California Cases December 27, 2019: Santa Cruz Cnty. Human Servs. Dep't v. M.C. (In re A.C.)

Case Description

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court , rule 8.1115(a) , prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published , except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. 17JU00179)

On June 21, 2017, the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (Department) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g) relative to a girl, A.C. (the minor), who was then nine months old. M.C. (mother) is the minor's mother, and T.A. is the minor's presumed father. The minor was placed into protective custody after mother bumped the minor's crib, causing the minor to fall. It was reported at the time that mother "ha[d] stated multiple times that she [would] not make it another night keeping her baby safe." At the

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time of the minor's detention, mother was placed into a temporary involuntary commitment under section 5150. The juvenile court declared the minor a dependent child, and she was placed in out-of-home foster care. Mother received 18 months of reunification services, those services being terminated in February 2019. At that time, the court scheduled a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26 (366.26 hearing).

On June 25, 2019—prior to the 366.26 hearing—mother filed a request for change of order pursuant to section 388 (the 388 petition), requesting that the court modify its February 2019 order by resuming her reunification services. Mother alleged that resumption of services was in the minor's best interests and that mother was stable with her mental health and had voluntarily participated in services. On July 18, 2019, after hearing argument, the juvenile court denied an evidentiary hearing on mother's 388 petition, concluding that mother had not made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances warranting relief or that the proposed change of order was in the minor's best interests.

The court conducted the 366.26 hearing on July 29, 2019. After hearing evidence and argument, the court adopted the recommendations of the Department. The court found the minor to be generally and specifically adoptable and the beneficial parental relationship inapplicable. It terminated the parental rights of mother and the alleged father, and it found the permanent plan of adoption to be appropriate.

Mother filed separate appeals from the order denying the 388 petition and the order after the 366.26 hearing. We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing, and we will affirm that order. We conclude further that there was substantial evidence supporting the court's finding that the minor was adoptable, and the court did not err in concluding that the beneficial parental relationship exception was inapplicable. We will therefore affirm the order after 366.26 hearing.

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A. Prior Proceedings (June 2017 - February 2019)

1 . The Minor's Detention (June 2017)

On June 21, 2017, the Department filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g) relative to the minor, who was then nine months old. It was alleged that mother had mental health issues, including anxiety, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and borderline personality disorder. Mother's mental health condition negatively impacted her ability to care for the minor. It was alleged that on June 19, mother had bumped the side of the minor's crib as a result of exhaustion, causing the minor to fall. It was alleged further that mother "was distraught and frustrated and was concerned that she would hurt her child." Mother was evaluated and placed on a section 5150 involuntary hold to assess her mental health issues. The Department had been unable to locate father.

In its investigative report, the Department advised that the reporting party stated that mother had been working with Families Together for four to five months and, through that organization, had been attempting to secure daycare for the minor, but the

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process had been slow. "The mother is extremely sleep-deprived and distraught, and has stated multiple times that she will not make it another night keeping her baby safe." Mother had stated "that the baby was the product of a date rape." It was reported further that mother did not have a support network that could provide temporary care for the minor. The Department advised that mother had a child welfare history (discussed, post ) involving the minor and the minor's half-sibling, A.L.

As recited in the investigative report, Capitola police officers interviewed mother on June 19, 2017, in the presence of a Department social worker, Renee Palmer. The minor presented as healthy, clean, and without visible marks or bruises. Mother stated that she slept four hours a night and did not eat very much. Mother said "[s]he was so sleep[-]deprived that she felt she could pass out, and was scared that she would accidentally hurt [the minor]." She also said that she had not showered in three days and "was at the end of her rope."

Police Officer Sandretti told mother that he wanted to avoid placing the minor in foster care, and he asked mother if she had any family or friends who could temporarily take care of the minor. Mother mentioned her 18-year-old daughter, A.L., but stated A.L. was too busy with a fulltime job. Mother stated that A.L.'s father, who had remarried, was not a good candidate. Mother also said she would not feel comfortable placing the minor in her neighbor's care because of her night-drinking. Mother wanted to place the minor in foster care voluntarily, but Palmer explained that the Department did not have a voluntary program besides relinquishment; mother was opposed to this option. "[M]other cried as she stated she was overwhelmed, wanted to sleep and felt that there was no other choice but to have [the minor] go to a foster home."

Officer Sandretti discussed with mother about a voluntary commitment under section 5150 for assessment by Telecare. Mother responded that she would take herself to Telecare after showering and taking care of some matters. Officer Sandretti told mother that he was required to transport her to Telecare. After mother refused, Officer

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Sandretti stated he was placing mother under an involuntary section 5150 hold, and he asked Palmer to leave the home with the minor so that officers could handcuff and transport mother to Telecare for assessment. After Palmer left, she could hear mother "screaming, 'Rape! Rape! Someone please help me!' "

Social worker Palmer met with mother the next day (June 20, 2017). Mother stated she had been released from the involuntary hold at approximately 11:00 p.m. on June 19. She was very angry about how things had transpired. Mother reported that she had been seeing a therapist through Beacon Services, but the therapist had said she was not qualified to treat mother. Mother stated she was also no longer seeing her psychiatrist and was looking for a new professional. She expressed great concern about the minor, and mother was relieved to hear she was doing well in foster care.

Mother told Palmer that she herself had been a foster care child. After the maternal grandmother was in a car accident as a result of her intoxication, mother (who was seven at the time) and her siblings were placed into foster care.

Mother also told the social worker that she had met the minor's father through a dating website, and he had raped her on a date. She stated there was an active criminal case concerning the incident, and she provided Palmer with contact information for the detective in charge of the investigation. Mother denied drug use in her meeting with Palmer, but did state that she had a medical marijuana card because she had degenerative disc disease.

Palmer contacted the alleged father, T.A., on June 21, asking him whether he was the father of the minor's father (mentioning the minor's name); T.A. "sounded confused" and responded " 'Who?' " He told Palmer he had dated a woman with mother's first name for approximately two months; she had told him at the time she was dating another man and thought she was pregnant when she and T.A. began dating.

On June 22, the juvenile court ordered the minor detained with temporary placement vested with the Department. The court ordered that mother receive supervised

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visitation with the minor at least three times per week. The minor was ultimately placed in the care of a licensed foster care home in Santa Cruz County.

2 . Jurisdiction/Disposition Report (July 2017)

a. Child Welfare History

In its report dated July 17, 2017, prepared for the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the Department reported that there was a prior child welfare history involving mother and her older daughter, A.L., as well as with the minor.

There was one child welfare report in December 2003 involving mother and A.L. in which it had been reported that mother appeared to be suicidal. She would not permit the Housing Authority and the property manager to enter her apartment so that they could do an inspection required for certification. Mother had resisted two prior inspection attempts, cancelling a November appointment "because she was having a 'mental breakdown.' " On the day of the referral, she advised that she was going to commit suicide. The allegation of emotional abuse involving A.L. was determined to be unfounded.

There was a June 2016 report of neglect concerning mother's unborn child. It was reported that mother had significant mental health issues, had not been seen by a psychiatrist for more than one year, was not taking her medications, and was distressed about her pregnancy. Mother had stated "that she absolutely [could not] care for the baby." She said she was "very distressed by her pregnancy," and she slept all day. The Department reported that mother "has no support system, and says she wants help but then refuses it." The reporting party felt that mother was unable to care for a baby given her then-current state. The report was evaluated out because the child had not yet been born.

In September 2016, there was a report of a threat of neglect, based upon a concern that mother had ongoing untreated mental health issues, had no money, and had no home for her newborn baby, the minor. Mother was not under psychiatric care at the time. She

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admitted to depression during her pregnancy and at the time of the referral. Mother was "socially isolated," and the person she identified as being "[h]er 'best friend' " who was supposed to attend the delivery had not shown up. The allegation of general neglect involving the minor was determined to be unfounded, and mother was referred to Families Together for support services.

In March 2017, there was another referral in which the reporting party stated that mother had indicated she was depressed and wanted to harm herself. The day before the referral, mother had strapped the minor to her car seat, left the minor at home and had gone "outside and [had] sat in her car for about an hour until she felt better. [Mother] felt that this was the safest thing to do for [the minor]." The reporting party indicated that mother was "connected to Families Together and Beacon," but she had no family or friend support network. Based upon the conclusions that mother appeared to be protective of the minor and had availed herself of services, it was determined that the allegations of general neglect and emotional abuse were unfounded and inconclusive, respectively.

The Department identified in its report the current referral of June 19, 2017, restating what was presented in the petition and investigative report (discussed, ante ). The Department reported that mother had "stated that she does not have friends, family or people of support to contact when she needs help."

b. Department Interviews

In July 2017, mother met with persons at Adult Mental Health Services for an assessment. It was determined that mother qualified for Integrated Behavioral Services consisting of therapy/counseling and psychiatric services.

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Also in July 2017, the assigned social worker, Xochitl Lomiti, spoke by telephone with M.L., the father of mother's adult daughter, A.L. M.L. stated that he and mother had had a 50-50 custody arrangement relative to their daughter, A.L., and that there had been numerous times during her childhood in which mother had called M.L. in tears, stating that he needed to pick up A.L. before mother hurt her. M.L. told Lomiti that often when he would pick up A.L. after receiving phone calls from mother, he would "find [A.L.] in one corner crying and [mother] in another." M.L. told Lomiti that mother had not been physically abusive toward A.L., although mother had frequently expressed to him that she "was resentful of [A.L.'s] existence." But mother had expressed to M.L. sufficient fear that she might hurt A.L. to require M.L. to intervene on such occasions.

M.L. said he had had little direct contact with mother for approximately five years, since he had married, because of "the need of boundaries with [mother,] given that she would often call distraught at odd hours of the night, and on a couple of occasions presented to [M.L. at his] home very upset, and yelling at [him]." The record reflects that the minor was placed in the home of M.L. and his wife, and that they served as foster parents through May 2018.

M.L. stated to Lomiti he had ongoing concerns about mother's mental health. He told the social worker that mother had been suicidal in the past but had not attempted suicide or ever had a plan to harm herself. M.L. stated he was aware that mother was on and off her medications; he said she had never been consistent with them. He also said he was aware that mother was struggling to care for the minor and explained that A.L. had expressed concerns about leaving mother alone with the minor, and that A.L. had tried to be in the home more frequently because of those concerns.

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It was reported on July 10, 2017, that mother had been consistently attending visits with the minor, arriving on time and prepared for the visits.

3 . Psychological Evaluation Report (September 2017)

In anticipation of holding a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court on August 3, 2017, with mother's agreement, ordered that mother submit to a psychological evaluation. Mother was assessed on August 21 and 25, 2017, by a psychologist, Debra Vitullo, Ph.D. The psychological evaluation report of Dr. Vitullo was submitted at or about the time of the disposition hearing.

Mother reported to Dr. Vitullo that the maternal grandmother had Bipolar Disorder and Attention Deficit Disorder. Mother reported that County Mental Health had diagnosed mother as having Bipolar Disorder and Borderline Personality Disorder. Mother stated that she had also been diagnosed with PTSD; she also believed that she might be on the autism spectrum. She told Dr. Vitullo that when she felt stressed, she "tap[ped] her fingers repetitively, flap[ped] her hands and walk[ed] in small circles." Mother reported that she had not found medication to be helpful and had a " 'manic episode' after she began taking Paxil." Mother stated that she was taking lithium and that she thought it "help[ed] her to slow down enough to 'engage her brain and to organize her emotions.' " Mother denied she had had any prior mental health hospitalizations; Dr. Vitullo noted that records indicated that a reporting party had stated mother had been hospitalized in 2012. Mother advised Dr. Vitullo that she had received mental health treatment for years but could not recall specifics.

Dr. Vitullo's evaluation included background interviews of M.L. and A.L. M.L. stated that mother was "a very loving and caring parent, but that she ha[d] difficulty sustaining this at times." He advised that when his daughter, A.L., was younger, she told him that mother would sleep all day (and then be up all night), and that A.L. would take care of herself for fear of awakening her mother. M.L. believed that A.L. "often felt she had to 'walk on eggshells' with her mother for fear of upsetting her"; M.L. had the same

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feeling during the time he and mother had dated. A.L. reported to Dr. Vitullo that mother had not been abusive but "could be 'snappy.' " A.L. said that during her childhood, mother had frequently lost her patience and there were periods in which she had difficulty sleeping, and mother would also keep A.L. awake. A.L. told Dr. Vitullo she had concerns about mother being able to take care of the minor without assistance. A.L. believed that "mother could get 'super stressed' at night because the baby [was] 'fussy' and [didn't] sleep well at night."

Mother was previously seen for approximately one month by Pearl Chaiyarat, MFT; Chaiyarat terminated the treatment because she felt mother's PTSD was outside the scope of her competence. Chaiyarat reported that mother, who brought the minor to most of the sessions, seemed connected and attuned to the minor's needs. Chaiyarat reported that the final session together was a difficult one because the minor had been removed because mother had felt she was sleep-deprived and was concerned about her ability to safely care for the minor.

At the time of the evaluation by Dr. Vitullo in August 2017, Jennifer Talbot of County Mental Health was providing therapy to mother, who was also receiving psychiatric services from Kelsey Kloberdanz, MSN, Psychiatric Nurse Practitioner, through Adult Mental Health. Both professionals had diagnosed mother with Borderline Personality Disorder and PTSD. Nurse Kloberdanz gave a further rule-out diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder. She also reported that mother had improved significantly over a six-week period and was taking lithium.

Based upon her evaluation and testing of mother, Dr. Vitullo concluded that mother "suffer[ed] from significant depression and anxiety which likely result[ed] in difficulties in concentrating, focusing [that], at times, [might] interfere with her daily functioning. She appear[ed] to be in a chronic state of stimulus overload and ha[d] little internal resources or coping skills to manage stress. Additionally, testing indicate[d] long standing patterns of negative perceptions regarding herself and others that appear[ed] to

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result in significant interpersonal difficulties and mistrust and fear of others and the world that [were] somewhat paranoid in nature. Overall, she appear[ed] to have adopted an avoidant style of taking in information, dealing with emotions and interpersonal relationships." Dr. Vitullo also recognized mother's "numerous strengths," including her apparent intelligence, her openness "to processing emotions," her expressed desire to understand her issues, and her motivation to be a good parent.

Dr. Vitullo's diagnosis of mother included the following: "[Mother] appear[ed] to meet the diagnostic criteria for both Dysthymia ([DSM V] F34.1) and a Generalized Anxiety Disorder ([DSM V] F41 .1). Symptoms include a depressed mood for more days than not for a period of at least two years, insomnia, low energy or fatigue, low self-esteem, poor concentration, restlessness and feeling keyed up, irritability and muscle tension. Both of these diagnoses, however, are consistent with an overarching diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder ([DSM V] F43.10) that is chronic (or complex) in nature. Symptoms include distressing dreams, intense distress when triggered, avoidance of traumatic stimuli and persistent negative beliefs or expectations about oneself, others and the world, persistent negative emotional states, sleep disturbance and detachment or estrangement from others." Dr. Vitullo opined further that "given [Mother's] family history (mother diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder) and her long-term history of mood disorders, her report that she has become 'manic' on antidepressant medication and her positive response to Lithium, a rule out of Bipolar Disorder should be considered, though test results did not confirm this diagnosis."

Dr. Vitullo recommended that mother continue to be monitored for treatment, including compliance with medications prescribed by a psychiatrist or psychiatric nurse. It was recommended that mother continue with long-term therapy, ideally by the same therapist. Dr. Vitullo also suggested that mother might pursue mental health support groups (through National Alliance on Mental Illness [NAMI] or Mental Health Client Action Network [MHCAN]), and seek services through Families Together. Dr. Vitullo

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indicated further that mother's participation in attachment focused therapy with the minor, such as The Circle of Security Parenting Program, would be beneficial.

4 . Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing (August-September 2017)

On August 30, 2017, mother submitted to jurisdiction but stated her opposition to disposition. The court found the allegations of the first amended petition true and that the minor was a person described under subdivisions (b) and (g) of section 300.

At the contested disposition hearing on September 11, 2017, the juvenile court, found by clear and convincing evidence that the minor's continued residence in mother's home would be detrimental to the minor, and it ordered the minor placed in the care, custody, and control of the Department. The court ordered that mother receive family reunification services and that she participate in all treatment specified in those services. The juvenile court also ordered that mother receive supervised visitation of a minimum of three times per week. It ordered further that, because the minor was under three years old, mother's failure to comply with the terms of the case plan by the time of the six-month review hearing could result in termination of services and an order for the development of a long-term plan for the minor of adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care.

5 . Interim Order Concerning Educational Rights (December 2017)

On December 1, 2017, the Department filed a 388 petition seeking a change of order. It sought an order that educational rights for the minor be shared between mother and the minor's caregivers. The circumstances prompting the Department's 388 petition were that the minor's daycare service had expressed concerns about the minor not meeting her developmental milestones, and the entity doing the assessment (STARS Infant program) required authorization to move forward. The Department explained that mother (1) was not then engaged in services, (2) was not taking her medication to address her mental health needs, (3) was refusing visits with the minor, and (4) was not

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answering phone calls from the STARS Infant program seeking authorization to conduct the developmental assessment.

At the hearing on December 7, mother waived notice and agreed to share educational rights with the minor's caregivers. The juvenile court granted the Department's 388 petition. The court also found that appropriate notice had been given under the Indian Child Welfare Act (the ICWA), the minor was not an Indian child, and the ICWA did not apply.

6 . Six-Month Review Report (February 2018)

In a report dated February 15, 2018, submitted in connection with the six-month review hearing, the Department advised that mother had initially engaged in services and had showed progress in addressing her mental health issues. Visitation had reportedly gone well, and mother had transitioned to unsupervised visits in late October 2017. On November 20, 2017, mother's therapist reported that mother had not attended counseling for several weeks; mother had told the therapist that " 'I can't do this anymore, [the current caregiver is] going to keep the baby. I can't deal with this anymore.' " The therapist expressed concern about mother's welfare and requested some follow-up by the Department.

The minor's foster parents (M.L. and his wife) also reported that mother had sent a text message on November 21 cancelling her visit, stating in a text message, " 'I won't be able to pick [the minor] up after all, I'm spiraling fast. I don't think I'm going to make it to the end of the year, I'm sorry.' " The Department contacted the Capitola Police Department, who performed a welfare check concerning mother. The police officer who performed the visit reported to the Department that although mother "was very upset and emotional, . . . [she] did not appear to be a danger to herself." Mother told the officer that she was planning to relocate to the desert soon so "that she would be able to start over."

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On November 22, Department social worker Mary Ellen Olson paid an unannounced visit upon mother, who initially closed the door after seeing Olson. Mother allowed Olson to enter after the social worker asked if they could talk. Olson then spent "several hours" visiting. Mother stated, "she '[couldn't] do this anymore' and that she could 'barely keep it together.' " Mother told Olson she had not wanted to visit the minor because she was unable to "stay collected and [did not] want to subject [the minor] to that." Mother stated that her struggles included "housing challenges, run-ins with her alleged rapists, a lack of social support, and overall lack of motivation to move forward." She denied suicidal ideation.

During the November 22, 2017 visit, mother told Olson that "she did not feel she would [be able to] adequately address her mental health challenges within the allotted Court time . . . [,] blam[ing] her apathy on her medication, which she reported to have stopped taking a few weeks prior." Mother said she felt strongly that her only option was to leave the area and to live in her car, even though that would mean being far from both of her children. Mother stated "that she 'didn't want [the minor] to have the kind of life . . . [A.L.] did.' " She also told Olson that she had not submitted the paperwork to extend her Section 8 housing and would have to leave her apartment by the end of the year. Olson suggested that mother reconsider by calling the housing offices to seek a filing extension. Mother "stated she would try, but she had not been able to make phone calls to anyone."

Olson called to check on mother five days later. Mother was crying, and Olson asked if she was all right and whether she "had someone to call, and she said no. [Mother] reported that she was overwhelmed and she couldn't talk, and then hung up." There was then a period of no contact with mother, apparently due to mother's telephone service having been interrupted because she had not paid the bill. Mother appeared at the December 7, 2017 hearing (discussed, ante ), and cried throughout the proceeding. After the hearing, mother told Olson again "that she 'just [can't] do it.' "

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On December 14, Olson was informed by the minor's foster parents that mother had had a verbal fight with A.L., and mother had "tried to block [A.L.'s] car with her own while screaming and yelling at her. [Mother] also called the foster parents and yelled at them on the phone, making accusations they had ruined her life."

Olson attempted unsuccessfully to reach mother on December 19 and 27. Mother responded on December 31, 2017, and January 1, 2018, with two e-mails. In the first e-mail, she stated that she would "be officially homeless in 8 minutes." Mother wrote: "I don't know why everything is being destroyed. I feel like God is really trying to make me kill myself. I need help, but it needs to be help that will actually help me." In her second e-mail, mother expressed her despondency, stating that no one had checked on her over Christmas, and that she had "no value." Mother wrote to Olson: "You're a social worker that won't help. I've been very clear that this area is not healthy for me and you only offered planned [ sic ] locally. You want me to survive? . . . Get off your ass and find me somewhere safe away from the people that hurt me."

Mother sent another e-mail to Olson on January 12, 2018. Mother stated that after encountering "my rapist in front of CVS on Front Street in Santa Cruz" on January 7, she concluded "it was no longer tenable to stay there while having to be triggered everyday [ sic ] and having no safe place to go." She advised that she was in the process of relocating to Fresno, had found a therapist with a first appointment scheduled that day, and had lined up a part-time job. She stated that she was working on filing renewal paperwork with the Housing Authority to obtain a voucher for Fresno. Mother reiterated that Santa Cruz was "completely unhealthy and unsafe for [her]" and stated she "had no hope in Santa Cruz."

Mother acknowledged in her January 12 e-mail that she had not spoken to Olson for some time, explaining that it "was a direct result of the fact that [her] mental health was being destroyed by being [in] Santa Cruz surrounded by people that were judging and making demands of me, but completely unwilling to offer any real support for me."

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She stated that she still wanted to attempt to have the minor returned to her care, "but something has to be different because asking me to go to visits around the corner from where I've seen my rapist walking is not acceptable and I will continue pointing out that it is not in my or [the minor's] best interest to continually put me in stressful and dangerous situations." Mother wrote further: "No one can do everything completely without support and the only thing that makes me different from anyone else is the complete lack of support I have. That however, is not my fault. That no one in my life was willing to be a true friend is because of the choices that the people in my life made, not the choices I made . . . . [¶] I am willing to do what needs to be done but I am no longer willing to run in circles trying to prove my value to people that are determined to not see it. I need you to send a letter to Housing Authority to let them know that I am trying to get [the minor] back. I also need contact to remain through email or text because I want everything recorded. Nothing personal but I no longer trust that you or anybody else has my best interest at heart and have been lied to and about [ sic ] so many times that I want proof of everything."

In mid to late 2017, mother was seeing two therapists. One therapist was Jennifer Talbot through the Integrated Behavioral Health Department at Adult Behavioral Health. Mother saw Talbot from August to October 2017. Talbot reported to the Department that mother resisted "trying new ideas or methods, and [would] reject them during sessions." Talbot said she had seen some improvement, but that the last appointment mother attended was in late October.

Mother also saw Gloria Simpson at the Parents Center for therapy between August and the end of October. The treatment goals included expanding her social support system, proper and safe parenting, and exploration of her behaviors and expressing emotional issues. Simpson had reported to Olson in October that mother was "doing very well"; Simpson expressed the caveat that mother "was not always focused and seemed to be struggling, [and Simpson stated] 'I think she is somewhat ambivalent about whether or

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not she can really do it.' " Simpson reported that mother was not returning Simpson's calls after mother cancelled or no-showed appointments. Simpson was able to reach mother by telephone on November 20. Mother "was tearful and stated that she just couldn't 'do it and she was asking [M.L.] if he would keep [the minor]." She told Simpson "she felt better talking about it . . . [and] was firm about her decision." Simpson observed in her report that "[mother] seemed to be overwhelmed with increased care of [the minor]." Mother cancelled or no-showed her appointments with Simpson on October 30, November 6, 20, and 27.

The Department confirmed that after mother relocated to Fresno, she had met with a new therapist, Gerardo Madrigal, LMFT, once weekly between January 12 and February 14, 2018.

In a meeting in February 2018, mother confirmed with Olson that she was not taking any medications because her Medi-Cal benefits had not yet transferred to Fresno. She stated further that no medication would help her PTSD symptoms; they would, in fact, make the symptoms worse.

The Department reported that mother had begun a parenting class in September 2017 and had attended the first five classes. Mother had not done the required work with her individual counselor for the next two classes. The instructor reported to the Department that mother had "no[-]showed out of the parenting class."

Visitation was ordered by the court in June 2017 at a minimum of three times per week, and mother's supervised visits were consistent and appropriate between June and September 2017. It was reported that mother and the minor had "a loving and meaningful bond" during visits. The visits became loosely supervised in September 2017 without any issues developing. Unsupervised visitation was approved by the Department beginning the week of October 11. In early November 2017, the Department approved unsupervised visits coordinated by the foster parents and mother, which proceeded without problems until late November, when, as noted, ante , the foster parents reported

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that mother had cancelled a visit and had indicated, among other things, that she was "spiraling fast." Although Olson encouraged mother to contact the Parents Center to arrange for visitation, mother continued to decline visitation until she relocated to Fresno in January 2018. On January 18, mother e-mailed Olson, stating she was willing to attend supervised visits, but not at the Parents Center or in central Santa Cruz County because of concerns that she would run into, or be "unnecessarily triggered by having to be a couple of blocks from [her] rapist." Olson reported that she "worked within these stipulations" and contacted mother but did not hear from her until February 2. Visits were arranged at the Watsonville Parents Center commencing on February 12, and the two visits on February 12 and 13 reportedly went well.

The Department advised that the foster parents were no longer prepared to serve as a concurrent home. This decision was based upon their concerns about mother's mental health.

The Department concluded that, while mother initially engaged in services and seemingly stabilized her mental health, "[i]n November 2017 circumstances changed and [mother] withdrew from services and stopped visitation with [the minor]." Although it recognized mother's efforts and successful relocation, the Department expressed continued concerns about mother's stability and her ability to safely parent the minor. Social worker Olson stated that "[she had] spoke[n] to [mother] on numerous occasions about her support network, and [mother] was unable to identify support people in her area. On 11/22/17[, mother] stated she had 'tried everything' and that there were no more avenues in Santa Cruz where she could get support. She stated she had gone to churches, mental health support groups, and other meetings, but 'no one wanted to be [her] friend.' " Accordingly, the Department recommended that mother's reunification services be terminated and that the court schedule a 366.26 hearing to establish a long-term plan for the minor.

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7 . Six-Month Review Hearing (March 2018)

At the six-month review hearing on March 28, 2018, in which mother contested the recommendations of the Department, the juvenile court did not adopt all of the Department's recommendations; notably, the court rejected the Department's recommendation that services be terminated. The court found that the conditions that had justified the initial assumption of jurisdiction continued to exist or were likely to exit if supervision were withdrawn. The court also found that mother had made substantial progress and ordered the continuation of reunification services. The court later issued an amended order that approved an updated case plan for mother.

8 . Twelve-Month Review Report and Hearing (August 2018)

In the Department's report dated July 27, 2018, Olson advised the court that since mother's relocation to Fresno in January, she had maintained regular contact with Olson and had travelled to Santa Cruz for visits three times per week. Mother was for the most part living in her car, explaining that it was difficult for her to comply with the strict in-out rules that shelters had for residents because of her trips to Santa Cruz. Due to car trouble, mother began staying in her car in Santa Cruz in June. She said she was attempting to save money so that she would be in a better position to obtain housing once her car was repaired.

When she resumed visitation in February 2018, mother had requested two weekly visits rather than three because of her relocation to Fresno. In late March, she stated she was able to resume visiting three days per week. Mother was reportedly always on time for visits and was prepared with snacks and drinks. Mother was attentive and watchful of the minor, and engaged her in appropriate activities. At the time the report was filed, mother was having two unsupervised visits and one loosely supervised visit per week with the minor.

The Department reported that Mother had not been on medication since November 2017, "but by all accounts appear[ed] to be stable and doing well." Mother

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reported that she had been seeing therapist Madrigal in Fresno, who had provided her with Eye Movement Desensitization And Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy, which she had found to be extremely helpful in reducing her flashbacks and anxiety. Since mother's temporary relocation to Santa Cruz in June 2018, she had been unable to see a therapist because of the transfer of her Medi-Cal file to Fresno.

In May 2018, there had been a referral by a mandated reporter concerning the discovery of a large bruise on the minor's thigh. After an investigation, the minor was removed from the foster parents' home, and she was placed in a new foster home with a licensed foster parent who was a family friend of mother's.

The Department recommended that mother continue to receive reunification services.

The juvenile court at the twelve-month review hearing on August 16, 2018, adopted the Department's recommendations, including the continuation of the minor as a dependent child in out-of-home placement with reunification services provided to mother.

9 . Eighteen-Month Review Report (January 2019)

The Department filed a status report on January 7, 2019, in connection with the 18-month review hearing. Mother continued to travel between Fresno County and Santa Cruz County. Olson encountered difficulty reaching mother in July and August 2018.

Olson learned in October 2018 that mother was engaged; mother told Olson she and her fiancé, D.H., were no longer together because of his infidelity. D.H. was arrested

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in September after assaulting mother. (The Department determined that D.H. had "an extensive history of violence and arrests," "as well as child endangerment offenses.") Mother obtained a temporary restraining order preventing D.H. from contacting her. When Olson met with mother on November 1, she said that she was approximately six weeks pregnant, the father was D.H., and she was unsure whether she would be keeping the baby. Mother told Olson at their next meeting that she intended to keep the baby, and she was receiving services from Pregnancy Resource Center in Santa Cruz.

On December 21, 2018, Olson received a number of calls and text messages about D.H.'s release from jail. Mother advised that D.H. had sent her a text message the morning of his release that led her believe he intended to kill her. Mother told Olson she was concerned for the minor's safety because D.H. had access to her telephone records and GPS. The caregiver picked up the minor from childcare to ensure her safety; the other children in daycare were also removed from the facility that day as a safety measure. D.H. was arrested and returned to custody the same day.

Mother also reported to Olson in October 2018 that mother had purchased a trailer and had secured a rental spot for it in Fresno. She was not living in it; rather, she continued to remain in Santa Cruz because of limited funds.

Mother told the Department that she had "had a difficult time building a support network, as the people she met, including her ex-fiancé, she now fe[lt] she c[ould] no longer trust. Per [mother], the friends who introduced her to her ex-fiancé ha[d] since betrayed her, and she [was] . . . working to rebuild a support system. In her small trailer park, there [were] a few families with children the same age [as the minor], and [mother] hope[d] to build relationships with them."

The Department reported that mother had continued with therapist Madrigal in Fresno from January to June, with one additional session in August 2018; Madrigal closed his practice in September 2018. Mother had not been assessed for psychotropic medication since discontinuing lithium in November 2017.

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Mother was engaging in unsupervised visitation with the minor occurring near her foster home. Early in the period of August 2018 to January 2019, there were some issues with the consistency of visitation because of mother's housing and transportation difficulties; she cancelled a number of visits in September while she was attempting to locate housing in Fresno. Mother generally visited with the minor three times a week for two hour visits; mother reported they spent the time eating, going to a park when the weather was good, and watching videos or television in mother's car when the weather was bad. The caregiver reported that transitions for the minor were challenging and the minor would become increasingly upset if the transitions were protracted. In December 2018, Olson approved longer visits with the goal of overnight visits; longer visits proved difficult because of poor weather and mother's lack of housing. Olson stated that "[t]he caregiver reported some concern[s] about the length of visit and [mother's] inability to put [the minor] down for a nap in her living situation, and [the minor's] demeanor before and after visits. The caregiver reported that [the minor] would tell the daycare provider 'No' when they told her it was time for a visit, or cling to the caregiver and her husband when it was time to leave. When she returned from visits, it was reported [the minor] was at times aggressive and would act out with the other children."

The foster family advised the Department that they were committed to adopting the minor if reunification proved unsuccessful.

The Department concluded that mother was not then in a position to have the minor returned to her care. The Department stated it "remain[ed] concerned about [mother's] sporadic service engagement, her unstable living situation, the volatile relationship with her ex-fiancé, and [the minor's] safety were she to be returned. As [mother] has received 18 months of reunification services, she has reached the statutory time limits for further services." The Department recommended that the juvenile court termination reunification services and schedule a hearing under section 366.26.

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10 . Eighteen-Month Review Hearing (February 2019)

The juvenile court conducted a contested 18-month review hearing on February 4, 2019. Olson and mother testified at the hearing.

Olson testified that the Department's concerns about mother's ability to safely parent the minor—who was then two years and five months old—were based on the fact that mother had not been able to move to overnight or long-term visits, Olson stated there were "also still concerns about [mother] fully addressing her mental health and engaging in those services that would help her to be a safe full-time parent to [the minor]." In addition, the Department was concerned that there had been domestic violence in mother's relationship with D.H. and, acknowledging that mother had taken steps to address the issue, the Department "still had concerns about how that would look [with respect to the minor] long-term."

Mother testified that there were no approved medications for PTSD. She was not taking medications for anxiety because they made her drowsy and she "ha[d] to be able to function."

Mother testified that, after encountering difficulty because of her Medi-Cal insurance being available only in Fresno County, she had begun seeing Chris Hogland, a therapist, through Integrated Behavioral Health in in Santa Cruz County in January 2019. She had seen Hogland once a week for a month and had found her services to be helpful.

Mother also testified that, since October 2018, she had been receiving individual counseling services in victim domestic violence through the Walnut Avenue Women's Center in Santa Cruz. She had attended five or six counseling sessions.

Mother testified that she had a safety plan to protect herself from domestic violence. This plan included having a three-year criminal protective order preventing D.H. from having any contact with her; receiving electronic updates whenever D.H. was incarcerated or released from jail; and maintaining no contact with D.H.

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Mother sought an order returning the minor to her care. Her intention was for the two of them to live together in the trailer she had purchased that was located in a Fresno trailer park that had full hookups. Mother testified that she wanted to parent the minor "[b]ecause she's my child. I love her with all my heart. I've been fighting for her through everything. Every time . . . I hit an obstacle, I find a new way. . . . [¶] . . . I keep trying. She is my life. She is important to me. I have been here in Santa Cruz County homeless the majority of the time so that I do not miss my visits with her, so that we can continue our relationship, and so she knows that I love her with all of my heart."

At the February 4, 2019 hearing, the juvenile court adopted the Department's recommendations. It found that mother's progress in the case plan had been minimal. In support of this conclusion, the court recited that mother's participation in her case plan had not been consistent. Specifically, in August 2018 when mother was informed that her therapist would not be able to continue to see her, mother had not retained a new therapist until the beginning of 2019. Further, the court expressed concern that the timing of the Department's attempts to extend visits to determine whether mother could safely parent the minor coincided with mother's problems with her ex-fiancé. The court noted that the Department had offered longer visits in December, but mother had declined visits on December 24 and 25, because she did not have a place to take the minor, and mother postponed visits on January 1 and 2. The court indicated that this was "so crucial [in that it was] right when this court needed to see if [the mother] could handle extended visits with [the minor] because we were running out of time."

The juvenile court concluded that (1) the return of the minor to mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection or well-being of the minor,

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(2) the conditions still existed that justified the initial assumption of jurisdiction under section 300, or such conditions would be likely to exist if supervision were withdrawn, and (3) by clear and convincing evidence, mother had been offered and provided with reasonable services designed to aid her in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal of the minor. The court therefore ordered that mother's reunification services be terminated and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for May 16, 2019.

B. Department's Section 366.26 Report (April 2019)

The Department submitted its report dated April 24, 2019, in connection with the 366.26 hearing. It summarized the history of the proceedings, including the circumstances leading to the minor's detention, mother's mental health history, the nature and extent of mother's participation in services for 18 months, and the visitation history between mother and the minor.

One month after the juvenile court terminated services, on March 5, 2019, the Department was advised that mother had been placed on a section 5150 hold due to suicidal ideation. Mother reportedly had "felt desperate, was homeless and mentioned that she [had] recently lost her parental rights for her daughter." Mother had been at the Santa Cruz Wharf and had threatened to jump; law enforcement determined she was a danger to herself and placed her into custody. The Department advised further that mother was pregnant and May 17 was the anticipated delivery date of her child.

The Department described the minor as "an active and lovable toddler with blond hair and green eyes." At the time of the report, the minor had no current medical or developmental issues. The Department advised that the minor had "a secure attachment" with her foster family with whom she had been living since June 2018. The foster

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parents advised that they were ready and willing to adopt the minor should the juvenile court determine that adoption as the permanent plan was appropriate. The Department opined that the minor was generally and specifically adoptable.

The Department summarized: "The mother . . . [does] not have a parent/child relationship with the minor. The parent/child relationship has been disrupted and/or absent due to [mother's] mental health, parental neglect, and absence from the child's day to day life." It stated that mother and the minor had, "at best, . . . developed a 'visiting relationship.' " The Department concluded further that "[the minor's] need for permanency, emotional stability, consistency, security and sense of belonging that her prospective adoptive parents provide greatly outweighs any possible/child relationship with [mother]."

The Department recommended that (1) the parental rights of mother and of the alleged father, T.A., be terminated, (2) a permanent plan of adoption for the minor be established, and (3) educational rights be transferred to the prospective adoptive parents.

The 366.26 hearing, originally scheduled for May 16, was continued by the court to June 27 at the requests of mother and the Department. Mother had asked for a continuance because she was pregnant and the 366.26 hearing was causing her stress. The Department sought a continuance because proper notice had not been provided to the alleged father.

C. Mother's 388 Petition (June 2019)

On June 25, 2019, mother filed a 388 petition, requesting that the court modify its February 4, 2019 order terminating services and scheduling a 366.26 hearing. Mother alleged that the resumption of reunification services was in the minor's best interests

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"because [the minor] knows that [M.C.] is her mother and they have continued [to] bond throughout the case . . . . Mother is stable with her mental health, participated in services voluntarily and is ready to safely parent [the minor]." Mother detailed that her voluntary participation in services following the court's February 2019 order had included her (1) working with David Hayes, Counselor, and Mary Ann Malloy, NP, at the Santa Cruz County Health Department; (2) attending weekly Peer to Peer classes sponsored by the National Alliance for Mental Illness (3) attending and completing in May 2019 the Making Proud Choices Program; (4) participating in domestic violence counseling sessions and support groups through the Walnut Avenue Women's Center; and (5) enrollment in April 2019 in the Janus Perinatal Treatment Program. Mother alleged further in the 388 petition that she was working to obtain stable housing (attaching letters from three housing facilities indicating that she had been placed on waitlists) continued to expand her support system, and consistently visited the minor.

Her counsellor, David W. Hayes, LCSW, submitted a letter dated June 25, 2019, indicating that mother commenced psychotherapy services with him on April 26, 2019. Hayes stated that mother had been "consistently engaged with the therapeutic service and process and ha[d] not missed any meetings. [Mother had] shown initiative in increasing [the] frequency of meetings as needed to address variable stress levels [and was] meeting her treatment goals and appear[ed] to benefit from the therapeutic process." Hayes in his June 25 letter did not indicate whether mother had made progress in addressing the mental health issues that had led to the dependency proceedings.

Mother submitted seven pages of clinical notes from Hayes as a supplemental exhibit in support of her 388 petition. Hayes noted that mother's strengths included her intelligence, confidence, assertiveness, and the fact that she was "a strong survivor of childhood abuse." He assessed her challenges as including the fact that "impairments to [her] mood [could] negatively affect her ability to communicate and negotiate her needs [that] result[ed] in a repeated experience of inability to access needed resources and

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support that she [felt were] appropriate to her life situation." Hayes noted that mother had experienced "[five] events identified as crisis in the . . . [two] months [prior to May 7], some resulting in community safety intervention, and one resulting in psychiatric hospitalization (suicidal ideation with a plan and stated intent)." He stated further that "[mother] present[ed] in an assertive and self advocating manner, yet due to circumstances and major anxiety, [she did] engage in a way that carrie[d] pressure and some elements of confrontation, when her stated needs [we]re not met. This result[ed] in a repeated pattern of statements reflecting self[-]harm ideation and intent due to overwhelm and perceived lack of ability to access resources. In [mother's] experience this pattern carrie[d] themes of stigma and community exclusion." Hayes identified mother's goals as of May 7 as including the reduction of crisis events over a 12-month period. He recommended individual psychotherapy at the initial frequency of twice per week for the first month and once per week thereafter, and he indicated the "[d]uration of [i]ntervention" as being one year.

Mother argued in a letter attached to the petition that "[r]esuming services is in the best interest of [the minor] because she knows I am her mom and is bonded to me. She asks to leave with me at each visit. I have been consistent in visiting. [The minor] lived with me for the first 9 months of her life and we have continued our bond throughout the case and it continues today."

D. Hearing on Mother's 388 Petition (July 2019)

The juvenile court ordered a hearing for July 18, 2019, on whether mother had made a prima facie showing in her 388 petition to grant an evidentiary hearing. After the court heard argument on the matter from counsel representing mother, the Department, the minor, and the guardian, it denied mother's 388 petition.

The court, in denying an evidentiary hearing on the 388 petition, concluded that mother had failed to make a prima facie showing of (1) changed circumstances, or (2) that the requested relief was in the minor's best interests. The court noted that mother's

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"reengagement in mental health & domestic violence counseling and new support system [were] commendable, [but] these represent changing circumstances and given [the minor's] age, granting further services [was] not in her best interest." In emphasizing the minor's need for stability, the juvenile court referred to a recent (March 5) "acute mental health crisis where [mother] was placed on a 5150 hold while pregnant with [the minor's sibling]. Given [the minor's] age and magnitude of risk posed by the instability in mother's mental health, the Court finds that mother has failed to establish a prima facie case under either prong."

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying the 388 petition.

E. Hearing Pursuant to Section 366.26 (July 2019)

The juvenile court conducted a contested 366.26 hearing on July 29, 2019. The Department submitted the matter on its report. The court accepted the report into evidence, advising that it had read it along with its voluminous exhibits, including visitation logs dating back to 2017. The court also received into evidence additional visitation logs offered by mother describing four visits between mother and the minor between March 26, 2019 and June 24, 2019.

Mother testified that she had regularly visited the minor during the dependency proceedings. After the court terminated services in February 2019, the frequency of visits had been reduced to once a month. Mother testified that during supervised visits, she and the minor usually went to the park and played. The supervised visits at the Parent Center since February were one hour in duration; they played with the toys that were available and the minor ate snacks that mother brought to the visits. The minor called mother "mommy" during the visits and gave mother hugs and kisses. Mother described the minor as being affectionate during the visits, telling mother she loved her

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and mother likewise telling the minor she loved her. Mother testified that at the end of each visit, the minor asked to leave with mother.

Mother explained that she was requesting that the juvenile court not terminate her parental rights and that it implement a less permanent plan of guardianship because she loved "[her] children and everybody who [had] seen [mother] parent [had] acknowledge[d] that [she was] a great parent." She testified that she had "never stopped fighting for [her] kid."

After hearing argument, including argument by mother's counsel that the beneficial parent relationship exception applied to prevent the termination of parental rights, the court adopted the recommendations of the Department. It took judicial notice of the prior findings, orders, and judgments of the court in the proceeding. The juvenile court found the minor generally and specifically adoptable. The court concluded further that the beneficial parent exception did not apply. It explained that while mother had visited regularly, it could not find that a beneficial parental relationship existed or that termination of mother's parental rights would be detrimental to the minor. The juvenile court therefore in its order (1) found by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was likely to be adopted, (2) terminated the parental rights of mother and the alleged father, (3) found the permanent plan of adoption to be appropriate, and (4) appointed the prospective adoptive parents as the educational representatives for the minor.

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the order after the 366.26 hearing.

A. Family Reunification Services

When a dependent child is removed from parental custody, the juvenile court is ordinarily required to provide "the child and the child's mother and statutorily presumed father or guardians" with services to facilitate the reunification of the family. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); see Bridget A . v . Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 303.) Where reunification services are ordered for a child over three years old at removal, they begin

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with the dispositional hearing and end 12 months after the child entered foster care. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) For a child under three years of age at the time of removal, services are provided for a period of six months from the dispositional hearing but no longer than 12 months after the child entered foster care. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) These time limitations under section 361.5, subdivisions (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) notwithstanding, the juvenile court may extend the time of services up 18 months after the child's removal, if it is shown that the permanent plan is that the child will be "safely maintained in the home" (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A), and the court finds it reasonably probable "that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian within the extended time period or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or guardian" ( ibid .).

Reunification services are very significant, but parents have no absolute right to receive them. As explained by one court: "The importance of reunification services in the dependency system cannot be gainsaid. The law favors reunification whenever possible. [Citation.] To achieve that goal, ordinarily a parent must be granted reasonable reunification services. [Citation.] But reunification services constitute a benefit; there is no constitutional ' "entitlement" ' to those services. [Citation.]" ( In re Aryanna C . (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242.)

A court may order the bypass of reunification services altogether if one of sixteen circumstances is established by clear and convincing evidence, as specified in section 361.5(b). These exceptions "have been referred to as reunification 'bypass' provisions." ( Tyrone W . v . Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 845.) "These bypass provisions represent the Legislature's recognition that it may be fruitless to

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provide reunification services under certain circumstances. [Citation.]" ( Francisco G . v . Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 597.)

B. Section 388 Petitions to Change Orders

At any time after the court has determined a child to be a dependent of the juvenile court, "[a]ny parent or other person having an interest in a child" may by verified petition request the court to change, modify or set aside a previous juvenile court order "upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence." (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) A petition under section 388 is appropriate to seek, based upon changed circumstances, a return of the child or renewed services after reunification services have been terminated and a 366.26 hearing has been scheduled. ( In re Marilyn H . (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308-309.)

If the court determines from the petition that "it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order," it shall schedule a hearing on the matter. (§ 388, subd. (d).) A parent seeking modification of a prior court order pursuant to a section 388 petition must "make a prima facie showing to trigger the right to proceed by way of a full hearing. [Citation.]" ( In re Marilyn H ., supra , 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.) "There are two parts to the prima facie showing: The parent must demonstrate (1) a genuine change of circumstances or new evidence, and that (2) revoking the previous order would be in the best interests of the children. [Citation.]" ( In re Anthony W . (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1) [petition may be denied ex parte if petitioner "fails to state a change of circumstance or new evidence" or "fails to show that the requested modification would promote the best interest of the child"].) The petition is liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. ( In re Jasmon O . (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415; see also rule 5.570(a).) But to satisfy the requirement that petitioner make a prima facie showing to justify a hearing, "the allegations of the petition must be specific regarding the evidence to be presented

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and must not be conclusory. [Citation.]" ( In re Alayah J . (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478.) And the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the proceedings in making its determination of whether there has been a prima facie showing. ( In re Jackson W . (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258.) Therefore, if the petition's allegations, liberally construed, do not show changed circumstances under which the child's interests would be promoted by changing a prior order, the court need not order a hearing on the section 388 petition. ( In re Zachary G . (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) Such summary denial does not violate the due process rights of the petitioner. ( In re Jeremy W . (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413-1414.)

C. Hearings Under Section 366.26

After it has been adjudicated that a child is a dependent of the juvenile court, the exclusive procedure for establishing the permanent plan for the child is the selection and implementation (permanency planning) hearing as provided under section 366.26. The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court "to provide stable, permanent homes for these children." ( Id ., subd. (b); see In re Jose V . (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792, 1797.) There are six statutory choices for the permanency plan; the preferred choice is adoption, coupled with an order terminating parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see also In re Celine R . (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 ["Legislature has thus determined that, where possible, adoption is the first choice"]; ibid . [where child is adoptable, "adoption is the norm"].) The court selects this option if it "determines . . . by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)

Thus, at the section 366.26 hearing, "in order to terminate parental rights, the court need only make two findings: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated. . . . '[T]he critical decision regarding parental rights will be made at the dispositional or review hearing, that is, that the minor cannot be returned home and that reunification efforts should not be pursued. In such cases, the

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decision to terminate parental rights will be relatively automatic if the minor is going to be adopted.' [Citation.]" ( Cynthia D . v . Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249-250 ( Cynthia D .).)

"If the court determines it is likely the child will be adopted, certain prior findings by the juvenile court (e.g., that returning the child to the physical custody of the parent would create a substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the child) shall constitute a sufficient basis for the termination of parental rights unless the juvenile court finds one of six specified circumstances in which termination would be detrimental [to the child]." ( In re I . W . (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1522-1523, citing § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One such circumstance—the one asserted by mother here—is the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption discussed below. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The six specified circumstances in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) are "actually, exceptions to the general rule that the court must choose adoption where possible." ( In re Celine R ., supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) They " 'must be considered in view of the legislative preference for adoption where reunification efforts have failed.' [Citation.] At this stage of the dependency proceedings, 'it becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place the child in a permanent alternative home.' [Citation.] The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption." ( Ibid ., original italics.)

The relevant exception asserted by mother here is the beneficial parental relationship exception under which the court may conclude that termination of parental rights is inappropriate if it "finds a compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.) There are thus three component determinations made by

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the juvenile court, the first two of which establish the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the third being the court's assessment of whether that relationship (assuming its existence) presents a compelling reason not to terminate parental rights. Those three " 'component determinations [are]—[(1)] whether the parent has maintained regular visitation, [(2)] whether a beneficial parental relationship exists, and [(3)] whether the existence of that relationship constitutes "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." ' [Citations.]" ( In re Caden C . (2019) 34 Cal App.5th 87, 104.)

Assessment of the first component is "quantitative and relatively straightforward, asking whether visitation occurred regularly and often." ( In re Grace P . (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 612.) It is an evaluation of "whether the parent consistently has contact with the child." ( Id . at p. 613.) " 'Sporadic visitation is insufficient to satisfy the first prong . . .' of the exception." ( In re Marcelo B . (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643.)

Determination of the second component of "whether the nature and extent of a particular parent-child relationship is sufficient to be deemed 'beneficial' . . . is a more involved inquiry, made on a case-by-case basis by taking into account many variables which affect the parent/child bond." ( In re Caden C ., supra , 34 Cal App.5th at p. 104.) In this case-specific endeavor, the court looks at such factors as "[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs." ( In re Autumn H . (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) "No matter how loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the existence of an 'emotional bond' with the child, 'the parents must show that they occupy "a parental role" in the child's life.' [Citations.]" ( In re K . P . (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621.) Although day-to-day contact is not required, the relationship "characteristically aris[es] from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences." ( In re Casey D . (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51.)

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In assessing the third component, assuming the parent establishes the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must then determine whether the relationship "constitutes a 'compelling' reason to forgo termination of parental rights." ( In re Caden C ., supra , 34 Cal App.5th at p. 105.) In doing so, the court performs a balancing task of determining whether "the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed , the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." ( In re Autumn H ., supra , 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575, italics added.) But " '[a] biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent.' [Citation.]" ( In re Marcelo B ., supra , 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 643, original italics.)

The burden is on the parent asserting the beneficial parent relationship to produce evidence establishing that exception. ( In re I . W ., supra , 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527.) The parent must prove the exception by a preponderance of the evidence. ( In re Caden C ., supra , 34 Cal App.5th at p. 104.)

D. Standards of Review

The applicable standard of review of mother's appeal of the order denying her 388 petition (H047125) is abuse of discretion. A determination on whether to change an order by granting a 388 petition "is 'committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and [its] ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.' [Citation.] An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court

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has exceeded the bounds of reason by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination. [Citation.]" ( In re Marcelo B . (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 642, quoting and citing In re Stephanie M . (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) This abuse of discretion standard also applies where the court denies a 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. ( In re G . B . (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158.)

Mother's challenge to the order after the 366.26 hearing (as we will explain) is in part, reviewed for substantial evidence, and in part, reviewed under a hybrid substantial evidence/abuse of discretion standard. A finding by the juvenile court at the 366.26 hearing based upon clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted is reviewed for substantial evidence. ( In re Erik P . (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 400.) Review of a court's determination of the applicability of the beneficial parental relationship exception under section 366.26 is governed by a hybrid substantial evidence/abuse of discretion standard. ( In re Bailey J . (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315.)

As a panel of this court explained in In re Bailey J . with respect to the first part of this hybrid standard: "Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court's determination. Thus, . . . a challenge to a juvenile court's finding that there is no beneficial relationship amounts to a contention that the 'undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.' [Citation.] Unless the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, a substantial evidence challenge to this component of the juvenile court's determination cannot succeed." ( In re Bailey J ., supra , 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)

This court explained the second component of the hybrid standard of review as follows: "The other component of . . . the parental relationship exception . . . is the requirement that the juvenile court find that the existence of that relationship constitutes

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a ' compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental.' (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.) A juvenile court finding that the relationship is a 'compelling reason' for finding detriment to the child is based on the facts but is not primarily a factual issue. It is, instead, a 'quintessentially' discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption. [Citation.] Because this component of the juvenile court's decision is discretionary, the abuse of discretion standard of review applies." ( In re Bailey J ., supra , 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315, original italics; see also In re J . C . (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 530-531 [following In re Bailey J .]; In re K . P ., supra , 203 Cal.App.4th 614 at pp. 621-622 [same].)

E. No Abuse of Discretion in Denial of Mother's 388 Petition (H047125)

1 . Failure to Present a Prima Facie Case

The juvenile court below concluded that mother had failed to make a sufficient showing in her 388 petition for two reasons. First, she failed to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. Second, mother did not show the requested relief was in the minor's best interests. Mother contends on appeal that the juvenile court abused its discretion and acted in an "arbitrary" manner by denying her 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. She argues that she made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances justifying an evidentiary hearing on her 388 petition. Mother asserts further that she made a sufficient showing in her petition that her request for resumption of services was in the minor's best interests.

First, in concluding mother had failed to meet her burden of making a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, the juvenile court found that while mother's having recently "reengage[ed] in mental health [and] domestic violence counseling" was "commendable," it did not constitute "changed circumstances" under section 388. The

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court further commended mother for her "new support system," but likewise found that it did not constitute changed circumstances.

There was ample support in the record for the juvenile court's finding that mother had failed to make a showing of changed circumstances. Mother's conclusory assertion in her petition that she had "maintained stable mental health" was insufficient. Further, it was not unreasonable for the court to conclude that mother's references to various activities, including counseling, in support of her assertion of stable mental health, upon closer examination, did not present a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. For instance, her psychotherapeutic counseling with David Hayes was recent, having commenced—after a significant hiatus from counseling—only two months prior to the filing of mother's petition. Although Hayes advised in his June 25 letter that mother was "meeting her treatment goals and appear[ed] to benefit from the therapeutic process" (italics added), Hayes failed to state whether she had made progress in addressing her mental health issues. Further, the fact that Hayes indicated in his clinical notes a that he recommended weekly therapy and intervention for one year and listed therapeutic goals over a one-year target period underscored that the recent resumption by mother of therapy constituted, at best, a changing, rather than a changed circumstance. (See In re Mickel O . (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 [proponent of 388 petition "must show changed , not changing, circumstances"].) The juvenile court so concluded.

In addition, occurrences after reunification services were terminated on February 4, unfortunately, undercut mother's assertion that her maintenance of stable mental health constituted a changed circumstance supporting her 388 petition. One

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month after such termination, on March 5, mother had to be placed on a section 5150 hold due to suicidal ideation, after having threatened to jump off the Santa Cruz Wharf. The court highlighted "the severity of [this] mental health crisis" occurring while she was pregnant. Further, Hayes noted that, in addition to this March 5 mental health crisis, mother had experienced four other "events identified as crisis in the . . . [two] months [prior to May 7], some resulting in community safety intervention."

Mother claimed in her petition that she was "continu[ing] to expand her support system." She referred to three attachments in support of this assertion. First, mother referred to her letter, wherein she stated that she was "continuing to expand [her] social support system by reaching out at recovery meetings as well as support groups she attend[ed]." Second, mother referred to a June 12 letter from Carrie Jensen, a NAMI Peer to Peer Instructor. Jensen stated that mother had attended all classes—without stating the time period in which they were held—except the weekend when her new baby was born. Other than Jensen stating her opinion that the classes were "really helping [mother] deal with her mental illness," she did not identify what qualitative progress mother had made. Third, mother referred to a June 14 letter from a friend and coparticipant in NAMI groups, who stated that she had "witnessed [mother's] provid[ing] constant love and care that her daughter needs"; mother had "been taking steps in recovery to better herself and no one should be punished for reaching out for help"; and "[mother's] mental illness ha[d] not compromised her ability to care for her child." The comments by mother's friend concerned mother's relationship with her newborn child, not the minor. The friend's letter, in any event, did not demonstrate an expanded support system that would facilitate mother's ultimately caring for the minor. Mother's claim in her petition that she was "continu[ing] to expand her support system," coupled with the attachments to her petition on this issue, were not sufficient to compel a finding by the court of changed circumstances.

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Likewise, reasonable grounds are shown in the record to support the juvenile court's conclusion that mother failed to show the requested order for a resumption of reunification services was in the minor's best interest. Once services are terminated—as was the case here—"the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability" ( In re Marilyn H ., supra , 5 Cal.4th at p. 309), and there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the child's best interest ( id . at pp. 309-310). The juvenile court here held that mother had not presented "prima facie evidence that it would be in [the minor's] best interest[,] given that [the minor] is entitled[,] as the [L]egislature [has] said[,] to move forward with a stable, permanent plan for her."

Mother argued in her petition, in an attachment and in a letter attachment, that resumption of services was in the minor's best interest. Collectively in her petition and attachments, she raised the following points: (1) mother was stable with her mental health; (2) mother had voluntarily participated in services; (3) mother had cared for the minor the first nine months of her life; (4) mother and the minor had continued to bond throughout the proceedings; (5) the minor knew that M.C. was her mother; and (6) the minor asked during every visit to live with mother.

We have addressed in detail, ante , mother's claim that she was maintaining mental stability as of the time her 388 petition was filed. Further, although it is commendable that mother voluntarily participated in services subsequent to the order at the February 2019 18-month review hearing, this fact, under the circumstances, did not compel a finding by the court that mother had made a prima facie showing that the minor's best interest would be served by an order resuming reunification services. And while mother cared for the minor the first nine months of her life, it is also the case that the minor was in foster care continuously for 24 months after her initial detention. The juvenile court noted that mother had received 18 months of reunification services while the minor was under three years old, and that the minor had "been in foster care most of her life." During those two years in which the minor was in foster care, the contact

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between mother and the minor was, for the most part, through supervised visitation. At no time did it progress to day-long or overnight or multiple-day unsupervised visits as the Department had hoped. Moreover, while mother argues that she and the minor continued to bond throughout the time the minor was a dependent child, the record also shows that the minor had "a secure attachment" with her foster family with whom she had been living since June 2018.

The juvenile court praised mother for her engaging in therapy and domestic violence counseling and having made efforts to obtain community support. But in concluding that mother had failed to make a prima facie showing through the 388 petition that resumption of reunification services was in the minor's best interest, the court found that the activities had not "been for the length of time . . . needed, and in this case, . . . it's no longer in [the minor's] best interest to continue to wait for [mother's] mental health to get to be in a stable place where [mother] can safely parent [her] daughter."

Mother argues on appeal that although the minor here "was quite young, the mother could technically receive up to 24 months of reunification services." This argument apparently suggests that the juvenile court placed undue emphasis on the fact that mother had received 18 months of reunification services, where the ordinary statutory period for children under three is six months from the dispositional hearing but no longer than 12 months after the child's entry into foster care. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) In support of her argument, mother relies on In re M . F . (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1. That case does not further mother's position here.

In In re M . F ., the appellate court addressed, inter alia, the extent to which the juvenile court could continue services for the parent of a minor child under three years old where there was an express finding that reasonable services had not been provided by the agency. The appellate court first rejected the minor child's contention that under the statutory scheme, the juvenile court could extend services to a parent of a minor child under three only up to the 12-month review date. ( M . F ., supra , 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 19-

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20.) It concluded that under section 361.5, subdivision (a)(3)(A), the court could extend services up to 18 months upon the making of appropriate statutory findings. ( In re M . F ., supra , at p. 20.) The appellate court went on to hold that although section 366.26 requires the setting of a selection and implementation hearing if the child has not been returned to the parent at the 18-month review date, when the juvenile court finds that reasonable services have not been offered or provided, it need not observe this 18-month deadline for setting a 366.26 hearing. ( In re M . F ., supra , at pp. 20-23.) Here, there was no finding below that reasonable services were not offered or provided to mother. To the contrary, the juvenile court found on three separate occasions that reasonable services had been offered and provided to mother. In re M . F . has no application here.

While we are mindful that a 388 petition is liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency ( In re Jasmon O ., supra , 8 Cal.4th at p. 415), its allegations must be specific, not conclusory ( In re Alayah J ., supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 478). The juvenile court here acknowledged that it had adjudicated nearly all matters in the dependency proceeding,

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and that it had taken into consideration, as was appropriate ( In re Jackson W ., supra , 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 258), the entire factual and procedural history of the case. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother's 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing after concluding, through a liberal construction of the petition's allegations, that mother had not showed changed circumstances under which the child's interests would be promoted by changing the order after the 18-month review hearing. (See In re Zachary G , supra , 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 806-808.)

2 . Mother's Due Process Argument

Mother argues on appeal that her due process rights were violated because the juvenile court, in deciding mother's 388 petition, considered extraneous evidence that was neither offered nor presented by the parties in this case—namely, evidence from a separate dependency proceeding involving mother's new baby. Mother contends that because "[t]he court considered evidence outside the record," she was unable below to "challenge or test the sufficiency of the evidence as it related to [the minor]." Further, she contends that the error is magnified because the extraneous "evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, was not entered into evidence in this case, this [appellate c]ourt does not have access to what the juvenile court considered in making its determination."

"A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court. [Citations.]" ( In re Dakota H . (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222; see also People v . Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 786, fn. 7 [failure to assert evidentiary objection below on basis that admission of evidence

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violated defendant's constitutional rights forfeited].) A key rationale for the forfeiture doctrine " 'is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.' [Citation.]" ( Doers v . Golden Gate Bridge etc . Dist . (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1 ( Doers ), original italics.) This principle that claims unpreserved at the trial level are forfeited on appeal "has been applied in dependency proceedings in a wide variety of contexts." ( In re G . C . (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1398-1399.)

Mother did not raise an objection below that the juvenile court was allegedly considering extraneous evidence in deciding whether mother had presented through her 388 petition a prima facie case. Had she done so, the juvenile court could have readily addressed whether it was, or was not, giving consideration to matters not presented in the instant dependency proceeding. It is therefore apparent that a defect, if any, " 'could easily have been corrected at the trial.' [Citation.]" ( Doers , supra , 23 Cal.3d at pp. 184-185, fn. 1.) Mother has forfeited her appellate argument. ( In re Dakota H ., supra , 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 221-222.)

Even were we to consider the merits of mother's forfeited claim, we would conclude it lacks merit. We have reviewed the entire transcript from the hearing on mother's 388 petition in the context of the 388 petition itself and the other proceedings in this case as detailed above. We do not find error in the juvenile court's alleged consideration of extraneous evidence.

The underlying basis for mother's argument was the following statement by the court near the beginning of the hearing on the 388 petition: "I know this is an important motion for [mother] and just—I can't help but be[] aware of facts concerning the recent birth of [mother's] child and that I was the judge that heard a contested detention hearing relating to that. [¶] So I just want to make sure that the parties know that I have that information and part of it was included in the 388 application showing that the work that the mother has been doing with her mental health providers, the mental health support

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that she's getting from other individuals and the hard work that she's doing surrounding the birth of her new child, and again getting domestic violence counseling. [¶] So all that work that she is doing you—I definitely think is really positive and I am aware of that evidence. So given that I am aware of that evidence, through not only hearing her testify and seeing the support people in the audience concerning the detention of her daughter, [mother's counsel], I think I understand [mother's] position, and so I would like to hear from minor's counsel and county counsel and then have you rebut their presentation. [¶] But then I did also want the record to reflect that as [mother] knows, I have been the judge on [the minor's] case almost for the whole time. I have seen [mother] go through a lot of changes, and so I do have that knowledge of the whole scope of this case in addition to—so when I am sitting hearing this 388 concerning the 366.26 hearing I do have that background."

As we read the record, it does not support mother's contention that the juvenile court considered, to mother's prejudice, evidentiary matters outside of the instant dependency proceeding. The court stated that some of the information received in the detention hearing involving mother's newborn baby was the same information disclosed in the instant 388 petition concerning the work mother had been doing with mental health providers, obtaining mental health support, and receiving domestic violence counseling. The only information identified by the court that was not part of the instant proceedings—the fact that mother received support from persons in the audience at the detention hearing for her minor baby—was favorable to mother, given that a key issue throughout the proceedings was mother's lack of a support system. And as noted, ante , the court's consideration of the entire factual and procedural history of the instant dependency proceeding—as disclosed in the court's statement quoted above—was entirely appropriate. ( In re Jackson W ., supra , 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 258.)

Therefore, even were we to consider the merits of mother forfeited claim, we conclude there was no error.

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F. No Error in Court's Order After 366.26 Hearing

Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in its order after the 366.26 hearing terminating parental rights. She contends that she established the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption and termination of parental rights. In doing so, she argues that the evidence showed that she regularly visited the minor, her relationship with the minor was parental in nature rather than simply a visiting one, and the minor would be harmed by the termination of parental rights.

We begin by noting that mother does not challenge on appeal the juvenile court's findings in support of termination of rights. Those required findings were "(1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated." ( Cynthia D ., supra , 5 Cal.4th at pp. 249-250.) The current foster parents were committed to adopting the minor, and the Department expressed the belief that the minor was generally and specifically adoptable. There was no evidence presented below to the contrary, and mother did not challenge the Department's position. Further, it was not disputed that reunification services had been previously terminated at the 18-month review hearing. The juvenile court's conclusion that parental rights should be terminated—putting aside mother's contentions (addressed below) regarding the beneficial parental relationship exception—was based upon the two requisite findings supported by substantial evidence.

We address the merits of mother's claim that the court erred in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception inapplicable. In considering mother's position, we are mindful of the California Supreme Court's explanation that this exception to an adoptability finding " 'must be considered in view of the legislative preference for adoption where reunification efforts have failed.' . . . Th[is] statutory exception[] merely permit[s] the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption." ( In re Celine R ., supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)

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And it must be remembered that, where there is a supported adoptability finding, termination of parental rights may be found to be inappropriate under the beneficial parental relationship exception only if the juvenile court "finds a compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.) We examine the three component determinations required for the juvenile court to apply the exception, namely, " '[(1)] whether the parent has maintained regular visitation, [(2)] whether a beneficial parental relationship exists, and [(3)] whether the existence of that relationship constitutes "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." ' [Citations.]" ( In re Caden C ., supra , 34 Cal App.5th at p. 104.)

The juvenile court below found that mother had visited regularly. In so concluding, the court expressed as a caveat that "there [were] some interruptions in the visitations." This was an apparent reference to the period between November 2017 and February 12, 2018, discussed ante , in which mother did not visit the minor at all.

But the juvenile court concluded that there was no beneficial parental relationship between mother and the minor. It concluded that "unfortunately[, it could not] make that finding in this case." We consider the following factors in reviewing the juvenile court's conclusion: "(1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, (3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and the child, and (4) the child's particular needs. [Citation.]" ( In re Angel B . (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 467, fn. omitted.)

Applying the first two factors, the minor was very young when she was originally detained and it is unclear from the record the extent to which she had any understanding of the concept of a biological parent. The minor spent the first nine months of her life living with mother. She spent the next two years and one month under the custody and care of two different licensed foster families. The minor had thus been outside the care of mother from the time the child was nine months to when she was nearly three years old.

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During the vast majority of that time period—up to December 2018 (two months before termination of services)—visitation between mother and the minor had not exceeded two-hour visits. Although the duration of visits increased in December 2018, poor weather and mother's lack of housing proved to be challenges to those longer visits. And after termination of services, the record shows that there were only four visits between March 26 and June 24, 2019.

The evidence relevant to the third factor presented a mixed showing. There was evidence, for example, that as of December 2018, after the Department's approval of longer visits, the foster mother expressed concerns about the effect of visitation upon the minor. The foster mother reported that "[the minor] would tell the daycare provider 'No' when they told her it was a time for a visit, or cling to the caregiver and her husband when it was time to leave. When [the minor] returned from visits, it was reported [the minor] was at times aggressive and would act out with the other children." On the positive side, the numerous pages of visitation logs in the record generally showed good interactions between mother and the minor. For example, the records show that the minor would smile and reach out to mother at the beginning of visits. On different occasions at the end of visits, the minor would either wave to mother or smile in response to mother telling the child that she loved her. On one occasion in July 2018, the minor attempted to say, "I love you" in response to mother's expressing her love for the minor.

In addressing the fourth factor—the minor's particular needs—the record showed that her needs were being met by her current foster family, the Department reporting that the foster parents were committed to adopting the minor and that she had "a secure attachment" with them. The Department indicated to the court that the prospective adoptive parents had been caring for the minor full time since June 1, 2018, and had "been able to meet all of [the minor's] needs on a daily basis." The Department commented further that, although the minor was too young to comment, she "present[ed] as a happy child who [was] clearly benefit[ing] from the love, attention, and stimulation

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of her prospective adoptive parents." The minor would obviously benefit from the stability and permanency that her current foster family offered.

By way of contrast, mother's circumstances, unfortunately, did not offer potential stability to the minor. She had not maintained stable housing as of the time of the 366.26 hearing. And—significantly, given that it was the source of the original proceedings—as of July 2019, mother had not shown stability with respect to her mental health. As recently as March 2019, mother had suffered a very serious mental health issue that resulted in her hospitalization for suicidal ideation. And she had experienced four other occurrences between March and May 2019 identified as crisis events. Moreover, mother's therapist, Hayes, indicated in his clinical notes that the recommended treatment plan for his patient's mental health included the reduction of crisis events and continued therapeutic treatment for an "[i]ntervention" period of one year (May 2019 to May 2020).

The Department concluded that mother's relationship with the minor had not progressed beyond, "at best, . . . a 'visiting relationship.' " The juvenile court concurred with this assessment. Specifically, the court concluded that the contacts between mother and the minor did not evidence a parental relationship. In so concluding, the court, citing In re Beatrice M . (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, acknowledged that their contacts had "been loving and playful and positive and appropriate" but that "that, in and of itself [was] not sufficient." In In re Beatrice M ., a panel of this court affirmed the juvenile court's termination of parental rights and rejection of the beneficial parental relationship exception, concluding: "No matter how loving and frequent [the parents'] contact with the girls, appellants had not occupied a parental role in relation to them at any time during their lives. 'Interaction between [a] natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child . . . . The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.' [Citation.]" ( Id . at pp. 1418-1419.)

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Mother argues on appeal to the contrary. She asserts that "[mother] acted as a parent to her daughter, not just a friendly visitor." Mother contends that she and the minor "shared a positive and beneficial bond" and that mother "acted in a parental fashion." She cites to the many positive interactions between her and the minor during visitation, the fact that the minor on occasion referred to mother as " 'mommy,' " and that mother would change the minor's diapers and redirect the minor to teach her right from wrong. Notwithstanding the existence of a record, especially noted in the visitation logs, of positive interactions between mother and the minor, substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding here that a beneficial parental relationship did not exist. Mother's "challenge to [the] juvenile court's finding that there is no beneficial relationship amounts to a contention that the 'undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.' [Citation.]" ( In re Bailey J ., supra , 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) Because the record here does not show indisputably the existence of a beneficial parental relationship between mother and the minor, her appellate challenge fails. ( Ibid .)

Even were we to conclude that the juvenile court erred in finding no beneficial parental relationship—error that we expressly do not agree occurred here—reversal would not be warranted unless we were to also conclude that the court erred in finding there was no " compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.) In making this determination, the juvenile court was required to "balance[] the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer." ( In re Autumn H ., supra , 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575, italics added.) The exception to adoption would apply only if parental rights termination "would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed ." ( Ibid ., italics added.)

Based upon the entirety of the record, including but not limited to the evidence recited above relative to whether mother established a beneficial parental relationship, the

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court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that there was no compelling reason for determining that the termination of mother's parental rights would be detrimental to the minor. ( In re Bailey J ., supra , 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315.)

In concluding that the juvenile court did not err in terminating mother's parental rights, we nonetheless acknowledge the substantial effort mother has made throughout the dependency, including her efforts to comply with her case plan. Moreover, it is very clear from the record that mother loves the minor very much and wants only the best for her daughter. Under the circumstances of this case, however, and given the legislative preference for adoption in instances, such as here, where reunification services have proved unsuccessful ( In re Celine R ., supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 53), we must affirm the order after the 366.26 hearing finding the minor adoptable and terminating parental rights.

The order of July 18, 2019, denying mother's petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, challenged herein (H047125) is affirmed. The challenged (H047136) order of July 29, 2019, after the 366.26 hearing, in which the court, inter alia, terminated parental rights and found the minor adoptable, is affirmed.

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/s/ _________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

/s/ _________
PREMO, ACTING P.J.

/s/ _________
MIHARA, J.