California Cases June 25, 2021: E.A. v. Superior Court(The People)

Case Description

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Super. Ct. Nos. BF181937A, JW138605-02 Lorna H. Brumfeld, Judge.

Pam Singh, Kern County Public Defender, and Cynda L. Bunton, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri and Barton Bowers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

THE COURT

Petitioner E.A. asks this court to vacate the juvenile court's order transferring his case for prosecution to a court of criminal jurisdiction (adult court), and to remand for further proceedings before the juvenile court. The Attorney General concedes the juvenile court must exercise discretion as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 before ruling on the transfer motion. We agree petitioner is entitled to relief, and that the juvenile court should reconsider its transfer decision after fully acknowledging its discretion.

BACKGROUND

On November 16, 2018, the Kern County District Attorney filed a juvenile court petition under section 602 alleging petitioner committed an attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664); attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 212.5, subd. (c), 664); and assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)). Enhancements were also included alleging petitioner personally used and discharged a firearm (Pen Code, §§ 12022.5, subd. (d), 12022.53, subd. (d)), and caused great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subds. (a)-(b)).

The District Attorney filed a motion to transfer petitioner to adult court, which the trial court heard on July 29, 2020. During that hearing, the juvenile court recited the reasons for granting the motion as required by section 707. However, when addressing one of the section 707 criteria, the juvenile court stated:

“Based on how I see the law and the comments of the California Supreme Court and the case of In re A.O ., I realize that in this case it would give the court potentially another--another means of disposing the case, but I do not believe I have the authority to do it; therefore, this makes this particular factor weigh in favor of transfer to adult court.”

Referring to its lack of authority, the juvenile court was referring to its belief it could not dismiss a prior juvenile wardship petition in which petitioner admitted an allegation of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (b)) on August 3, 2018, resulting in petitioner's placement in Camp Erwin Owen for 180 days (August 3 petition).

Thereafter, the juvenile court ordered petitioner's case transferred to adult court.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to adult court by failing to recognize it had discretion to dismiss the August 3 petition to retain jurisdiction in the juvenile court, where petitioner might get the benefit of rehabilitation services.

Both petitioner and the Attorney General agree the transfer decision should be vacated and the matter should be returned to the juvenile court. However, petitioner wants the entire matter to remain in the juvenile court while the Attorney General contends the juvenile court should simply reconsider its transfer decision after acknowledging the full scope of its authority.

When ruling on a transfer motion, the juvenile court must consider five specific criteria listed in section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A-E). The prosecution has the burden of establishing a minor is no longer a suitable candidate for the juvenile court system. ( Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 186.) The sole question presented to the court is whether the minor is amenable to treatment if they are declared a ward of the court, not whether they committed the crime alleged. ( Ibid .)

The specific criteria at issue here asks whether “the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B).) The juvenile court declared on the record its belief it lacked the ability to address this criteria by current case law. At the same time, the court expressed its belief petitioner had the potential to grow and mature and could benefit from services provided in the juvenile system.

For petitioner to remain in the juvenile system, the court would have to exercise its discretion and dismiss the August 3 petition because it involves a violent crime that is not included in the statute permitting a transfer. (See § 733, subd. (c), prohibiting minors from being committed to juvenile court facilities if “the most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is … described in subdivision (b) of Section 707, ” which incorporates burglary as a violent felony listed under Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c).) The Attorney General agrees, in its informal response, that the August 3 petition was eligible for a dismissal and would have resulted in petitioner remaining eligible for juvenile court services.

Section 782 specifically provides:

“A judge of the juvenile court in which a petition was filed may dismiss the petition, or may set aside the findings and dismiss the petition, if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal, or if it finds that he or she is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation. The court has jurisdiction to order dismissal or setting aside of the findings and dismissal regardless of whether the person who is the subject of the petition is, at the time of the order, a ward or dependent child of the court. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require the court to maintain jurisdiction over a person who is the subject of a petition between the time the court's jurisdiction over that person terminates and the point at which his or her petition is dismissed.”

The Supreme Court focused on this language in In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 404, noting a dismissal should further the interests of justice and benefit the welfare of the minor. “The statutory scheme governing juvenile delinquency is designed to give the court ‘maximum flexibility to craft suitable orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular ward before it.' ” ( Id .at p. 411.)

While the underlying findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, this court reviews a juvenile court's overall decision on whether to transfer a matter to an adult court under the abuse of discretion standard. ( C.S. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1027-1028.) A trial court's misunderstanding about the true scope of its discretion results in a failure to exercise discretion properly. ( People v. Aubrey (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 279, 282.)

Because the record is clear that the juvenile court did not believe petitioner was eligible for a juvenile placement, no real consideration was given to the criteria spelled out in section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(B). “If the record affirmatively shows the trial court misunderstood the proper scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required to permit that court to exercise informed discretion with awareness of the full scope of its discretion and applicable law.” ( F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 26.) The juvenile court here abused its discretion, and a remand is necessary to reconsider the transfer motion.

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the Kern County Superior Court to vacate its July 29, 2020, ruling transferring petitioner to adult court and to reconsider the motion to transfer after fully considering its authority to dismiss a disqualifying prior wardship petition and the criteria set forth in section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(B). This court expresses no opinion whether the juvenile court should grant or deny the motion to transfer.

The stay of trial court proceedings, previously ordered on September 22, 2020, is vacated.

This court's decision is final forthwith.

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Notes:

Before Levy, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Meehan, J.

Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

The charges involve an incident that occurred before petitioner turned 18 years of age. When the petition was filed, petitioner had already turned 18.

An additional juvenile wardship petition alleged a vehicle theft occurring on May 3, 2018, but it had no impact on the juvenile court's decision to transfer petitioner's case to an adult court.

The parties agree on the underlying fact the juvenile court did not believe petitioner was potentially eligible for a juvenile placement, and did not give real consideration to the criteria spelled out in section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(B). Further briefing and proceedings therefore would add nothing to the presentation already submitted. (See Goodenough v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 692, 697.)

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