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California Statutes § 15366 Definitions

⤴ Up to Article 5.5: Risk-limiting Audits Pilot Program

Statute Text

As used in this article, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a) "Ballot" means original, voter-verifiable paper ballots, including voter-marked paper ballots whether marked manually or via a ballot marking device or system, and, where direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems are used, the voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT). It does not mean electronic versions of ballots, digital images of ballots, or paper printouts of ballot images or digital cast vote records.
(b) "Ballot-level comparison audit" means a type of risk-limiting audit that involves both of the following steps:
(1) The elections official uses an independent system to verify that the cast vote records created by the voting system or ballots created independent from the tally or ballot marking system yield the same election results as those reported by the voting system.
(2) The elections official compares some or all of those cast vote records to a hand-to-eye, human interpretation of voter markings from the corresponding ballot marked by the voter or the voter verified paper audit trail, as defined by Section 19271.
(c) "Ballot polling audit" means a type of risk-limiting audit in which elections officials examine voter markings on randomly selected ballots seeking strong evidence that the reported tabulation outcome is correct.
(d) "Cast vote record" means an auditable document or electronic record that purports to reflect the selections a voter made on a ballot. It lists the contests on the ballot and the voter's selections in each of those contests.
(e) "Electoral outcome" means the winner or winners of an election contest or whether a measure passed. It does not mean the numerical vote totals.
(f) "Risk-limiting audit" means a post-election process that involves hand-to-eye, human inspection of ballots in such a manner that if a full manual tally of all the ballots cast in the contest would show different outcomes than the results reported by the voting system, there is at most a five percent chance that the post-election process will not lead to such a full manual tally. If this post-election process does lead to a full manual tally, the winner or winners according to that full manual tally replace the winner or winners as reported by the voting system if they differ.

History

Amended by Stats 2020 ch 33 ( AB 2400 ) , s 2 , eff. 8/27/2020 .

Added by Stats 2018 ch 913 ( AB 2125 ) , s 2 , eff. 1/1/2019 .