Illinois Cases September 30, 2022: Payne v. Encompass Home & Auto Ins. Co.

Case Description

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This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 19 CH 13978 The Honorable Pamela Meyerson, Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Walker and Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

MIKVA, PRESIDING JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held : Grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurance company is reversed where the term "family member" as used in the uninsured motorists coverage endorsement was not defined in the policy and, to the extent that common understanding of who is a family member left any ambiguity as to whether plaintiff was included as such, extrinsic evidence demonstrated the parties' intent to provide her with coverage.

¶ 2 The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant Encompass Home and Auto Insurance Co. (Encompass) and against plaintiff Laurel Payne, finding that Laurel was not entitled to insurance coverage under her parents' auto policy with Encompass because she did not qualify as a "family member" under the policy's definition, despite being a rated driver on the

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policy for whom her parents paid an additional premium. For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Encompass on Laurel's claim for a declaration of uninsured motorists coverage and remand for the circuit court to enter summary judgment in her favor on that count. We affirm the court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Encompass on Laurel's claim for costs, fees, and statutory damages under section 155 of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2018)).

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On December 9, 2018, while crossing an intersection in a crosswalk, Laurel was hit by a car driven by an underinsured driver. At issue in this appeal is whether Laurel was entitled to uninsured motorists coverage under her parents' insurance policy with Encompass.

¶ 5 A. The Policy

¶ 6 The policy in question was issued by Encompass to Laurel's parents, Emarie and J. Benson Payne (collectively, the Paynes), who were residents of Baltimore, Maryland, and was effective from July 22, 2018, through July 22, 2019 (policy No. 281 325 659) (the Policy). The Policy included home protection, motor vehicle protection, and personal umbrella coverage, along with several restrictions, conditions, exclusions, and endorsements. The two people listed on the Policy as named insureds were Emarie and J. Benson.

¶ 7 According to the motor vehicle protection coverage summary, the Paynes had coverage for three separate vehicles. Each vehicle included uninsured motorists coverage with a $250,000 limit per person and $500,000 limit per accident for bodily injury, for which the Paynes paid an additional premium. Laurel was listed as a rated driver for one of the three vehicles, on the same page as the uninsured motorists coverage limits with respect to that vehicle. The driver information section of the motor vehicle protection coverage summary listed all four Paynes-including

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Laurel-as drivers. Under "Total Vehicle(s) Premiums and Charges," a separate payment for "Uninsured Motorists Premium for all Vehicles" was listed.

¶ 8 The Policy also included an uninsured motorists coverage endorsement (UIM endorsement) that provided, as relevant to this appeal:

"In consideration of an additional premium, if the Coverage Summary shows an amount of Uninsured Motorists Coverage , we will provide the coverage described by the provisions of this endorsement.

Definitions

The following words and phrases are defined for this Uninsured Motorists Coverage endorsement. Only in regard to the coverage provided by this endorsement, the following definitions replace any corresponding definitions in the Motor Vehicle Segment . 1. Covered Person means:

** *

e. You or any family member as a pedestrian when struck by a vehicle.

** *

4. Uninsured Motor Vehicle means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type:

** *

c. Which, with respect to damages for bodily injury only, the sum of

the limits of liability under all liability bonds or policies applicable at the time of the accident is equal to or greater than the limit specified by the financial responsibility law of Maryland, but the sum of the limits for bodily

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injury is either:

(1) Less than the limit of liability for this coverage ***. * * * Insuring Agreement

We will pay compensatory damages which any covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of:

1. Bodily Injury sustained by any covered person , and caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle [.]"

(Emphases in original.)

¶ 9 There is no dispute on appeal that the driver who hit Laurel was an uninsured motorist, as defined by the UIM endorsement in the Policy, since the liability limits for the driver's policy were less than the liability limits for the Paynes' Policy.

¶ 10 The term "family member" was not defined in the UIM endorsement or in the vehicle protection section of the Policy. But that term was specifically defined for use in other sections of the Policy.

¶ 11 The personal injury protection coverage endorsement provided in its definitions section:

"The Definitions section when used in reference to this endorsement is amended as follows:

A. The following definitions are replaced:

1. Family member means a person related to the named insured by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of the same household. This includes the named insured's unmarried and unemancipated children while away from the household attending school or while in military service."

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(Emphases in original.)

¶ 12 The boat segment also included a definitions section that stated as follows:

"Throughout this 'BOAT' Segment, when the following words appear in bold type, they are defined as follows:

** *

5. Family Member means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of y [text unreadable]ld. This includes a ward or foster child.

For the purposes of this definition, to be considered a resident of y [text unreadable]ld when evaluating coverage for a loss, a person must have been actually residing in your household on the date the loss occurred. However, your :

a. Son;

b. Daughter;

c. Ward; or

d. Foster child;

in the United States military or away at school will be considered a resident of your household unless he or she has demonstrated an intent to reside elsewhere permanently."

(Emphases in original.)

¶ 13 The definitions section of the home segment of the Policy also provided a definition of family member:

"Throughout this ' HOME' Segment, when the following words appear in bold type, they are defined as follows:

** *

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5. Family Member means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. ***

For the purposes of this definition, to be considered a resident of your household when evaluating coverage for a loss, a person must have been actually residing in your household on the date the loss occurred. However, your :

a. Son;

b. Daughter;

c. Ward; or

d. Foster child; in the United States military or away at school will be considered a resident of your household unless he or she has demonstrated an intent to reside elsewhere permanently."

(Emphases in original.)

¶ 14 The personal umbrella endorsement defined the term "family member" in similar terms: "Throughout this ' UMBRELLA ' endorsement, when the following words appear in bold type, they are defined as follows:

* * *

6. Family member means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household.

* * *

For the purposes of this definition, to be considered a resident of your household when evaluating coverage for a loss , a person must have been actually residing in your household on the date the loss occurred. However, your :

a. Son;

b. Daughter;

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c. Ward; or

d. Foster child;

in the United States military or away at school will be considered a resident of your household unless he or she has demonstrated an intent to reside elsewhere permanently."

(Emphases in original.)

¶ 15 B. The Declaratory Judgment Action

¶ 16 On December 4, 2019, Laurel filed her complaint for declaratory judgment against Encompass. According to the complaint, on December 9, 2018, Laurel was struck by a negligent driver while crossing Halsted Street along Armitage Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Laurel sustained "serious and permanent injuries, as well as pain and suffering" because of the collision. The negligent driver's insurance company offered the driver's policy limit of $100,000 in exchange for a release of any claims against the driver. Laurel alleged that she then submitted a notice for a claim of uninsured motorists coverage to Encompass on January 11, 2019, but that on April 17, 2019, Encompass denied her coverage because she was not a "family member" under the Policy's definitions.

¶ 17 Laurel alleged that through the Policy, Encompass "agreed to provide insurance coverages for Emarie Payne, J. Benson Payne, Laurel Payne, and Jackson Payne." Laurel further alleged that the Policy provided her with motor vehicle protection and uninsured motorists coverage "in the event she was a 'pedestrian when struck by a motor vehicle,'" that she was specifically listed as a "rated driver" on the Policy, and that her parents paid insurance premiums for her to be covered.

¶ 18 In count I of her complaint, Laurel asked that the court to declare that she was entitled to coverage under the UIM endorsement for the injuries she sustained in the December 2018 accident and that Encompass was required to either engage in good-faith settlement negotiations or submit

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the claim to arbitration. In count II, Laurel alleged that Encompass "was guilty of a vexatious and unreasonable delay in settling the claim for underinsured motorist coverage" and asked for costs, attorney fees, and statutory damages pursuant to section 155 of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2018)).

¶ 19 On May 25, 2021, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Encompass argued that Laurel was not entitled to uninsured motorists coverage because the Policy defined the term "family member" as" 'a person related to the named insured by blood, marriage, or adoption who is a resident of the same household," including "the named insured's unmarried and unemancipated children while away from the household attending school or while in military service,'" citing the definition of "family member" in the Policy's personal injury protection coverage endorsement. Largely relying on Laurel's deposition testimony, Encompass argued that she was not a "family member" under the Policy because at the time of the accident she lived in Chicago, still lived at the same apartment in Chicago at the time of the deposition, was employed by U.S. Bank in Chicago, did not have a definitive end date for her employment with U.S. Bank, had an Illinois driver's license, never contacted Encompass to have her Illinois addresses added to the Policy, graduated from Tulane University in 2017, had not been enrolled in any school or educational program since graduating, and was not in the military. In support of its motion, in addition to Laurel's deposition, Encompass attached her complaint, the Policy, and its written denial of coverage.

¶ 20 In her deposition, taken on September 29, 2020, Laurel testified that at the time of her accident she was leasing an apartment at 1967 North Halsted Street in Chicago and working for U.S. Bank, where she had been employed for three years with no definitive end date to her employment. She graduated from Tulane University in 2017 and, at the time of the deposition, was

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studying for the GMAT and considering post-graduate schooling. In December 2018, she was enrolled in an analyst program with U.S. Bank, but not a formal MBA program. She never served in the military. Laurel acknowledged that at the time of the accident she was not living at her parents' house, explaining, "I frequented going home [ sic ], but I was paying rent in Chicago. So the accident happened in Chicago. So I was staying at the place where I pay rent." Laurel explained that she "got a lease in Chicago for [her] job," and was issued an Illinois driver's license on August 30, 2017.

¶ 21 When asked whether she paid insurance premiums on the Policy, Laurel said that it "was done through [her] parents under their policy." Laurel did not own a motor vehicle at the time of her accident. Laurel said that, as to her understanding of why her name was listed under driver information on the Policy, "I would assume it's because I'm covered by my parents' car insurance." Laurel did acknowledge she was not listed as a named insured.

¶ 22 In further support of its argument that Laurel did not qualify as a "family member" under the Policy's definition of that term, Encompass attached to its response to Laurel's motion for summary judgment Laurel's Illinois voter registration.

¶ 23 In her own motion for summary judgment, Laurel argued that the Policy afforded her coverage on its face because the term "family member" was not defined in the UIM endorsement, she was listed under the motor vehicle protection and driver information sections of the Policy, and she was a rated driver for one of the insured vehicles. Laurel argued that it was "absolutely incongruous for Encompass to now argue that [she was] not covered under the Policy, particularly where Encompass factored [her] into its premium calculations, billed [the Paynes] an additional premium coverage for [her], and then accepted premium payments for coverage." Finally, Laurel argued that denying her coverage when she was specifically listed on the Policy as a driver was

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vexatious and in bad faith, and thus entitled her to damages under section 155 of the Insurance Code.

¶ 24 In support of her motion, Laurel attached the Policy, Encompass's responses to her requests to admit, the deposition transcripts of Encompass representatives Marlo Faranda and Phoebe Carson, and her own deposition.

¶ 25 In response to Laurel's request to admit, Encompass had stated "an additional insurance premium was paid for coverage" of Laurel under the Policy. Encompass also admitted that a "rated driver,"' as that term is used in the Policy, meant "a driver who [wa]s being considered for the premium rates quoted by Encompass," and that the Policy did in fact list Laurel as a "rated driver."

¶ 26 In her deposition, Marlo Faranda testified as the representative of the company most knowledgeable regarding the Policy and premium calculations under the Policy. Ms. Faranda was shown and said she was familiar with two separate "Customer Bill Statement[s] of Events" for the Paynes' Policy. Ms. Faranda agreed that a payment of $777.83 was made on the Policy once per month from July through December of 2018, that Laurel was deleted as a driver in February 2019, and that there was a reduction in the premium at that time of $133. Based on these documents, Ms. Faranda agreed that the monthly payments on the Policy included an additional premium for Laurel until Laurel was removed from the Policy.

¶ 27 Phoebe Carson was an underwriter with Encompass. In her deposition, Ms. Carson was shown what she identified as the resident driver screen. She testified that about halfway down that screen, Laurel was classified as an "operator" under the Policy, which Ms. Carson explained meant "that she [was] a rated operator on the policy," which in turn meant that "there [was] a premium charge for having that driver listed on the policy." Ms. Carson agreed that nowhere on the resident driver screen was it indicated that Laurel was excluded from any coverage under the terms of the

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Policy.

¶ 28 On November 10, 2021, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Encompass and against Laurel. In doing so, the court said that the Policy provided uninsured motorists coverage for "you" or "any family member as pedestrian when struck by a vehicle," and that because Laurel was not "you" as she was not a named insured, the question was whether she qualified as a family member. The court then answered that question in the negative, saying, "[w]e do have to look at the definitions in the policy to decide that, and I find that there is no genuine issue of material fact that she is not a family member as defined in the policy." The court based its conclusion on the fact that Laurel did not live with her parents, was not in school or in the military, and had been living in Chicago at the time of the accident.

¶ 29 II. JURISDICTION

¶ 30 Laurel timely filed her notice of appeal from the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Encompass on December 8, 2021. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from final judgments entered by the circuit court in civil cases.

¶ 31 III. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 This case was before the circuit court on cross-motions for summary judgment. "Summary judgment is proper when 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Bremer v. City of Rockford , 2016 IL 119889, ¶ 20 (quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2012)). "The construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations thereunder are questions of law for the court which are appropriate subjects for disposition by way of summary judgment." Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp. ,

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156 Ill.2d 384, 391 (1993). We review the court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo . Beaman v. Freesmeyer , 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 22.

¶ 33 A. Maryland Law Applies

¶ 34 As an initial matter, we agree with the parties that, under an Illinois choice-of-law analysis, Maryland substantive law applies. Where, as here, an insurance policy does not have a choice-of-law provision, the forum state's choice-of-law rules control. Costello v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. , 376 Ill.App.3d 235, 240 (2007). Where it is necessary for the court to determine which state's law applies, Illinois uses the "most significant contacts" test, under which "insurance policies are governed by the location of the subject matter, the place of delivery of the contract, the domicile of the insured or of the insurer, the place of the last act to give rise to the contract, the place of performance, or other place bearing a rational relationship to the general contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 240-41. However, "[a] choice-of-law determination is required only when a difference in law will make a difference in the outcome of a cause." Gregory v. Beazer East , 384 Ill.App.3d 178, 193 (2008).

¶ 35 Here, the laws of Illinois and Maryland differ in at least one relevant respect: Maryland does "not follow the rule, adopted in some states," including Illinois, "that insurance policies are to be construed most strongly against the insurer." Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'n, Inc. , 607 A.2d 537, 539 (Md. 1992); see American Economy Insurance Co. v. DePaul University , 383 Ill.App.3d 172, 178 (2008) (noting that "[i]nsurance policies are to be liberally construed in favor of coverage, and where an ambiguity exists in the insurance contract, it will be resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 36 We agree with the parties that the most significant contacts in this case-including where the Paynes resided, where the Policy was issued, and where the insured motor vehicles were

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garaged-were in Maryland. We will apply Maryland law.

¶ 37 B. Laurel Was Covered Under the UIM Endorsement

¶ 38 Laurel argues (1) she was entitled to coverage under the plain language of the Policy, (2) if the Policy was ambiguous, it should be construed liberally against Encompass, and (3) she was entitled to coverage because she qualified as a "family member" even under the definition of that term provided in other sections of the Policy.

¶ 39 In response, Encompass maintains that Laurel is not covered by the plain language of the Policy because she was not the named insured and did not fit into the Policy's definition of "family member." Primarily relying on the definition in the Policy's personal umbrella endorsement. Encompass argues that "it is important to determine the interplay between a motor vehicle policy, boat policy, and homeowner's policy and the umbrella policy to determine how the umbrella policy might impact terms or provisions of the other policies" and that Laurel "ignores the fact that the umbrella policy is part of the Policy."

¶ 40 "It is settled that in construing insurance contracts, words are to be given their customary and normal meaning, [citations], unless there is evidence that the parties intended to employ the language in a special sense." Valliere v. Allstate Insurance Co. , 596 A.2d 636, 638 (Md. 1991). The key focus is the intention of the parties to the insurance policy. W.F. Gebhardt & Co. v. American European Insurance Co. , 252 A.3d 65, 73 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2021). Under "the objective theory of contract interpretation," which Maryland courts generally follow:

"[I]f the language of the contract is unambiguous, we interpret the contract based on what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood the language to mean and not the subjective intent of the parties at the time of formation. [Citation.] Thus, the written language embodying the terms of an agreement will govern the rights and

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liabilities of the parties, irrespective of the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract. [Citation.] Only [w]here a court determines contractual language to be ambiguous, [do] the narrow bounds of the objective approach give way, and the court is entitled to consider extrinsic or parol evidence to ascertain the parties' intentions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The language in an insurance policy will be considered ambiguous where "a reasonable layperson could infer two different meanings from the language used." Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Scherr , 647 A.2d 1297, 1300 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).

¶ 41 We first determine whether Laurel was entitled to uninsured motorists coverage under the plain language of the Policy. By the terms of the UIM endorsement, a "covered person" includes " [y]ou or any family member as a pedestrian when struck by a vehicle" (emphases in original). There is no dispute that Laurel was a pedestrian when she was struck by a vehicle.

¶ 42 Laurel argues both that she qualifies as a "family member" under the UIM endorsement and that she is also covered because, pursuant to Maryland statutory law, she qualifies as a "named insured" on the Policy. Because we agree that Laurel is covered under the UIM endorsement as a family member, we need not consider her alternative argument that she qualifies as a named insured under Maryland law.

¶ 43 The term "family member" is not defined in the UIM endorsement. The definition of "family member" relied on by Encompass-a person related to the named insured who is a resident of the same household or an unemancipated child attending school or in the military-is included only in other sections of the Policy. Those sections are the personal injury protection coverage endorsement, the boat segment, the home segment, and the personal umbrella endorsement. But the plain language of each of those sections makes clear that the definition applies only within that

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section of the Policy. The personal injury protection coverage endorsement provides that definitions are amended as indicated "when used in reference to this endorsement " (emphasis added). The boat segment states that "[t]hroughout this 'BOAT' Segment , when the following words appear in bold type, they are defined as follows" (emphasis added). The home segment provides, "[t]hroughout this 'HOME' Segment , when the following words appear in bold type, they are defined as follows" (emphasis added). The personal umbrella endorsement states that "[t]hroughout this 'UMBRELLA' endorsement , when the following words appear in bold type, they are defined as follows" (emphasis added).

¶ 44 It is true that "[w]hen a policy defines a term in a manner which differs from the ordinary understanding of that term, the policy definition controls." Valliere , 596 A.2d at 638. However, "in interpreting a contract a court will try to give effect to all of the agreement's provisions." Simkins Industries, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co. , 401 A.2d 181, 186 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). Here, the Policy includes a definition of "family member" in discrete sections of the Policy along with wording clearly indicating that the definition is limited to those discrete sections. It would be contrary to the plain language of the Policy's provisions to apply a definition unambiguously intended only for discrete sections of the Policy to other sections of the Policy that lacked such a definition.

¶ 45 Because "family member" as that term is used in the UIM endorsement is not defined, the words must be given "their customary, ordinary, and accepted meaning." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connors v. Government Employees Insurance Co. , 113 A.3d 595, 603 (Md. 2015). "Traditionally, to supply contractual language with its ordinary and accepted meanings[,] this Court consults the dictionary definition of such terms." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) W.F. Gebhardt , 252 A.3d at 74.

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¶ 46 "Member" is defined as "one of the individuals composing a group." Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/member (last visited July 15, 2022). A "family" is defined by Merriam-Webster's dictionary first as "the basic unit in society traditionally consisting of two parents rearing their children," then as "spouse and children," and third as "a group of individuals living under one roof and usually under one head." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/family (last visited July 13, 2022). Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines "family" first as "[a] group of persons connected by blood, by affinity, or by law, esp. within two or three generations," then as "[a] group consisting of parents and their children," and finally as "[b]y extension, a group of people who live together and usu. have a shared commitment to a domestic relationship." Black's Law Dictionary 721 (10th Ed. 2016). In contrast, however, "family" is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as, first, "[a] group of people living as a household, traditionally consisting of parents and their children, ***; any household consisting of people who have long-term commitments to each other and are (usually) raising children," and then "[a] group of people consisting of one set of parents and their children, whether living together or not." Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2013).

¶ 47 The definitions in these three dictionaries arguably create some ambiguity as to whether a family member is anyone in a group of related individuals, including parents and children, regardless of whether they are residing together, or is limited to a group of individuals residing in the same household. Assuming that there is such an ambiguity, we may consider extrinsic or parol evidence to ascertain the intentions of the parties. W.F. Gebhardt , 252 A.3d at 73. In this case such parol evidence demonstrates that the parties' intent was to provide UIM coverage for Laurel.

¶ 48 First, Ms. Carson, the Encompass underwriter, testified in her deposition that being listed on the Policy as a "rated operator," as Laurel was, meant "there [wa]s a premium charge for having

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that driver listed on the policy." And Encompass acknowledged in its response to Laurel's requests to admit that an additional premium was paid for Laurel to be listed on the Policy as a rated driver. This response was further substantiated by the deposition of Ms. Faranda-another Encompass employee-who agreed that monthly payments were made on the Policy from July through December 2018 and that the Paynes' premium decreased by $133 after Laurel was removed from the Policy. Notably, the same page of the Policy where Laurel was listed as a rated driver also listed the bodily injury and property damage limits for uninsured motorists. All of this lends further support to Laurel's argument that she and the Paynes understood that Laurel was a covered under the UIM endorsement.

¶ 49 Even if we found that this testimony did not resolve any ambiguity as to whether Laurel should be covered, the Maryland rules of construction would call for the Policy language to be construed against Encompass. See Scherr , 647 A.3d at 1300 (noting that "an insurance contract that is still ambiguous, after the court has considered any extrinsic or parol evidence, will be construed against the insurer as the drafter of the policy"). As the drafter of the Policy, Encompass was free to create a specific definition of "family member" for the UIM endorsement-just as it did for other sections of the Policy-that excluded children of the insureds who no longer resided at home. It could also have created a universal definition of the term that clearly applied to all portions of the Policy. It did not do either of those things. Thus, Laurel was entitled to coverage under the UIM endorsement as a "family member."

¶ 50 The case primarily relied on by Encompass in support of its argument to the contrary, Mundey v. Erie Insurance Group , 893 A.2d 645 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006), is simply inapplicable. There, the uninsured motorists coverage provision provided that" 'any relative '" was covered, the policy's definitions section required that a relative be a resident of the household, and

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"resident" was in turn defined as "a person who physically lives with you in your household" and any "unmarried, unemancipated children under age 24 attending school full-time, living away from the home." (Emphases in original.) Id. at 646-47. These definitions were clearly applicable to the uninsured motorists coverage at issue. In contrast here, the UIM endorsement did not have a specific definition of "family member," nor did the Policy have a general definitions section that applied to the UIM endorsement.

¶ 51 In this case, there is no definition of "family member" in the Policy that applies to the UIM endorsement. Under dictionary definitions, there is an ambiguity as to whether Laurel, who no longer lived with her parents, was a family member. However, that ambiguity must be construed against Encompass, where a premium was charged for Laurel and she was listed as a rated driver under the Policy. Laurel, and not Encompass, was thus entitled to summary judgment on count I of her complaint.

¶ 52 C. Section 155 Damages Are Not Warranted

¶ 53 Laurel also argues that she is entitled to damages pursuant to section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2020)). Under section 155, "an insured may collect attorneys fees and costs where an insurer creates a 'vexatious and unreasonable' delay in settling a claim." Illinois Founders Insurance Co. v. Williams , 2015 IL App (1st) 122481, ¶ 31 (quoting 215 ILCS 5/155(1) (West 2010)). If a bona fide coverage dispute exists, however, we will not award section 155 damages. Id. ¶ 32. A bona fide dispute is "real, actual, genuine, and not feigned." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. An insurer that denied coverage in connection with a bona fide coverage dispute will not be found to have acted in a vexatious or unreasonable manner. Id.

¶ 54 Here, there was a bona fide dispute as to whether Laurel was entitled to coverage under the

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UIM endorsement. Although we have found in her favor, we did so only after finding that the other definitions of "family member" in the Policy, which had been relied on by the circuit court, did not apply. We further found, using dictionary definitions, there was some ambiguity as to whether Laurel was a "family member." Because there was "no clear answer to the issue disputed by the parties" (emphasis in original), section 155 damages are not appropriate. Baxter International, Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co. , 369 Ill.App.3d 700, 710 (2006). The circuit court thus correctly denied summary judgment on count II, Laurel's claim for section 155 damages.

¶ 55 IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 56 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Encompass on Laurel's claim for a declaration of uninsured motorists coverage and remand for the circuit court to enter summary judgment in her favor on that count. We affirm the court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Encompass on Laurel's claim for costs, fees, and statutory damages under section 155 of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2018)).

¶ 57 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, with directions.