Connecticut Cases November 19, 2019: Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Leonard

Case Description

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

ROBERT B. SHAPIRO JUDGE.

On November 6, 2019, evidence was presented to the court at a bench trial in this subrogation action for alleged damages to an insured’s vehicle as a result of a motor vehicle accident.

After consideration of the evidence and arguments, the court issues this memorandum of decision.

I

Background

Part of the factual background is not in dispute. It is undisputed that, on January 5, 2017, nonparty Emily Davison was operating her Subaru Forester going southbound on I-95, a public highway, in Guilford, Connecticut, when her vehicle was hit from the rear by a Ford Explorer which was driven by nonparty Joshua Caruso, causing property damage to the Subaru Forester. Davison’s insurer, the plaintiff Amica Mutual Insurance Company (Amica). paid Davison the amount of $5,224.10 for the damages incurred, in accordance with the insured’s insurance policy.

Amica alleges that defendant Michael Leonard was operating a Chevrolet Colbalt, traveling directly behind Caruso’s Ford Explorer. Amica alleges that the collision was caused by Leonard’s negligence and carelessness when he drove the Chevrolet Cobalt into the rear of Caruso’s vehicle. Amica seeks to recover for the damages which it paid to Davison. In addition to seeking an award of damages against Leonard, it seeks an award of damages against defendant Teri Schneider, the owner of the Chevrolet Cobalt.

Leonard filed an answer in which he alleges that he was driving behind the Ford Explorer when he veered to the left into a jersey barrier, and never hit the Ford Explorer.

Additional references to the factual background are set forth below.

II

Discussion

In a case tried to the court, "[t]he ... judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 631, 637, 153 A.3d 1264 (2017). "[I]t is well established that it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to make determinations of credibility, crediting some, all, or none of a given witness’ testimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzalez v. State Elections Enforcement Commission, 145 Conn.App. 458, 475, 77 A.3d 790, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 954, 81 A.3d 1181 (2013).

"It is well settled that the trier of fact can disbelieve any or all of the evidence proffered ..., and can construe such evidence in a manner different from the parties’ assertions." State v. DeJesus, 236 Conn. 189, 201, 672 A.2d 488 (1996). The trier is not bound by the uncontradicted testimony of any witness. See Mather v. Griffin Hospital, 207 Conn. 125, 145, 540 A.2d 666 (1988). "Testimony that goes uncontradicted does not thereby become admitted or undisputed; [citation omitted] nor does the strength of a witness’s belief raise it to that level." Stanton v. Grigley, 177 Conn. 558, 563, 418 A.2d 923 (1979).

Davison testified that she did not see Leonard’s vehicle hit the Ford Explorer. Caruso did not testify at the trial. According to a police report, defendants’ Exhibit D, page 2 of 13, Caruso (Operator #2) stated that he was rear-ended by Leonard’s vehicle (Vehicle #3). The court disregards this statement as hearsay. "While police reports are normally admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, statements of witnesses repeated in the report do not fall within this exception[.]" (Citation omitted.) Paquette v. Hadley, 45 Conn.App. 577, 581, 697 A.2d 691 (1997).

A party’s "statement, however, contained in that report is admissible as an admission." Id. According to the police report, page 2 of 13, Leonard (Operator #3) "stated that vehicle #2 [Caruso’s Ford Explorer] braked suddenly in front of him and he could not avoid a collision." At trial, Leonard denied making this statement. No trial witness testified that Leonard’s Chevrolet Cobalt struck Caruso’s vehicle or drove into the rear of Caruso’s vehicle.

The police officer did not testify at the trial. Since the police officer did not witness the accident, the court also disregards the statement in the police report in which the officer determined that Leonard "Followed Too Closely." See Exhibit D, p. 11 of 13. His issuance of a written warning to Leonard for a violation of General Statutes § 14-240, for failure to drive a reasonable distance apart, is disregarded as well.

The statement attributed to Leonard in the police report is consistent with his answer and his trial testimony, that he veered left and collided with a jersey barrier, not with Caruso’s vehicle. After review of the photographs presented (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2; Defendants’ Exhibits A, B, and C), the court finds that they do not prove that Leonard’s vehicle struck Caruso’s vehicle.

Accordingly, the court finds that Amica has not proved that Leonard caused damage to Davison’s vehicle.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court finds in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff as to the plaintiff’s claims. Judgment may enter for the defendants.