Indiana Cases January 18, 2022: Youngblood v. State

Case Description

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Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

Appeal from the Jefferson Superior Court The Honorable Blaine S. Goode, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 39D01-1912-F6-1510

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy

Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Shepard, Senior Judge.

[¶1] Tony Youngblood appeals the trial court's imposition of his entire previously suspended sentence after he admitted he violated his probation. We affirm.

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Facts and Procedural History

[¶2] In December 2019, the State charged Youngblood with failure to return to lawful detention as a Level 6 felony. The State subsequently filed an habitual offender enhancement. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Youngblood pleaded to the felony, and the State dismissed the habitual offender allegation. In February 2021, the court sentenced Youngblood to 720 days, with all but 60 days suspended, and placed him on supervised probation in community corrections for 660 days.

[¶3] On May 18, 2021, the State filed a petition to revoke Youngblood's probation, asserting that he had failed to report to the community corrections department upon his release from jail, as ordered. After a fact-finding hearing, the court found Youngblood violated the terms of his probation and revoked his entire suspended sentence. Youngblood now appeals.

Issue

[¶4] Youngblood's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the entirety of his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[¶5] Probation is a criminal sanction that allows a convicted defendant to agree to certain conditions on his behavior in lieu of imprisonment. Bratcher v. State , 999

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N.E.2d 864 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied (2014). "Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed." Prewitt v. State , 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). When the court finds a probationer has violated a condition of probation, one sanction it may impose is the execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Brandenburg v. State , 992 N.E.2d 951 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied ; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (2015). A court's sentencing decisions for such violations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Wilkerson v. State , 918 N.E.2d 458 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[¶6] At Youngblood's fact-finding hearing, the community corrections intake coordinator testified that Youngblood reported to community corrections on March 10 when he was released from jail and scheduled an intake appointment for March 26. Youngblood failed to appear on March 26. Youngblood admitted these facts at the hearing.

[¶7] Another intake appointment was scheduled for March 30, although the record is not clear how that rescheduled date was communicated to Youngblood. He did not attend the appointment on March 30.

[¶8] The intake coordinator further testified that he called and talked to Youngblood on April 7 and rescheduled the appointment for April 14. Youngblood again failed to appear. Finally, the intake coordinator stated he left a voicemail for

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Youngblood on April 26 scheduling an appointment for May 5 but that Youngblood did not appear for that appointment. Youngblood testified that his phone was stolen on March 15, so he was not the person the intake coordinator spoke to on April 7, and he did not receive the voicemail from April 26.

[¶9] The court extended considerable leniency to Youngblood by allowing him to serve his sentence in community corrections in the first place. The underlying charge of escape in this case stems from his failure to return to lawful detention after a temporary leave that was granted for a specific purpose. Moreover, while the escape charge was pending, the State filed to revoke bail based on a violation of the conditions of pretrial release caused by Youngblood's failure to report to pretrial services for his scheduled appointment. The court set a hearing on the petition, and Youngblood failed to appear.

[¶10] For his part, in addition to asserting he lost his phone, Youngblood claims this is merely a technical violation that does not warrant the imposition of his entire suspended sentence. The violation of a single condition of probation can be sufficient to revoke probation. Luke v. State , 51 N.E.3d 401 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied . And, contrary to what Youngblood claims, this is a substantive violation that demonstrates he is not a good candidate for probation because he is unable and/or unwilling to submit to the monitoring process. Failing to appear for the initial probation appointment not only permits a probationer to exercise freedom to which he is not entitled (possibly putting the community at risk) but also, and more importantly, impedes the ability of the

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probation office to assess the probationer's needs and identify programs that would benefit him in his rehabilitation process and to monitor his progress.

[¶11] Lastly, Youngblood essentially requests that mitigating consideration be given to his substance abuse issue. At the hearing he testified that he had been approved for a treatment program and that they had a bed for him. He asserts he "needs alcohol abuse treatment" for his "lifelong struggle with alcohol." Appellant's Br. p. 10. When imposing the balance of Youngblood's sentence, the court stated, "The reason for the complete revocation of your sentence, Mr. Youngblood, is looking at your history, you have had a lifetime of opportunities to get treatment for alcohol abuse and you have either chosen not to - to take those opportunities or you've chosen not to take them seriously." Tr. Vol. II, p. 12. See Hape v. State , 903 N.E.2d 977 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009) (recognizing that history of substance abuse may be mitigating factor but finding no error when it is rejected as mitigator where defendant is aware of substance abuse problem and has not taken appropriate steps to treat it), trans. denied . The court also noted that treatment programs would be available to Youngblood while he serves his sentence and upon his release.

[¶12] Youngblood has demonstrated his need for a more stringent penalty by his unwillingness to accept limits on his behavior in lieu of imprisonment. Accordingly, we cannot say the court's decision that Youngblood serve his entire previously suspended sentence is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of this case.

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Conclusion

[¶13] We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the entirety of Youngblood's suspended sentence.

[¶14] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

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Notes:

Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-4 (2014).

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