California Cases June 02, 2020: Kern Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. L.S. (In re D.S.)

Case Description

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court , rule 8.1115(a) , prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published , except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. JD138346-00)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Cynthia L. Loo, Commissioner.

David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Bryan C. Walters, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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L.S. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights as to her now two and a half year old daughter, D.S. (the baby). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) She contends the juvenile court erred when it denied her trial attorney's request for a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing to consider placement of D.S. with her maternal aunt. We conclude mother lacks standing to challenge the order terminating parental rights on the grounds of relative placement and, in any event, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.

At 2:45 a.m. on February 17, 2018, Bakersfield police investigating a referral found mother standing outside a hotel with six-month-old D.S. (baby) in 40 degree weather. Mother had no money, nowhere to stay, and no provisions to care for the baby. Mother was arrested for child endangerment and the baby taken into protective custody. The baby was placed in a pre-adoptive foster family home, where she remained throughout these proceedings.

This was not the first time mother and the baby came to the attention of the Kern County Department of Human Services (Department). Within days of the baby's birth, the Department investigated referrals alleging mother was homeless, had a history of depression and talked about harming herself, and fed juice to the baby. The social worker spoke with mother, who was staying with a woman she called her cousin, M.M., but found the allegations inconclusive because mother was not cooperative. In October 2017, the baby was taken into protective custody after mother was arrested when she pulled a knife and barricaded herself in a room. The Department released the baby to

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M.M. so she could file for guardianship, but she failed to follow through and mother regained custody. When interviewed, mother told the social worker she moved from Philadelphia to California two weeks before the baby's birth, and while she had family in Philadelphia, they did not treat her well.

On February 22, 2018, the Department filed a petition alleging the baby came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect), based on mother's failure to provide the baby with food, clothing, and shelter, and inability to care for the baby due to her mental illness, and subdivision (g), based on the Department's inability to locate mother. Mother failed to appear at the detention hearing the following day and her whereabouts were unknown. The juvenile court found the petition's allegations true, the baby was a person described under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), and reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the need for the baby's removal. The juvenile court ordered the baby detained from mother and set a disposition hearing for March 28, 2018.

Maternal Aunt's ICPC Application

On March 1, 2018, the family finding SW called maternal aunt R.S. (maternal aunt) to explain family finding services and sent her an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) application by email and regular mail. On March 5, 2018, the family finding SW received a call from maternal aunt and answered her

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questions regarding the ICPC application. The next day, the family finding SW received maternal aunt's ICPC application, which he immediately forwarded to the family services social worker (family services SW), the court intake social worker (court intake SW), and the ICPC social worker.

On March 8, 2018, the family finding SW sent seven other maternal relatives information concerning placement. Thereafter, a number of maternal relatives contacted the Department to express their support for placing the baby with maternal aunt.

In a report prepared for the March 28, 2018 disposition hearing, the court intake SW reported she spoke with maternal aunt about mother and the baby on March 9, 2018. Maternal aunt confirmed mother had another child who was adopted around 2011 by a paternal cousin, who lived in Norristown, Pennsylvania. Maternal aunt said she received calls from mother on multiple occasions asking her to get legal guardianship of the baby, but mother would not follow through.

The report stated the Department recommended the provision of reunification services to mother. As of March 23, 2018, there were two relative applications pending, one for non-related extended family member M.M., and the other an ICPC application for maternal aunt, who lived in Philadelphia. As part of the case plan goals and objectives the Department recommended the juvenile court order into effect, the following was listed as one of the service activities for the Department: "The social worker will request the home of maternal aunt, [R.S.,] be evaluated in the state of Pennsylvania through Interstate Compact (ICPC) within 30 days."

Mother Appears in the Juvenile Court

Mother appeared at the March 28, 2018 disposition hearing and was appointed an attorney, who expressed a concern about mother needing a guardian ad litem. The juvenile court granted mother's attorney's request to trail the matter for one day. Mother, however, did not appear in court the following day. The juvenile court continued the matter to April 2, 2018, because mother called in sick.

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Mother did not appear at the April 2, 2018 hearing. Mother's attorney stated she was unsure how to proceed, as mother likely needed a guardian ad litem, but she doubted mother would consent to one. The juvenile court granted mother's attorney's request to set aside the jurisdiction findings made at the detention hearing because mother was not given proper notice. The juvenile court acknowledged the request for a guardian ad litem, but did not think it was procedurally proper without notice to mother. The juvenile court ordered the baby detained from mother, vested the Department with temporary placement pending disposition and further court orders, and set a jurisdiction hearing for April 23, 2018.

Mother, who had been arrested three times after the April 2, 2018 hearing, appeared in custody at the April 23, 2018 hearing. During her testimony on paternity, mother denied knowing the identity of the baby's father. Mother told the juvenile court she wanted her family in Philadelphia contacted and "let them take over this because I ain't got time for this." The juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem for mother based on the concerns expressed in the social worker's reports and by mother's attorney, and granted mother's attorney's request to continue the jurisdiction hearing, which it set for May 14, 2018.

The juvenile court told mother that if she was released from custody before the next hearing, she should give her social worker and attorney her address and phone number. Mother responded that if there was any trouble locating her, they should contact her family in Philadelphia. Mother named several relatives and stated her "family will be here in California dealing with this matter. I'm signing over - and, for the record, I'm signing over custody to my family in Philadelphia because I can't deal - I'm not from California, and I don't like how y'all deal with me." When the juvenile court asked for her relative's phone number, mother answered she had provided that "countless amount of times" to the Department and had given it to her attorney, who confirmed she had it.

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The Jurisdiction Hearing

At the May 14, 2018 jurisdiction hearing, an agreement was reached to amend the petition to delete the reference to mother's mental health diagnoses and dismiss the section 300, subdivision (g) allegation. After mother submitted on the reports, the juvenile court found the allegations of the amended petition true. The juvenile court granted the Department's request for a psychological evaluation in order to assess mother's ability to participate in and benefit from reunification services, and appointed Dr. Gary A. Longwith to perform the evaluation. The juvenile court set the disposition hearing for June 26, 2018.

The Disposition Hearing

Dr. Longwith conducted a psychological examination of mother on June 12, 2018. He diagnosed her with schizophrenia and opined that, given the totality of the medical evidence, mother would not likely benefit from reunification services. Based on this, the Department recommended a second psychological evaluation be ordered for mother. Mother was in local jail charged with several crimes related to an encounter with police on May 27, 2018.

At the June 26, 2018 hearing, the juvenile court ordered a second psychological evaluation and appointed Dr. Sheila Morris to perform it. The disposition hearing was continued to August 7, 2018. The Department learned Dr. Morris was not accepting new cases and on July 30, 2018, requested the appointment of another doctor. Two days later, the juvenile court appointed Dr. Carol Matthews to perform the evaluation and continued the disposition hearing to September 17, 2018.

Meanwhile, a social worker met with mother at the pre-trial facility on July 16, 2018 to review her initial reunification case plan. Mother told the social worker, who was not her assigned social worker, that she wanted her sister in Philadelphia to get placement of her baby. The social worker explained the ICPC process and why it was important for her sister to get her application in before the dispositional hearing. Mother

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stated she understood and would talk to her sister. The social worker said she would pass the information along to mother's assigned social worker.

On July 27, 2018, mother, who was out of custody, met with a social service supervisor to review her case plan and visits. Mother asked about her case being transferred to Philadelphia and stated her sister applied to have the baby placed with her there. The supervisor directed mother to speak with her attorney. When the supervisor asked how she would visit the baby if she returned to Philadelphia, mother said she could do face-to-face visits over the phone pending the outcome of her ICPC. The social worker told her to speak to her attorney to advise her what would be best for her. Mother also spoke with her assigned social worker and inquired about the baby going to her sister. The assigned social worker told mother she needed to look into the ICPC.

On July 31, 2018, mother was spotted in the Department's parking lots hiding behind trucks and she attempted to get into the building through the employee entrance. Police were called and arrested her for public intoxication. Mother was arrested again on August 14, 2018. On August 28, 2018, the criminal court granted defense counsel's motion for an examination to determine whether mother was competent to stand trial and cooperate with counsel.

On August 22, 2018, maternal aunt called the court intake SW to let her know she was almost finished with the process to become a foster parent in Pennsylvania. The SW thanked her for the information and explained the Department could not do anything until the disposition hearing scheduled for September 17, 2018. The family services SW spoke with mother on September 8, 2018, at the pre-trial facility. Mother asked about her sister's eligibility and the social worker discussed the ICPC process.

Dr. Matthews evaluated mother and diagnosed her with schizophrenia. Dr. Matthews opined that, given the totality of the medical evidence, mother was not a candidate for family reunification and all indications were that she was incapable of utilizing reunification services in the statutory time frame.

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In a report prepared for the September 17, 2018 disposition hearing, the social worker stated the Department would not be recommending reunification services be provided to mother due to her untreated and severe mental illness. The Department recommended the denial of services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), as the doctors' reports showed she was diagnosed with a mental disability that rendered her incapable of utilizing services and even with services, she was unlikely to be capable of caring for the baby within six months.

The social worker stated in the report that maternal aunt was asking the juvenile court to order an ICPC from Pennsylvania. Case plan goals and objectives were attached to the Department's report, which listed, among the Department's service activities, that the social worker would request maternal aunt's home be evaluated in Pennsylvania through ICPC within 30 days.

At the September 17, 2018 disposition hearing, mother's attorney requested a 30-day continuance due to the bypass recommendation, which the juvenile court granted. The disposition hearing was continued to October 24, 2018.

In a supplemental report for the October 24, 2018 hearing, the social worker stated that on September 18, 2018, the criminal court found mother was competent to stand trial and able to cooperate with counsel. Mother was found guilty of threatening with intent to terrorize and obstructing or resisting an executive order (Pen. Code, §§ 69, 422), and her sentencing was scheduled for November 14, 2108. The report repeated maternal aunt's request that the court order an ICPC. The Department continued to recommend a bypass of reunification services and that a section 366.26 hearing be set.

At the October 24, 2018 hearing, mother's attorney requested a continuance so either mother could be reevaluated or the psychologists subpoenaed. Mother's attorney explained that since mother's incarceration, she had been placed on medication and her mental state had improved, as shown by the criminal court finding her competent, and the psychologists might have a different opinion about whether she would benefit from

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services. The juvenile court granted the request and set the continued hearing for December 4, 2018. The juvenile court granted a request by the baby's caretakers to be given de facto parent status.

In a report for the December 4, 2018 hearing, the Department continued to recommend the denial of services. Mother had been sentenced to two years in prison and was going to be transferred to the Central California Women's Facility. In addition to denying services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), based on mother's mental disability, the Department was recommending denial of services under section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1), as mother was incarcerated and unable to participate in services within the statutory time frame. The report restated maternal aunt's request for the court to order an ICPC.

During a meeting the family services SW had with mother on October 27, 2018, mother discussed her sister and the ICPC process. The social worker told mother the Department would seek an ICPC court order at the dispositional hearing. In an October 30, 2018 conversation with the baby's caretaker, the family services SW answered questions about the ICPC process and the caretaker asked if the maternal aunt was interested in placement. The social worker responded that she was doing her part in seeking placement, but she must wait for the completion of the dispositional hearing. The caretaker said she was interested in adopting the baby should mother fail to reunify.

According to the Department's service logs, a social service supervisor spoke with maternal aunt on October 31, 2018, who stated she wanted placement of the baby and was going through an agency in Pennsylvania to get approved, which was almost complete. After the call, the supervisor noticed an ICPC application was received on March 6, 2018, which was waiting on the court to proceed. The supervisor spoke with the family services SW, who said she spoke with maternal aunt the prior day and explained the court process in general terms, as well as placement. In addition, the family services SW offered maternal aunt in-person visits, which maternal aunt said she

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could not do as she was out of state, or face-to-face phone contact, which the social worker would arrange with the caretaker.

At the December 4, 2018 hearing, the juvenile court granted mother's attorney's request to continue the hearing so both psychologists could reevaluate mother. Mother's attorney raised the issue of relative placement, stating she was not sure what steps the Department could take to start facilitating that. Mother's attorney believed the juvenile court could order the ICPC once jurisdiction was taken and asked the court to do that now "so we can at least have some movement on that." She noted the maternal aunt had come forward and "been put on hold for this period of time," but they needed "to be moving forward with that as a possibility." The juvenile court granted mother's attorney's request to order the ICPC, adding that was "without any indication as to what the court will do, but other than allow for the groundwork to be laid for that consideration." The juvenile court continued the hearing to January 10, 2019.

On December 11, 2018, the juvenile court issued the order authorizing the initiation of an ICPC. The order stated that on May 14, 2018, the baby was adjudged a dependent and ordered placed in the Department's care for suitable placement, and maternal aunt had come forward to request a home evaluation for purposes of possible placement, therefore the Department was authorized to initiate a request for ICPC services and place the child if the home and relative were appropriate and approved by ICPC in Pennsylvania. The order further stated the court agreed to a number of listed conditions. The Department forwarded the ICPC application, a request packet for a foster home study for maternal aunt, and the ICPC court order to the Pennsylvania ICPC office by certified mail on January 2, 2019.

The family services SW met with the baby's caretaker on December 17, 2018. According to the Department's service log, maternal aunt was receiving courtesy FaceTime visits with the baby, which the caretaker said were going well. Instead of having one hour visits, visits lasted 15 to 20 minutes per week, which gave maternal aunt

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the opportunity to see the baby engaged rather than experiencing the short attention span of a toddler.

The disposition hearing was not held until March 5, 2019, as the juvenile court granted mother's attorney's request to trail the matter to January 18, 2019, and her later request to continue the hearing to March 5, 2019, because mother was not transported from prison. The two psychologists reevaluated mother and while her overall condition had improved, both opined she remained unable to benefit from services. The Department continued to recommend denial of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(2) and (e)(1).

Mother testified at the disposition hearing that she was participating in counseling, seeing a psychiatrist and therapist, and taking an antipsychotic medication at the prison. Mother acknowledged having mental health issues, but she was doing "much better" on her medication. Mother had not seen the baby since being moved to Chowchilla in mid-January and believed her last visit was in December 2018, at which time the baby was "really happy" to see her. Mother was cooperating with services as best she could and felt she could benefit from her case plan components. Mother expected to be released from prison as early as April or May, but it was likely she would not be released until August 2019. Although mother had not previously planned to stay in California, she planned to stay in California after her release from prison, as there were a lot of supportive services available in California that were not available in Philadelphia.

County counsel, joined by the baby's attorney, asked the court to follow the recommendations and deny mother services. Mother's attorney argued mother should be offered reunification services as her improved condition showed she could benefit from services, which could continue beyond 12 months. Mother's attorney also noted an ICPC had been submitted for maternal aunt to get placement and asked that whatever the court decided, it would "hold relative placement preference open until that ICPC can be completed because we are very interested in placement with family."

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The juvenile court adjudged the baby a dependent, denied mother services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(2) and (e)(1), and set a section 366.26 hearing for July 2, 2019. Mother's attorney repeated her request for a court order that the relative placement preference remain open until the ICPC was completed. The court stated it would do so; its minute order states that "relative placement is to remain open until ICPC is completed." Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition on March 12, 2019, but her case was dismissed as abandoned, as she failed to file a petition.

The Permanency Planning Hearing

In a report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing, the Department recommended termination of parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption. Mother had visited the baby 10 times since the baby was taken into protective custody in February 2018, and the quality of visits were fair. Since the visits were not consistent, the baby's relationship with mother had diminished and the two only had a visiting relationship. Maternal aunt had a few FaceTime calls with the baby and applied for placement, but her application/licensing process was in the approval stage. Maternal aunt expressed a commitment to obtain placement and adopt the baby.

The Department determined the baby, who did not have any behavioral issues, or medical or mental health conditions, was generally adoptable. The baby was bonded to her caretakers, who had been caring for her since February 2018, and they were committed to adopting her. The adoption social worker stated that even if the adoption was unsuccessful, it would not be difficult to secure another prospective adoptive home for the baby. The juvenile court granted the baby's caretakers request to designate them as the baby's prospective adoptive parents.

The section 366.26 hearing was continued to August 13, 2019, because the guardian ad litem did not receive the Department's report. At the August 13, 2019 hearing, mother's attorney asked the Department to provide its daily service logs from

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detention to the present so she could verify how many visits mother had. The juvenile court granted the request and continued the hearing to September 17, 2019.

The Department submitted several supplemental reports for the continued section 366.26 hearing. The social worker reported that mother attended 12 out of 147 visits. Mother had been transferred to Patton State Hospital in August 2019, and it was not known how long she would remain there.

On August 21, 2019, the ICPC social worker notified the adoption social worker maternal aunt's ICPC application had been approved. The Department, however, decided not to remove the baby from her current placement to place her with maternal aunt, and a placement denial letter was mailed to maternal aunt on September 5, 2019. That same day, an adoption social worker spoke with maternal aunt about the Department's decision. Maternal aunt stated she and mother were very upset and demanded an explanation. She was not satisfied the Department could not change the baby's placement "per California State Regulations, due to the length of time she has resided with her caretakers," which the social worker noted had been 18.5 months. Maternal aunt requested the names and phone numbers of the social worker's supervisor, program specialist, and adoptions program director, which were provided to her, and said she would " 'go all the way to the top' " if necessary in order to have the baby placed with her. The social worker told maternal aunt the placement denial letter and grievance instructions had been mailed to her, and encouraged her to file a grievance. The social worker also emailed the documents to maternal aunt.

The Department's daily service logs contained details concerning maternal aunt's FaceTime visits with the baby and the ICPC process. On January 22, 2019, the caretaker reported maternal aunt was having weekly FaceTime visits lasting 20 to 30 minutes, but by March 27, 2019, maternal aunt was no longer calling for visits.

The adoption social worker spoke with maternal aunt on June 3, 2019, regarding her ICPC. Maternal aunt stated she completed the home study process through a foster

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care agency, but California did not contract with that agency. She was diligently working with another foster care agency to get everything transferred over, but she might have to redo her home study. When the social worker asked maternal aunt about her commitment towards the baby, she said she wanted to adopt the baby.

They also discussed the FaceTime calls, the last of which occurred in March 2019. Maternal aunt expressed some concerns about not following through with them. The adoption social worker and maternal aunt agreed FaceTime calls would occur every Sunday morning, and maternal aunt would let her know if she and the caretaker decided to change the time and day of visits. The social worker explained it was maternal aunt's responsibility to call the caretaker and the length of contact should be based on the baby's ability to be engaged. Maternal aunt expressed frustration in regards to her communication with the caretaker.

On September 9, 2019, mother filed a section 388 petition seeking either placement of the baby, which would allow her to make appropriate housing arrangements for the baby, or reunification services. The juvenile court denied the petition without a hearing as mother failed to show the requested order was in the baby's best interest given the lack of regular visitation.

At the September 17, 2019 section 366.26 hearing, mother's attorney asked for a continuance so the court could conduct a placement hearing. Mother's attorney noted relative placement was left open at the March 2019 dispositional hearing, and while it was "unfortunate the ICPC process took such a long time," maternal aunt, who "has preferential consideration under [section] 361.3, did apply timely, was approved as quickly as she could be," and "[t]he only delays ... that occurred in this matter were due to the department's delays, and I don't think that these reports adequately explain the process and what happened." Mother's attorney asked the juvenile court for a placement hearing. While she was willing to have the hearing that day, she did not think there was enough information before the court.

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The baby's attorney asked the juvenile court to proceed with the section 366.26 hearing, adding that he understood the relative had a grievance hearing set for the coming Friday and if the relative was not successful at that hearing, she had the right to come before the juvenile court and address that issue at any time. County counsel concurred.

Mother's attorney responded that if the juvenile court terminated parental rights that day, it would change the relative preference consideration, so preference would be given to the prospective adoptive parents under section 366.26, subdivision (n). Mother's attorney did not know what maternal aunt's current contact with the baby was, noting she had FaceTime contact with the baby, which was not in the reports. She believed the juvenile court needed all of the information to make the decision before the burden and preference changed. Mother's attorney noted the court would also have to decide whether it was in the baby's best interest to be moved, and asked the court to decide the placement issue before terminating parental rights.

The baby's attorney asserted it was undisputed that the baby, who was 25 months old, had been placed with the caretakers for 19 months, which in and of itself carried the weight with respect to the placement issue. The baby's attorney supported the Department's recommendation because this was the only placement the baby had known.

The juvenile court responded it was hearing "that regardless of the caretaker presumption, ... there's going to be a very difficult burden for the relative even if the court were to continue the matter." The baby's attorney confirmed that was correct, and while he sympathized with the relative who sought placement and recognized the ICPC process was imperfect, he did not think the placement and best interests of the baby should be jeopardized. Mother's attorney interjected that did not mean "we shouldn't be afforded due process and a right to a hearing." She did not dispute how long the baby had been in its placement, but they did not know how much contact the maternal aunt had or why the ICPC process took so long. She asked the court to set the hearing, as "mother and the [relative] are entitled to due process on this issue." County counsel pointed out

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there was some information about the maternal aunt's contact in the caregiver information form.

The juvenile court denied mother's request, explaining: "It appears to the court that the out-of-state relative promptly came forward and did whatever she could to have [baby] placed in the relative's care. And it's not her fault that the matter has taken so long. I think, ultimately, the court, in balancing all the different considerations, needs to place what's in the child's best interest in the forefront, and, therefore, the court is going to move forward as recommended by minor's counsel and the department. [¶] The court is informed that the relative does have a hearing on Friday, and she'll be given an opportunity for due process there and still will have an opportunity in the future to make argument to the court. I think regardless of when she does it, today or after today - I think the burden is going to be difficult regardless." The juvenile court further stated that mother's attorney made strong arguments and it was not an easy decision.

With respect to the issue of termination of parental rights, mother's attorney asked the juvenile court not to terminate parental rights based on the beneficial relationship exception. She asserted it appeared from the Department's daily services log that when the Department calculated the number of scheduled visits, they did not consider when mother was incarcerated and did not receive visits. Mother's attorney claimed mother had less than 147 opportunities to visit and several missed visits were while mother was in custody. She then argued mother had regularly and consistently visited the baby, and the reports showed the majority of the visits were positive - the baby was happy to see mother and responded to her.

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The baby's attorney responded the evidence before the court was that mother attended 12 of 147 visits, which indicated mother had not visited on a regular basis, and asked the court to follow the recommendations. County counsel submitted based on those comments.

The juvenile court noted visits between the baby and mother were positive and pleasant, but that was not enough to make the beneficial relationship exception to the termination of parental rights applicable. In addition, the court could not find there were regular visits and contact, or that the baby had a significant, positive emotional attachment to mother. The court found the baby was likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights.

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her attorney's request for a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing so a relative placement hearing could be held. Mother asserts there was good cause to continue the hearing because the Department's delay in commencing the ICPC was inexcusable, and the baby was in a stable placement and would have suffered no detriment as the result of a short delay. Mother further asserts the juvenile court's denial was based on erroneous information and a lack of evidence. Mother asserts remand is required for the juvenile court to conduct a relative placement hearing.

Relative Placement Preference

Section 361.3, often referred to as the relative placement preference, provides in relevant part, "In any case in which a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative ...." (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) " 'Preferential consideration' means that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated." (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).)

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"The statute does 'not supply an evidentiary presumption that placement with a relative is in the child's best interests' but it does require the social services agency and juvenile court to determine whether such a placement is appropriate, taking into account multiple factors including the best interest of the child, the parents' wishes, and the fitness of the relative." ( In re R . T . (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1295, fn. omitted.) "The correct application of the relative placement preference places the relative 'at the head of the line when the court is determining which placement is in the child's best interests.' " ( Cesar V . v . Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1033.)

"The relative placement provisions in section 361.3 apply when a child is taken from her parents and placed outside the home pending the determination whether reunification is possible. [Citation.] The relative placement preference also applies to placements made after the dispositional hearing, even when reunification efforts are no longer ongoing, whenever a child must be moved." ( In re A . K . (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 498.) The preference, however, does not apply to an adoptive placement, as there is no relative placement preference for adoption. ( Ibid .; see In re Lauren R . (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 841, 855.) "Instead, at the section 366.26 hearing, the court must apply the caretaker preference under section 366.26, subdivision (k)." ( In re A . K ., supra , 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 498.)

Standing

As an initial matter, we address whether mother has standing to raise relative placement issues as a basis to reverse the order terminating her parental rights.

Although mother consistently stated her desire to have the baby placed with maternal aunt and argued in the juvenile court that it should grant maternal aunt a relative placement hearing, "the mere fact a parent takes a position on a matter at issue in a juvenile dependency case that affects his or her child does not alone constitute a sufficient reason to establish standing to challenge an adverse ruling on it." ( In re

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Carissa G . (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 731, 736; accord, In re K . C . (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 239.)

A parent has standing to appeal a juvenile court's order only if she is aggrieved, that is if her own "rights or interests are injuriously affected by the decision in an immediate and substantial way, and not as a nominal or remote consequence of the decision." ( In re K . C ., supra , at p. 236; see In re A . K . , supra , 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 499 [since "[a] person does not have standing to urge errors on appeal that affect only the interests of others ... a parent is precluded from raising issues on appeal which do not affect his or her own rights"].)

While parents have "an interest in their children's 'companionship, care, custody and management,' " "after reunification services are terminated or bypassed ..., 'the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child [is] no longer paramount. Rather, at this point "the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability ...." ' " ( In re K . C ., supra , 52 Cal.4th at p. 236.) For this reason, "[a] parent's appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights confers standing to appeal an order concerning the dependent child's placement only if the placement order's reversal advances the parent's argument against terminating parental rights ." ( Id . at p. 238, italics added; see In re A . K ., supra , 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 499 [a parent whose reunification services have been terminated lacks standing to challenge relative placement issues on appeal because "decisions concerning placement of the child do not affect the parent's interest in reunification, where the parent is no longer able to reunify with the child"].)

Mother contends she has standing to appeal the denial of a relative placement hearing because she requested the hearing before her parental rights were terminated and, unlike the parent in In re K . C ., she objected to the termination of her parental rights, arguing at the section 366.26 hearing that she had a beneficial relationship with the baby that overcame the benefits of adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Mother, however,

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overlooks the fact she does not challenge on appeal the juvenile court's finding that this exception did not apply. Moreover, she has made no showing reversal of the order she now contests, the denial of continuance to hold a relative placement hearing, would advance that, or any other, argument against terminating her parental rights.

Since mother was denied reunification services at the dispositional hearing, she cannot establish her "rights and interest in reunification are injuriously affected" by any failure to continue the section 366.26 hearing to consider relative placement. ( In re A . K ., supra , 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 499.) Further, since mother does not argue the order terminating her parental rights was improper, she has "no remaining, legally cognizable interest in [the baby's] affairs, including [her] placement." ( In re K . C ., supra , 52 Cal.4th at p. 237.)

For these reasons, mother is not an aggrieved party and lacks standing to raise the issue of the juvenile court's failure to grant a continuance to hold a relative placement hearing.

The Continuance Request

While our conclusion on standing obviates the need for us to address the merits, even if mother had standing we would conclude the juvenile court did not err.

Section 352, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a juvenile court "may continue any hearing under this chapter beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held, provided that a continuance shall not be granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor. In considering the minor's interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor's need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements." A continuance shall be granted only on a showing of good cause. (§ 352, subd. (a)(2).) Continuances are generally discouraged in dependency cases, and we review the denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. ( In re Ninfa S . (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810-811.) The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is

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whether the court exceeded the bounds of reason. ( In re Stephanie M . (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)

Here, the juvenile court denied the request for continuance of the section 366.26 hearing so a relative placement hearing could be held. At the time, the baby had been living with the caretakers for 19 of her 25 months, and was bonded with them. In contrast, maternal aunt had weekly contact with the baby through FaceTime visits for at least six months (from December 2018 to March 2019, and again from June to September 2019), which were limited in duration due to the baby's young age. Based on these facts, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude it was not in the baby's best interest to delay permanency to consider placement with a relative the baby had a minimal relationship with. We cannot say the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of reason in denying mother's request.

Mother contends the juvenile court's decision was based on an incorrect belief maternal aunt would have a grievance hearing concerning the placement denial a few days after the section 366.26 hearing. She asserts, based on documents she has asked us to augment the appellate record with, that the Department cancelled the grievance hearing because mother's parental rights were terminated. Even if a grievance hearing was

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cancelled after the termination of parental rights, it would not provide grounds to reverse the juvenile court's order. The juvenile court did not rely on maternal aunt's ability to have a grievance hearing in denying the continuance, but rather based the denial on whether it was in the baby's best interest. In addition, mother does not raise any due process issue.

Finally, mother asserts the Department failed to timely assess maternal aunt for placement. Mother contends the Department should have initiated the formal ICPC process as soon as she made clear at the April 23, 2018 hearing that she wanted the baby placed with relatives in Philadelphia or sought an expedited ICPC in December 2018. The Department responds that mother was aware the Department intended to wait until the disposition hearing to ask the juvenile court to order the ICPC and tacitly agreed with that plan. The Department asserts it timely implemented the ICPC process as soon as the juvenile court ordered it, and the delay was caused by the numerous continuances of the disposition hearing and mother's failure to request the ICPC order earlier.

"Dependency appeals are governed by section 395, which provides in relevant part: 'A judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed from in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from as from an order after judgment.' " ( In re Meranda P . (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1149.) Section 395 makes the dispositional order the appealable "judgment." Therefore, all

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subsequent orders are directly appealable, except for orders setting a section 366.26 hearing. ( In re Meranda P ., supra , at p. 1150.) Such orders must be challenged by extraordinary writ petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450(a).) If mother believed the Department failed to comply with statutory requirements in assessing maternal aunt, she could have raised the issue at the dispositional hearing and, thereafter, by extraordinary writ petition from the court's setting order. Since she did not do so, she forfeited her objection. (See In re A . K ., supra , 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 500-501.)

Notwithstanding mother's forfeiture, any failure to assess maternal aunt promptly does not provide a basis for reversal. It is clear from the record that the Department either believed it could not initiate an ICPC request until the baby was declared a dependent at the disposition hearing or had a policy of not initiating the ICPC until then. As mother asserts, there is nothing in the ICPC and its implementing regulations or the applicable court rule (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.616) that suggests the Department and court do not have authority to initiate an ICPC assessment to obtain a home study on an out-of-state relative prior to the disposition hearing. In fact, the record shows the Department was able to do so in this case. In addition, as mother points out, an expedited process is available under ICPC Regulation No. 7 where, among other things, the proposed placement is with a close relative, including an aunt, and the child is under four years of age or there is an unexpected dependency due to incarceration or incapacitation of a parent. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.616(h)(2).) The Department knew within two weeks of the baby's detention that maternal aunt was interested in placement, as it had received her ICPC application. Since it was not required to wait until the disposition hearing to initiate the ICPC process, it should have initiated the process much earlier in the proceedings.

Despite the foregoing, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion. The issue before the juvenile court was whether it was in the baby's best interest to continue the section 366.26 hearing, not whether the delay unfairly hindered maternal

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aunt's chances for placement. ( In re Stephanie M ., supra , 7 Cal.4th at p. 322 [juvenile court's failure to sufficiently consider placement with a relative earlier in the proceedings was irrelevant on whether placement with the relative was in the child's best interests at the time of the hearing].) Thus, the juvenile court properly focused on what was in the baby's best interest with respect to placement.

The case mother relies on, In re Isabella G . (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, is distinguishable. There, the child's grandparents requested placement of the child with them, but the social services agency ignored their request until after the court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. ( In re Isabella G ., supra , 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 711-712.) It was not until the grandparents filed a section 388 petition seeking placement that the social services agency completed a relative home assessment and found the grandparents' home suitable for placement. ( Id . at p. 712.) Nevertheless, the juvenile court denied the petition after it declined to proceed under the relative placement preference set forth in section 361.3 and instead applied the caregiver adoption preference under section 366.26, subdivision (k). ( In re Isabella G ., supra , at p. 712.)

The appellate court held that when a relative makes a request for placement of a dependent child before the disposition hearing and the agency does not timely complete a relative home assessment as required by law, the relative requesting placement is entitled to a hearing under section 361.3, even if reunification services have been terminated. ( In re Isabella , G ., supra , Cal.App.4th at p. 712.) The court rejected the agency's argument that the application of the relative placement factors would not result in a more favorable outcome. ( Id . at p. 724.) The court cited facts that showed the history and quality of the relationship between the grandmother and the child, including that the grandmother was the child's primary caregiver from birth until she was nearly two years old, the child missed the grandmother and requested frequent contact with her, and the child wanted to stay with the grandmother. ( Ibid .) The court concluded that focusing on the child's

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relationship with grandmother instead of on the quality of the child's relationship with her caregiver might lead to a different outcome on remand. ( Ibid .)

In contrast here, any error was harmless because there was no such relationship between maternal aunt and the baby. Despite the delay in initiating the ICPC, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion when it found that by September 2019, the baby was in a stable placement with the caretakers and therefore it was in her best interest to remain with them.

The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.

SMITH, J.

WE CONCUR:

POOCHIGIAN, Acting P.J.

MEEHAN, J.