law does not require the use of force likely to produce great bodily injury."

Here, however, the minor admitted that count 5 was a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. The juvenile court accepted the minor's admissions to counts 2 through 6, found that the admissions were supported by a factual basis, and found at the disposition hearing that the minor had committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. The minor did not object to the finding.

Based on the minor's admission that count 5 constituted a section 707, subdivision (b) offense and the juvenile court's finding at the disposition hearing that the minor had committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense, the juvenile court did not err when it determined at the September 11, 2018 probation progress hearing that the minor had committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense. (See In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32 ["We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked"].) Thus, section 786 did not require the juvenile court to seal the minor's records. (§ 786, subd. (d).)

E. Exercise of Discretion Under Section 781 , Subdivision (a)(1)(E)

The minor contends in the alternative that even if the juvenile court properly found he had committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense, the court "did not understand [that] it had discretion to seal [his] juvenile record under . . . section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(E)." The minor argues that "[t]he record is barren of anyone

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acknowledging that a sealing was possible that day." The Attorney General asserts that absent evidence to the contrary, this court must presume that the juvenile court properly understood and applied the law.

In general, we presume that the trial court was aware of, and followed, the applicable law ( In re Julian R . (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499 ( Julian R .)), "including statutory discretion at sentencing" ( People v . Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527). "A ' " 'judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct [, and a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.' " [Citation.]' " ( Julian R ., supra , at pp. 498-499, italics omitted.) " 'This rule derives in part from the presumption of Evidence Code section 664 "that official duty has been regularly performed," ' and thus when 'a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular finding or order.' " ( Id . at p. 499.)

Both parties focus on the juvenile court's urging of the minor to file a motion to seal at a later date, and particularly the court's statement that "[i]t may be possible for you to get your record sealed at some later point, but I can't do it today." The minor argues that the statement indicates that the juvenile court did not comprehend its discretion to seal his record pursuant to section 781 despite its finding of a section 707, subdivision (b) offense because the court "did not say it would not seal the record, it said it could not." The minor asserts that the court's statement "suggested that [the] law may change to allow sealing in the future."

The Attorney General, in contrast, contends that the juvenile court's statement "can be interpreted in at least two other ways showing that the court appreciated its

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discretion to seal [the minor's] record." The Attorney General argues that the statement could reflect that the court determined the minor had not yet been rehabilitated to the court's satisfaction, as required to seal a minor's record under section 781, subdivision (a)(1)(A) and (E). Alternatively, the Attorney General asserts that "the court could have meant that it was simply not prepared on that day to determine whether it would seal the record[] because it needed time to consider the matter further."

Based on our careful review of the record, it appears that the juvenile court understood its authority. However, based on the probation officer's misstatement that there was "no sealing" because "[t]here's a [section] 707(b) offense" and the failure of either party to raise section 781, we remand the matter to provide the minor the opportunity to petition the juvenile court to seal his record pursuant to section 781 and for the court to consider the juvenile's request pursuant to that section.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to allow the minor to petition the juvenile court to seal his record pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 781. The minute order regarding the September 11, 2018 hearing is ordered corrected to indicate that the petition is dismissed.

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/s/ _________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

/s/ _________
ELIA, ACTING P. J.

/s/ _________
MIHARA, J.

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Footnotes:

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

In contrast to the transcript of the hearing, the September 11, 2018 minute order indicates that the juvenile court dismissed probation but did not dismiss the petition. Neither party contends that the minute order controls. The minor states that "the petition was dismissed by the court," and the Attorney General asserts that "the juvenile court . . . dismissed the section 707(b) offense." We concur with the parties' interpretation of the record (see People v . Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599) and order the minute order to be modified to reflect that the juvenile court dismissed the petition on September 11, 2018.

"Subdivision (a) of section 781 was amended in March 2000 pursuant to the voter initiative entitled Proposition 21. It added the following language: 'Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not order the person's records sealed in any case in which the person has been found by the juvenile court to have committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 when he [or she] had attained 14 years of age or older.' " ( In re G . Y . (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1200, fn. omitted.)

Since this court issued its decision in Pedro C ., Penal Code section 245 has been amended to separate the offenses of assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1), (4).)

Different counsel represented the minor at the subsequent probation progress hearing, where the minor objected to the juvenile court's decision not to seal the minor's record by arguing that he had not committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense.

At the probation progress hearing, in determining that the minor had committed a section 707, subdivision (b) offense, the juvenile court stated: "Looking at the amended petition, I think it is appropriate for the Court to dismiss but not seal."

"Th[e] presumption . . . does not apply 'where the law in question was unclear or uncertain when the lower court acted.' " ( People v . Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 567.)

We observe that the minor did not file a petition or motion to seal his record pursuant to section 781 or orally request sealing pursuant to section 781 at the progress hearing. However, the Attorney General does not contend that the issue has been forfeited or that the statute required the minor to file a petition.

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