Illinois Cases March 07, 2022: People v. Kelli T. (In re K.P.)

Case Description

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This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County. Nos. 19-JA-143, 19-JA-144, 19-JA-145 Honorable Francis M. Martinez, Judge, Presiding.

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JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Brennan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

ZENOFF JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: The orders terminating respondent's parental rights to three minors were affirmed where (1) respondent's appellate counsel reasonably determined that there were no nonfrivolous issues to raise on respondent's behalf with respect to two of the minors and (2) the trial court's finding regarding the third minor's best interests was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 2 Respondent, Kelli T., appeals orders terminating her parental rights to three of her children: K.P., D.P., and I.T. Respondent limits her argument to challenging whether terminating parental rights was in I.T.'s best interests. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In April 2019, the State filed petitions alleging that the minors were neglected. According to the State, the minors' environment was injurious to their welfare because their living conditions were unsanitary, respondent had substance abuse and mental health issues that prevented her from properly parenting the minors, respondent had a history of domestic violence, and the minors had been exposed to domestic violence. Respondent waived her right to a shelter care hearing, and the court transferred temporary guardianship and custody of the minors to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). In July 2019, the court adjudicated the minors neglected pursuant to respondent's stipulation to one count of the petition pertaining to domestic violence. In September 2019, respondent agreed to a dispositional order, whereby the court granted DCFS guardianship and custody of the minors.

¶ 5 The record shows that respondent's alcohol abuse was the greatest barrier to reuniting the family. Although respondent completed some, but not all, recommended services, she relapsed

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multiple times and missed numerous required drug screenings. Caseworkers also suspected that respondent was intoxicated during some visits with the minors. Visits were moved to an agency office rather than respondent's home.

¶ 6 In February 2021, the State petitioned to terminate respondent's parental rights. The State alleged that respondent (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the minors' welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)), (2) failed to protect the minors from conditions within their environment that were injurious to their welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 2018)), (3) failed to make reasonable efforts (750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(m)(i) (West 2018)), and (4) failed to make reasonable progress (750 ILCS 50/1 (D) (m) (ii) (West 2018)).

¶ 7 Following a hearing on parental fitness, the court found that respondent was unfit pursuant to all counts of the petition. At a subsequent hearing, the court determined that it was in the minors' best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights.

¶ 8 A. Limitation of the Scope of this Appeal

¶ 9 Respondent's appointed appellate counsel submitted both a brief on respondent's behalf and a motion to withdraw. In a minute order, we struck the motion to withdraw as procedurally improper, given that counsel intended to continue representing respondent. Nevertheless, we indicated our awareness of counsel's determination regarding the frivolity of challenging certain aspects of the trial court's rulings. Specifically, counsel determined that he could raise no nonfrivolous issues on respondent's behalf to challenge the unfitness findings or the court's findings as to the best interests of D.P. and K.P.

¶ 10 Having reviewed the record, we agree with respondent's counsel that it would be frivolous to challenge the court's unfitness findings. We would have to affirm those findings if the State met its burden on any single count of its petition to terminate parental rights. See In re Tr. A., 2020 IL App (2d) 200225, ¶ 43.

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At the very least, it is beyond dispute that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the minors' return. As previously mentioned, respondent failed to maintain sobriety, she did not complete all required services, and she did not progress to consistent unsupervised visitation. Thus, it is not arguable that the unfitness findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 11 We likewise agree with appellate counsel that he cannot reasonably challenge the findings regarding the best interests of K.P. and D.P. Those minors were placed together in a traditional foster home throughout the entirety of the case. K.P. and D.P. were bonded with their foster parents, and the foster parents were committed to adopting them. Under these circumstances, counsel cannot reasonably argue that the court's findings with respect to the best interests of K.P. and D.P. were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 12 Accordingly, we affirm the judgments terminating respondent's parental rights with respect to K.P. and D.P. We will now consider respondent's sole contention on appeal: that the trial court erred in determining that it was in I.T.'s best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights.

¶ 13 B. I.T.'s Best Interests

¶ 14 I.T. was seven years old at the time of the best-interests hearing. He struggled with mental health issues, behavioral problems, and impulsiveness. When I.T. first came into care, he resided with his half-brother, P.W., in the home of one of P.W.'s paternal relatives. In late 2020, I.T. was removed from that placement and was hospitalized due to threatening self-harm. When I.T. was released from the hospital, he was placed in a residential program at Hephzibah Children's Home. In June 2021, I.T. was assigned to a new agency and was sent to a therapeutic foster home in Chicago, which was expected to be an approximately 9 to 12-month placement. When I.T. finishes

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that program, he will return to his original agency, and caseworkers will attempt to find an adoptive home. At the time of the best-interests hearing, I.T. had monthly visits with his half-siblings and respondent.

¶ 15 I.T.'s case manager, Kimdra Harris, testified that I.T. received weekly therapy and mentoring at the therapeutic foster home, along with monthly monitoring of medications. Workers used a system of rewards and consequences to get I.T. to follow rules, as he thrived in "stable environments with structure and discipline." According to Harris, I.T. became angry easily and struggled with his self-esteem. He attended regular schooling but had an individualized education program designed to address his behavior. Harris explained that I.T. was doing well in his current placement, and the foster parent attended to I.T.'s basic needs. I.T. also had a mentor who took him to recreational activities. Although Harris believed that I.T. was "very bonded" with his foster parent, Harris acknowledged that there was no possibility of permanency with this placement. Harris testified that I.T. will be discharged from this placement when he makes sufficient progress, rather than at any predetermined time.

¶ 16 Harris further testified that I.T. was always excited after seeing respondent, and such visits did not cause I.T. to experience adverse effects or behavioral issues. Harris believed that I.T.'s visits with respondent were beneficial for him. Harris was unable to opine as to what effect it would have on I.T. if the court terminated respondent's parental rights.

¶ 17 Stephany Creviston, who was I.T.'s former caseworker, believed that it was in I.T.'s best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights. Creviston testified that I.T. sometimes exhibited defiance and aggression, and his mental health needed to be "monitored carefully and addressed." According to Creviston, I.T.'s current placement, though not permanent, provided for his needs and offered security, familiarity, and affection. Creviston related that I.T. was involved in an after-

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school program and a summer camp. I.T. enjoyed his visits with his siblings. Creviston acknowledged that, if respondent's parental rights to the minors were terminated, it would be up to K.P.'s and D.P.'s adoptive parents to ensure that I.T. got to see his half-siblings. Creviston explained that respondent's visits with I.T. were currently going "really well." However, Creviston said that I.T. was aware of respondent's issues with alcohol abuse, which was an "ongoing concern" throughout this case. The last time that I.T. saw respondent intoxicated during a visit was approximately nine months before the best-interests hearing.

¶ 18 Respondent testified that she used to speak with I.T. on the phone every day, but I.T.'s current placement did not allow such phone contact. Respondent believed that her phone conversations with I.T. were helping and motivating him, such that he was not having as many behavioral issues. Respondent also believed that her present lack of communication with I.T. might be "triggering for him." Respondent described the things that she did to improve herself, though she volunteered that she was "still a work in progress." Respondent acknowledged that she tested positive for alcohol four months before the best-interests hearing. Respondent emphasized her love for her children, and she believed that it was in the children's best interests to be with her.

¶ 19 The court found that it was in I.T. 's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights. The court noted that I.T. was "in a more difficult position" than K.P. and D.P., as I.T. presented "special challenges to his caretakers and to the State." The court believed that I.T. had "made significant progress with his own issues," which would not have happened had he been in respondent's care. The court also found that I.T.'s "prospects for adoption [were] good" in light of his age, his progress, and that caseworkers were seeking a long-term placement for him. The court found that respondent had not demonstrated that she had "the potential to attain fitness within a reasonable period of time and with a safe and secure permanency."

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¶ 20 Respondent timely appealed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 Respondent challenges the trial court's finding that it was in I.T.'s best interests to terminate parental rights. In presenting her argument, respondent emphasizes the lack of a permanent placement for I.T., along with the evidence that I.T. benefitted from his visits with respondent. The State responds that the court's judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 23 Involuntary termination of parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)) is a two-step process. In re C. W., 199 Ill.2d 198, 210 (2002). The State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under any single ground listed in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)). C. W., 199 Ill.2d at 210. If the parent is unfit, the matter proceeds to a second hearing, at which the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the minor to terminate parental rights. In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347, 352, 366 (2004).

¶ 24 In evaluating a child's best interests, the trial court considers:

"(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, and clothing;

(b) the development of the child's identity;

(c) the child's background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious;

(d) the child's sense of attachments, including:

(i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued (as opposed to where adults believe the child should feel such love, attachment, and a sense of being valued);

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(ii) the child's sense of security;

(iii) the child's sense of familiarity;

(iv) continuity of affection for the child;

(v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child;

(e) the child's wishes and long-term goals;

(f) the child's community ties, including church, school, and friends;

(g) the child's need for permanence which includes the child's need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives;

(h) the uniqueness of every family and child;

(i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and

(j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child." 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018).

We will not overturn the trial court's finding that termination of parental rights was in the child's best interests unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Shru. R., 2014 IL App (4th) 140275, ¶ 24. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence" 'where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based upon any of the evidence.'" Shru. R., 2014 IL App (4th) 140275, ¶ 24 (quoting In re Tasha L.-I, 383 Ill.App.3d 45, 52 (2008)).

¶ 25 Respondent argues that the best-interests finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was no known permanent placement for I.T. and I.T. benefited from visits with her. The lack of a permanent placement will not per se defeat the State's petition for termination of parental rights, though it is a factor to consider. See In re Tashika F., 333 Ill.App.3d 165, 170 (2002) ("While we find a child's likelihood of adoption may be considered at a best

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interest hearing, we note it is merely one factor to consider, and a child's slim chance of adoption does not per se require a finding that termination of parental rights is not in the child's best interest."); accord In re F. P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 92; Shru. R., 2014 IL App (4th) 140275, ¶¶ 25-26; In re D.M., 336 Ill.App.3d 766, 775 (2002). As the court explained in In re J.R., 342 Ill.App.3d 310, 322 (2003):

"In termination-of-parental-rights cases, often the trial court is left without a perfect solution, and the court must choose what in its judgment is the best alternative. It may be in a child's best interest to have his parents' parental rights terminated, even if no adoptive candidate exists."

Such may be the case, for example, where permanency through adoption is as unlikely as reunification of the family. See Tashika F., 333 Ill.App.3d at 170-71 ("Although the likelihood of adoption was slim, so was the likelihood respondent could care for Tashika. Because the evidence demonstrated it was highly unlikely respondent would ever be able to parent Tashika, a possibility of adoption was Tashika's best hope for permanency.").

¶ 26 Here, the trial court found that I.T.'s "prospects for adoption [were] good," given his age, his progress, and that caseworkers were seeking a long-term placement for him. The court also found that respondent had not demonstrated that she had "the potential to attain fitness within a reasonable period of time." Thus, it seems that the court believed that it was more likely that I.T. would find permanency through adoption than it was that I.T. could be reunited with respondent.

¶ 27 We determine that the court's judgment was reasonable considering the circumstances. As respondent notes, there was evidence that I.T. benefited from his monthly visits with respondent. Though not dispositive, that certainly was a relevant consideration. See F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 93 ("Even though the children were attached to their mother, and she to them, a child's

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feeling of attachment [citation] is only one of the considerations in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987."). On the other hand, I.T. had special needs, including mental health issues, that required a stable environment and careful monitoring. Despite the case being open for two and a half years, it was highly unlikely that respondent, in the foreseeable future, would be able to provide the level of care that I.T. required.

¶ 28 Respondent argues that, "[a]bsent *** a prospect for permanency, severing I.T.'s relationship with [respondent] does nothing to advance his interests." However, terminating respondent's parental rights arguably was a step toward permanency for I.T. The only alternative- which respondent argues the trial court should have ordered-was to keep I.T. in a state of legal limbo until caseworkers found a permanent placement for him. The trial court reasonably could have rejected that alternative, as there was no real prospect of parental reunification.

¶ 29 There was no perfect solution here, and the trial court was tasked with making a difficult decision about I.T.'s best interests. Under the circumstances, we determine that the court reasonably determined that terminating respondent's parental rights was in I.T.'s best interests. Accordingly, the court's finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court of Winnebago County.

¶ 32 Affirmed.

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Notes:

Respondent's rights to her other child, P.W., are not at issue in this appeal.

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