Louisiana Cases May 04, 2022: Robinson v. Ardoin

Case Description

RULING

SHELLY D. DICK UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the Emergency Motion to Stay Proceedings filed by Attorney General Jeff Landry. The Galmon Plaintiffs filed an Opposition . For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the Emergency Motion shall be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 14, 2022, the Court set a preliminary injunction hearing in these consolidated Voting Rights Act cases, to begin Monday, May 9, 2022. Now, with the hearing five days away, the Attorney General asserts that “[t]he Supreme Court's upcoming resolution of lingering questions regarding Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act”

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is an emergency that compels a stay. Merrill v. Milligan , the Attorney General asserts, is “likely to substantially affect or be fully dispositive over the issues presented in this case, ” and the Purcell doctrine suggests that it is already “too close to critical statutory deadlines for the 2022 congressional elections” for this Court to grant Plaintiffs' requested relief.

The Galmon Plaintiffs oppose the arguments proffered by the Attorney General, calling his Motion “an eleventh-hour, last-ditch attempt to forestall adjudication of Plaintiffs' claims.” Though the Plaintiffs do not dispute that Merrill v. Milligan is relevant to the instant cases, they note that, for now, “neither Gingles nor any other controlling authority has been overruled, expressly or by implication, ” and putting this case on hold for what amounts to “jurisprudential divination” is not appropriate. Plaintiffs argue that the hardship allegedly faced by the Attorney General in having to defend the claims is self-imposed, insofar as the Attorney General “ chose to participate in this lawsuit via intervention.” In sum, the Galmon Plaintiffs urge the Court to deny the Motion because the Attorney General “does not get to put the Voting Rights Act on hold for an entire election cycle just because it might be inconvenienced in the future.”

After reviewing the parties' briefs, the docket, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the Attorney General's Motion shall be DENIED.

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II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Motions to Stay

A district court has the inherent power to stay its proceedings. This power to stay is “incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” This is best accomplished by the “exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” When determining whether to exercise its discretion to stay proceedings, relevant factors for the Court to consider include: (1) the potential prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the hardship and inequity to the moving party if the action is not stayed; and (3) judicial economy. “A court is within its discretion to grant a stay when a related case with substantially similar issues is pending before a court of appeals.”

B. Analysis

As the above-stated law makes clear, the decision to stay is a matter of the Court's discretion. In this case, the Court declines the Attorney General's untimely invitation to put these proceedings on hold. The Court is simply not persuaded that waiting for a substantive ruling in Merrill v. Milligan is justified. The Attorney General's own brief phrases the potential impact of Merrill in terms of possibility , noting that the case “ could be dispositive of this litigation ... At the very least, the Supreme Court's disposition of that case will be informative to the Parties' claims and defenses in the instant case.”

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The blow to judicial economy and prejudice to Plaintiffs that would result from granting the moved-for stay cannot be justified by speculation over future Supreme Court deliberations, and the Court is not persuaded that halting these proceedings to await a result that would be “informative” is defensible. Merrill v. Milligan was already pending before the Complaints were filed in these cases. To stay this matter on the eve of the hearing on the premise that Merrill v. Milligan and Purcell constitute an “emergency” would in fact create , not avoid, the “clear risk of wasted time and resources” that Attorney General Landry describes. If Attorney General Landry's concern over wasted time and resources is sincere, the Court questions why he telegraphed the filing of this Motion in a footnote at the end of an opposition brief instead of filing it immediately. In the delay, reply briefs were filed and a lengthy Pre-Trial Conference conducted, during which counsel for the Attorney General said not a word about this looming “emergency” as the parties discussed in-depth the procedures to be used at the hearing.

As Plaintiffs note, the Attorney General's complaints of hardship are difficult to comprehend given that he voluntarily intervened in these cases. The idea that a stay is necessary to allow for “a proper and robust defense” is likewise baffling in light of the fact that Defendants have already filed thorough and well-researched opposition briefs, not to mention offered nine expert reports and a slew of other exhibits. The Court has expended significant judicial resources digesting these materials in preparation for the upcoming hearing.

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Lastly, the Court rejects the Attorney General's contention that Purcell demands a stay. Purcell will be an issue at the preliminary injunction hearing, as the briefs make clear. While Purcell does caution against judicial intervention on the eve of elections, it does not require a stay, particularly here where the Court has been asked to and will consider the Purcell doctrine in the forthcoming proceedings.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Emergency Motion to Stay Proceedings filed by Attorney General Jeff Landry is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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