California Cases April 28, 2023: People v. Rodriguez

Case Description

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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County Super. Ct. Nos. F21901660, F22900214 David Andrew Gottlieb, Judge.

Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D. Cary, Jesica Gonzalez, Eric L. Christoffersen, and Sally Espinoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

THE COURT

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In this consolidated appeal, defendant Diana Lee Rodriguez challenges the trial court's finding she was not competent to stand trial, and further challenges the court's ability to commit her to a state hospital for evaluation and treatment, arguing the court lacks jurisdiction because the two-year period designated by the controlling statute has expired. Our review of the record and the relevant legal standards leads us to conclude substantial evidence supports the court's finding defendant was incompetent to stand trial. We also conclude the court had jurisdiction to commit defendant for evaluation and treatment on the issue of competency. However, we remand this matter for further proceedings to correct errors in the order of commitment issued on August 12, 2022.

PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On February 25, 2021, a complaint was filed charging defendant with three separate counts of resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69, all felonies; counts 1-3), three counts of assault with caustic chemicals (§ 244, all felonies; counts 46), and one count of vandalism/graffiti (§ 294, subd. (a)(1), a misdemeanor; count 7). The trial court held a hearing on June 4, 2021, suspending criminal proceedings because questions were raised about defendant's mental competence. The court instituted proceedings under section 1368 and appointed a doctor to examine defendant. After the initial evaluation was submitted to the court and defendant disagreed with the conclusions reached in that evaluation, a second doctor was appointed to conduct another evaluation in February 2022.

On January 11, 2022, a new complaint was filed against defendant while she was in custody on the first complaint, alleging she had committed a battery on a custodial officer (§ 243.1, a felony; count 1). On January 12, 2022, the trial court ordered this new

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case to trail the prior case initiated in February 2021, while also adopting all orders in place for that first case.

Over one year later, during a hearing held on July 22, 2022, the two doctors' evaluations were submitted addressing defendant's competence to stand trial for both cases pending in the trial court. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court found defendant not competent, and referred the matter for an evaluation to determine a proper placement. On August 12, 2022, the court committed defendant to a state hospital for the purpose of restoring her competency.

Four notices of appeal were filed on behalf of defendant, and the four separate files have been consolidated into one appeal. Two of the files specifically addressed the court's ruling on competency. The other two files addressed questions about defendant's confinement and length of time she could be held in custody, either to assess competency or as a whole, if she was ultimately convicted of the charges alleged.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On February 23, 2021, defendant, who had been living with her mother for approximately 20 years, poured bleach on her brother, trying to avoid his "germs." When law enforcement arrived, defendant repeatedly flung bleach on the officers and tried to prevent them from entering the home. Defendant also poured bleach in various places around her mother's house. Defendant screamed at the officers to get out of her house. After using a taser, law enforcement was finally able to take defendant into custody.

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On January 9, 2022, defendant committed a battery on a correctional officer while housed in the Fresno County jail. No specific facts about this event beyond the felony complaint exist in the record.

Competency Hearing

At the beginning of the hearing on defendant's competency, held on July 22, 2022, the trial court stated both parties stipulated to the entry of the two mental health reports. Both reports concluded defendant was not competent to stand trial, and defendant disputed their conclusions.

Defendant was the first witness to provide testimony at the hearing. Defendant was able to recall dates and the fact she had been in custody for over a year and a half. Defendant also expressed her understanding of the charges brought against her and the role each person played in the hearing. Defendant expressed her belief she was capable of assisting her attorney during trial on the charges alleged. Defendant challenged the accuracy of the reports, noting she did not believe either doctor spent enough time with her to justify the conclusions they reached.

Dr. Tamara Kenworthy was the next witness to testify. Dr. Kenworthy prepared a report addressing defendant's competency approximately one year earlier. After listening to defendant's testimony, Dr. Kenworthy noted her concern that defendant still lacked insight to "fully understand her own behavior and mental health needs." As a result, Dr. Kenworthy felt defendant's statements were consistent with the report she prepared almost one year before, concluding defendant exhibited paranoid, delusional, and persecutory beliefs, which impacted her competency, and her ability to rationally assist her attorney in the proceedings.

On the specific issue of defendant's competency, Dr. Kenworthy's report stated:

"[Defendant] will require inpatient restoration services based on her current charges involving aggressive behavior. Her lack of insight and refusal to participate in mental health services also makes her an unsuitable candidate for outpatient restoration services. It is recommended that

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[defendant] receive inpatient services where she can be evaluated for psychotropic medications to assist in restoring her to competency."

A second evaluation was completed by Dr. Howard Terrell, who did not testify. After reviewing defendant's history, including mental health services provided in the past, Dr. Terrell concluded that while defendant had the ability to understand the charges brought against her, he was concerned about her symptoms of paranoia. As a result, Dr. Terrell concluded defendant "suffers from a psychotic mental disorder, which renders her unable to assist her attorney in a rational manner for the preparation of a legal defense ... [and Dr. Terrell] believed that this mental disorder also rendered [defendant] mentally incompetent to represent herself in a rational manner before a [c]ourt of [l]aw."

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion Defendant Was Incompetent to Stand Trial

"The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and state statutory law prohibit the state from trying or sentencing a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent." ( People v. Jackson (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 374, 391; see also § 1367, subd. (a).) "Both federal due process and state law require a trial judge to suspend trial proceedings and conduct a competency hearing whenever the court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial. [Citations.] The court's duty to conduct a competency hearing may arise at any time prior to judgment." ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847.)

"A defendant is [considered] incompetent to stand trial if he or she lacks a' "sufficient present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and . a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him [or her]." '" ( People v. Rogers , supra , 39 Cal.4th at pp. 846847.) Once a concern has been raised about a defendant's competence to stand trial:

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"The court shall appoint a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, and any other expert the court may deem appropriate, to examine the defendant. If the defendant or the defendant's counsel informs the court that the defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the court shall appoint two psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, or a combination thereof. One of the psychiatrists or licensed psychologists may be named by the defense and one may be named by the prosecution." (§ 1369, subd. (a)(1).)

If a defendant is found to be mentally incompetent, either by a jury or the court, any proceedings including a trial must be suspended until the defendant becomes mentally competent. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B).)

The record shows the trial court acted appropriately with respect to this standard. When defendant's original defense attorney questioned defendant's competence to stand trial, the court suspended proceedings and appointed a doctor to evaluate her competence. After the first doctor concluded defendant was not competent, and defendant disagreed with this conclusion, a second evaluation was ordered. That second evaluation also concluded defendant was not competent to stand trial. These reports were then entered into evidence by stipulation of the parties and without objection. The court then took testimony from defendant and from one of the doctors who completed an evaluation. Up to this point, the court acted appropriately. The next question we must resolve, therefore, is whether the evidence presented at the hearing is sufficient to uphold the court's conclusion defendant was incompetent to stand trial in July 2022.

The court's conclusion that a defendant is not competent to stand trial must be supported by substantial evidence of the" 'incapability] of _ cooperating with counsel.'" ( People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 84.) "The standard of competence to stand trial is well established: 'A defendant is competent to stand trial if he or she is able to understand the nature of the proceedings taken against him or her and to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.'" ( In re Sims (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 762, 781.)

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The evidence provided on the issue of competency was provided by the two doctors who evaluated defendant, and defendant. The two reports prepared by the doctors were entered into evidence by agreement of the parties. Dr. Kenworthy also testified at the competency hearing.

Of most relevance here, both doctors concluded defendant lacked competency to assist her attorney in the cases brought against her. While Dr. Kenworthy's report was completed about one year before the competency hearing, when observing defendant's testimony at the hearing, Dr. Kenworthy testified she remained concerned defendant lacked the insight to "fully understand her own behavior and mental health needs." Dr. Kenworthy therefore felt defendant still exhibited "paranoid, delusional and persecutory beliefs," which impacted her competency and ability to rationally assist her attorney in the proceedings. Dr. Terrell's report documented his concern about her symptoms of paranoia and concluded her mental disorder prevented her from representing herself rationally in a court of law.

The two separate reports, along with the testimony provided at the competency hearing, provide substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding defendant was not competent to stand trial. While defendant may have understood the mechanics of the trial proceedings, the opinions of the two doctors that she lacked the competency to either represent herself or capably assist her attorney supported the court's findings.

II. Defendant's Length of Commitment to Assess Competency and Access to Conduct Credits

A. The Court Order Must be Amended to Reflect the Two-Year Limit on Commitment

The second amended minute order states that the "[t]erm of [c]commitment ... exceeds [two] years." Pursuant to section 1370, subdivision (c)(1):

"At the end of two years from the date of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law

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for the most serious offense charged in the information, indictment, or misdemeanor complaint, or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for a violation of probation or mandatory supervision, whichever is shorter, but no later than 90 days prior to the expiration of the defendant's term of commitment, a defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to the committing court, and custody of the defendant shall be transferred without delay to the committing county and shall remain with the county until further order of the court." (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1), emphasis added.)

On July 22, 2022, the trial court found defendant was not competent to stand trial and ordered an evaluation for a proper placement. On August 12, 2022, the court ordered that defendant be provided with antipsychotic medications to help restore her competency, with or without her consent, and committed defendant to the State Department of State Hospitals for an evaluation of competency, for a term of commitment that "exceeds [two] years."

While a prior version of section 1370 that existed before January 1, 2019, allowed commitments to last up to three years, an amendment to that section reduced the allowable period of commitment to two years. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 2.) Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, the trial court could not order a commitment to evaluate defendant's competency for more than two years in August 2022. (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1).) The order of commitment issued on August 12, 2022, must, therefore, be amended to reflect this fact.

B. Defendant is Entitled to Conduct Credits

A defendant shall receive credit for time while confined, "including all days of custody from the date of arrest to the date when the sentence commences" for a judgment later resulting in imprisonment. (§ 4019, subd. (a)(1).) Under section 4019, subdivision (c), a defendant is also eligible for additional days of credit as long as the defendant has "complied with the reasonable rules and regulations" of the facility. This type of credit is referred to as conduct credit. ( People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 793; People v. Orellana (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 319, 332.) Individuals who are kept in a

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county jail facility or state hospital under an order of commitment to assess competency are also entitled to these credits following more recent amendments to section 4019, subd. (a)(8). ( Orellana , at pp. 332-333; see also Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 5 (Senate Bill No. 1187; 2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), eff. Jan. 1, 2019; and Stats. 2021, ch. 599, § 3 (Senate Bill No. 317; 2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), eff. Jan. 1, 2022, making these credits also available to defendants placed in state hospitals under an order of commitment.)

Therefore, this matter must be returned to the trial court for a determination of whether and how much conduct credit is available to defendant.

III. Did the Court Have the Necessary Jurisdiction to Act?

Again, section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) provides defendant can only be held for two years "from the date of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense charged," whichever is less, for the purpose of recovering mental competence. Defendant appears to suggest that either the two-year maximum term of commitment designated in section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) reached back to the date she was first taken into custody in February 2021, or that her custody and conduct credits together have already exceeded the two-year term of commitment, requiring her release. Neither proposition is correct.

When engaging in statutory interpretation, our fundamental concern is to determine legislative intent. ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 724.) We make this determination about intent by looking to the words of the statute," 'giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.'" ( People v. Stewart (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 163, 171.) We are also required to consider the statutory language in the context of the entire statute. ( People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743.) "When the words of the statute are clear, the court does not alter or amend them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute; rather, the court gives effect to the plain meaning of the statute." ( Reidy v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 580, 591.)

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Citing section 1026 and People v. Superior Court (Frezier) (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 652, which addresses commitments following a plea of insanity, defendant contends that" '[T]he calculation of the maximum term of commitment for persons committed to a state hospital ... includes credits for days served in actual custody and conduct credits pursuant to section 4019.'" However, unlike section 1370, section 1026 concerns only a term of commitment to a state hospital following a plea of insanity and a trial. (§ 1026, subd. (a).) Furthermore:

"In the case of any person committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility pursuant to [s]ection 1026 ... the court shall state in the commitment order the maximum term of commitment, and the person may not be kept in actual custody longer than the maximum term of commitment, except as provided in this section. For the purposes of this section, 'maximum term of commitment' shall mean the longest term of imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offense or offenses of which the person was convicted .." (§ 1026.5, subd. (a), emphasis added.)

Section 1370 designates two separate time periods that may impact how long a defendant is held in a state hospital for evaluation of and possible restoration to competency. This includes the two-year period associated with the order of commitment, and the separate period associated with the maximum term for the most serious offense charged. (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1).) Unlike the language found in section 1026.5, subdivision (a) as cited above, there is no language in section 1370 indicating the maximum term for an order of commitment is connected to the term for the most serious charge brought. They are mentioned in the same subdivision as separate terms that a court must compare to determine which is the shorter term, determining how long the order of commitment can stay in effect. (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1).)

Pursuant to section 2900.5, subdivision (a), actual and conduct credit are applied against a term of imprisonment. A term of imprisonment generally follows a conviction or a trial. The period used to assess a person's competency to stand trial or to be restored

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to competency precedes a trial. The purpose of an order of commitment under section 1370 is to restore competency, and" 'that goal would be hindered if mere institutional good behavior and participation automatically reduced the therapy period.'" ( People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 570.)

Again, defendant's "date of commitment" was August 12, 2022. Two years after the order of commitment would be August 12, 2024. Turning to the language in section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) addressing the maximum term for the most serious offense charged, we note that language is not linked to the date of commitment. Defendant's most serious offense charged was for an assault with caustic chemicals (§ 244), which carried a potential maximum term of imprisonment of four years. Therefore, because defendant was arrested and placed into custody for this charge in February 2021, defendant's four-year term could extend to February 2025.

At the time we are addressing this appeal, defendant has served just over two years of the potential four-year term for an assault with caustic chemicals. Once again, defendant's term of commitment to assess competency does not expire until August 12, 2024. Depending on how many conduct credits defendant has earned to date, her potential confinement for the most serious offense may result in a shorter term, but it is unclear if the additional credits will result in satisfying that four-year term before the two-year term of commitment to assess competency comes to an end.

We note further that if defendant has not regained competency to stand trial, she must be returned to the "committing court" 90 days before her term of commitment ends for further proceedings. (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1).) A new order of commitment would not

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be available as an option at this time. (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1); see also People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1379.) In her opening brief addressing her term of commitment, defendant cites Quiroz and contends the trial court will be required to dismiss the charges brought against her. This statement constitutes a misstatement of the language of the Quiroz court, which merely discusses the various options available to a committing court once a defendant returns without having regained competency to stand trial. (See Quiroz , at p. 1379.) In fact, section 1370 itself directs a court to consider various options. (See i.e., § 1370, subds. (c)(3) &(e).)

The trial court, which is the committing court here, will be obligated to consider those options, if necessary, in this matter. This court cannot order one option over another as that decision requires further evaluation and belongs in the trial court.

DISPOSITION

The order finding defendant not competent to stand trial is affirmed. This matter must be remanded, however, to correct the order of commitment entered on August 12, 2022, in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.