Illinois Advisory Opinions January 01, 1976: IL Opinion S-1078

Advisory Opinion Text

WILLIAM J. SCOTT
ATTORNEY GENERAL

April 23, 1976

FILE NO. S-1078

ELECTIONS:
Status and Authority
of Precinct aegistrare

Bonorable William C. Harris
Minority Leader
State of Illinois senate
309 State House
Springfield,Illinele 62706

Franklin J. Lunding, jr.
Chairman
state Board of Elections
State of Illinois
1020 South Spring street
Springfield, Illinois 62701

Gentleman:

I have our letters wherein you raise several questions conceraing the constitutionality and proper con- election Code.(Ill. Rev.State. 1979, ch,46,pars,4-6.2 and 6-50.2,as amended by P.A. 79-942.) It should be noted that section 4-6.2 was also amended by Public Act 79-1071. The provisions of that amendment are not relevant to the issues under consideration here* however.

Section 4-6,2» a* amended toy Public Act 79-942, previdee in pertinent part:

"the county precinct resjiatrar*. Precinct registrars shall fee deputy ragiatrara

. provided by thia Act Cor such office, but may accept registrations at any place within the

Section 6-5Q.2, aa amended, provides in pertinent paaxt

"The board of election commissioners shell .: appoint all precinct coBoeitteejaen residing within it* jurisdiction precinct registrars. Precinct

: have all of the powers and duties provided by this Act for ami office, but may accept registrations at any place within the precinct in which they serve. • * * *

The first Question ralaed ia whether Public Act 79-942 is unconstitutional in that it does not provide for the appointment of precinct registrars in cotmtiee with a population of 500,009 or more.

The provisione of the Illinois constitution of WO applicable to your inquiry are section 4 of article IXIt

"The General Assembly by law shall define permanent residence foe voting purposes, insure secrecy of voting and the integrity of the election

process,, and facilitate registration and voting by all qualified persons* taws governing voter registration and conduct of electiona shall be general and uniform.*

and aeetioa 13 of article IVj

•the General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or ean be isado applicable. Whether a general law is or ean be made applicable shall be a matter for judicisl determination.*

In the ease of Srldqewater v. Hots, $1 ill* 2d 103* the Supreee court was called upon to define the tora "general and uniform" used in section 4 of article HI. Xt was argued at that tins that the "general and uniform* standard was meant to be «ore stringent than the proscription of "local or special laws" contained in seotion 13 of article IV. The eonrt rejected thia argument and applied a definition of "general and uniform" that nad evolved in a series of cases dealing with the prohibition against "local or special laws* found in section 22 of article IV of tha Illinois Constitution of 1870.

The court pointed out that an ©lection law need sot apply identically in every part of the State in order to bo "general and tanlfottft** Rather, it is sufficient if it operates alike on all parsons and in all places in the same condition. As long as a reasonable basis can bs found for differentiating between those to whan the law applies end those to whom if dee* not, Kb* legislative classification is 0 proper one. The court goes on to state at pages ill to 112 thati

** • * {X]« i» well settled that an act is not local or special aerely because of a legislative clessification based upon population {cites emitted} or territorial dlffereneefl. fo£t*e omitted) Such claseiflcations will bo sustained whore founded upon a rational difference of . situation or condition exieting in the objects upon which it rests, and where there is a reasonable ' basis for the classification in view of the objects and purposee to bo acocs^lAshed. * • * **

Thus, if it eon a* said that a -rational basis exist* for the classification implicit in Public Act 79-042, the Act does not violate either section 4 of article ttt or section IS of article XV of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

In providing for the registration of voters in Illinois, the General Asseabiy has created three basic eye tenet One for registration in countiea witti a population of less than 500,000 (ill, Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 46, pars* 4-1 ot sec.) t one for registration in counties with « population of 500,000 or more (111. Rev. Stat. 197$, eh. 46, pore, s-i ot sea.)* and oeo for registration in municipalities having boards of election eoaaaissionere. <ttl* »«v. Stat* 1975, oh. 46* pare* 6-1 et seq.) The goal of ail throe syatma ia the registration of all eligible voters, Public Act 7§-#42 refloots a decision by the legislators that stagnate provision had not basn mad© for the attainment of thia goal under two of the three systoma. Based on the information provided oo» x oan only conclude that this decision was a reasonable response to differences of oondition perceived by the legislature.

It is, therefore, ray opinion that Public act 79<*#42 doss not violate either section 4 of article ill or section 13 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution of 1970,

The next cgnaatioa raised is whether sections 4-6.2 and 6-S0.2, as eatended* do in fact author tee precinct registrars to register voters at any location within their precincts. In ^mffmam to this question, it is say opinion that under too provisions of aeo&ioas 4-6.2 and 6-53.2, as amended, a precinct registrar may indeed register voters at any place in the precinct in which he serves•

The construction of a statute is neesssary only where the statutory language is uncertain or ambiguous.(Bergoson v. Mullinix, 399 Ill. 470.) Where the statutory language is clear and unaasbiguou* there is no occasion for applying the rules of statutory construction (nordine v. Illinois Power Co, 32 Ill. 2d 421) and the statute must be held to mean what it plainly express. Levinson v. Home Bank Trust Co., 377 Ill. 241.

The intent of the legislature as expressed in the language of section 4-6.2 and 6-50.2 seems unmistakably clear. Precinct registrars "shall be deputy regietrara and' ahall have all the power, and duties provided by this Act for such offices, but in addition they are authorised to "accept registration, at any piece within the precinct in which they server. Thus, yonr seeona ciueation nuat bo answered in the affinitive.

The third question raised is whether the Illinois Constitution of 1970 is violated because precinct registrars can register voters anywhere while other deputy regietrare are United to specific places at which they can accept registrations, in my opinion no violation is involved.

Section 4 of arUcle ZZZ of the Illinoia Conatitotion Of 1970 provides:

" The General Assembly by law shall define permanent resivonce for voting purposes, insure secrecy of voting and the integrity of the election process, and facilitate registration and voting by ail qualified persons. Laws governing voter registration and conduct of elections shall be general and uniform. "

The language of this provision clearly give* to tno legislature the power to provide by Saw for tno registration of votera, subject only to the requirement that such law* bo "geneiaX and uniform*, hm ia evident from my discussion of the first question, tho #general and unifora* standard wa* meant to insure that all individuala in slnilar elrctaBstanoes are affooted equally by the state's election laws* Thus, for exasqple, an election law cannot provide different rules for different counties absent a rational basis for the distinction.

Section 4 of article ill doss not* however, prohibit tho legislature frost providing several rooms of registering voters within a county, as long as all individuals in all countlss similarly situated have the same options, - there is, in mg opinion, no constitutional violation.

The next question raised is whether the enactment of Sections 4-6.2 and 6-50.2, as aaended, constituted a repeal by iteplication of section 14-1 of Tho Election Code. (Ill. now, 197S, eh. 46, par. 14-1.) Repeal by implication takes place whsn tho provisions of two sots are irreconcilably inconsistent. the later in tins repeals tho earlier in tino to tho extent of tha inconsistency. Rosechill Cometary Co. v. Lueder 406 Ill. 458.

Section 14-1 sets forth the <niallficatione for election judges in Municipalities that have choeen boarde of election cootaiasioners pursuant to article 6 of'site Election Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 46, pars. 6-1 et seq.) Section 14-1 etetee in pertinent part:

"To qualify aa judges the electore must:

(6) not qualify candidates for any office at the election and not be election and not be elected committes-ment; " (emphasie added.) too etate that the qualifications listed in eection 14-1 apply to deputy registrars aa well, and point out the apparent conflict between the portion of eection 14-1 quoted above and the amandntent to sections 4-6.2 and 6-50.2.

Section 6-32 of The Election Code (III* Rev. Stat* 1975, en* 4ft* par* «~32) doee indeed indicate that certain deputy reglatrara ehall 'have the Qualifications prescribed for judges of election by section 14-1*. The applicability of the standards of section 14-1 is limited by, section 32, however, to "the deputy registrars and judges of registration provided for by section 6-30 of this Article*.

Section 6-30 of The Election Code (111* Haw* Stat. 1975, oh* 46, par* 6-30) provides:

•f 6-30. Xf any city, village or incorporated town adopts and becomes entitled to tno benef its of this Article 6 and Articles 14 and 13 of this Act, after tho data for the first registration hereunder, registration therein shall be governed by tho law applicable thereto at tho ttoa of tho adoption of said Articles until a complete first registration can be had. Soon first registration shall bo in tho manner provided in this Article and shall precede the primary bold for tno nomination of candidates for the next succeeding congressional election* and the periods provided for each step in such registration shall bo the same as are provided by this Article 6 with respect to cities, villages and incorporated towns subject to this Article at tho tins when it takes effect. A period for registration at the offloe of tho board of election commissioners prior to snob election shall be allowed equal to that provided by this Artiolo* for the period intervening between the first Tuesday in August, 1936 and tho first Tuesday after the first Monday in Koveaber, 1936.*

A careful reading of this provision stakes it clear that it does not apply to deputy registrars appointed by county clerks pursuant to section 4-6.2, as amended. It is likewise evident that section §-30 doss not apply to deputy registrars appointed in the normal course of events by boards of election commissioners pursuant to section 6*30.X, as amended* Rather, section 6-30 applies only to the "first registration" conducted by hoards of election ootnaissioners in those municipalities which choose to adopt snob, a board after tho date far the first registration provided in section €-39 itself.

It is* therefore, tsy opinion tbat there la no conflict between the provisions of sections 4-4.2 end 6-SQ.2, aa amended, on the one hand, and section 14-1 on the other, and as a result the former provisions cannot be said to repeal the latter by implication.

Finally, it is noted tbat should a precinct registrar be discharged, the precinct registrar from the other major political party would be placed in a position of accepting voter revistrations frost both parties. I agree that the regaining precinct registrar could indeed accept registrations from both parties, but I find nothing in the Illinois Constitution of 1970 prohibiting this.

Very truly yours,