Minnesota Cases October 11, 2022: Partridge v. Minnesota Beltrami Cnty.

Case Description

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Bruce Justin Partridge's (1) Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. 1 (“Complaint”)), and (2) Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Dkt. 2 (“IFP Application”)). For the following reasons, the Court recommends dismissing this action and denying the IFP Application as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

This action commenced on September 2, 2022, when the Court received the Complaint and the IFP Application. ( See Dkt. 1 at 1; Dkt. 2 at 1. ) When Partridge filed the Complaint, authorities were holding him in the Beltrami County Jail; recent mail sent to him has been returned unopened, however, so he apparently is no longer there. ( See Dkt. 1-2 at 1 (envelope containing opening filings); Dkt. (indicating mail return).)

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The Complaint names a large number of defendants. ( See, e.g. , Dkt. 1 at 1-2, 5-9.) Indeed, as best as the Court can tell, the Complaint has two somewhat different lists of Defendants: one in the Complaint's caption ( see id. at 1-2), and the other listed within that part of the template document that asks for a list of Defendants ( see id. at 5-9). For reasons discussed below, the Court need not list all the Defendants, but the complete list encompasses at least 30 people or entities.

For most of the Defendants, the Complaint has no substantive allegations. For the other Defendants, the Complaint alleges as follows:

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• Partridge alleges that Defendant Dawn-Marie Eckdahl “is/was [his] foster mom and spouse.” (Dkt. 1 at 5.) Partridge states that in Eckdahl's role as “social worker for [Partridge's] tribe”- specifically, the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe (LLBO)-she “manipulates [Partridge's] disabilities and her relationship with him.” ( Id. ) Partridge also asserts that Eckdahl refers to him with derogatory terms, and apparently that she “cheat[]s on [him].” ( Id. )

• Partridge claims that Defendant Ernie Bietal-Beltrami County's Sheriff-failed to respond to various letters that Partridge sent concerning Eckdahl. ( See id. at 5, 10.) Partridge asserts that in order to further a relationship with Eckdahl, Bietal “persecutes” Partridge, “overlooks [Partridge's] legal status,” and “illegally charges and oppresses” Partridge. ( Id. at 10)

• Partridge asserts that Defendant Johnathan G. Melby, identified as a “District Nine Court Magistrate,” “overlooks [Partridge's legal status]” and “decides on presumptive guilt”-presumably Partridge's-“in collusion with [the] State without prima facie evidence or even [and] fair procedures.” ( Id .)

• Partridge identifies Defendant David Hansen as the Beltrami County Attorney. ( Id. ) Partridge states that Hansen “overlooks” certain authorities relevant to Minnesota competency proceedings, and does so as a “favor to” others, including Bietal. ( Id. )

• Partridge does not identify the positions of Defendants Symon Soen-Schindler and Riley Irish, but he claims that both of them are “under [the tutelage] of [the] DA”-presumably meaning the Beltrami County Attorney. ( Id. ) Partridge claims that the pair have both “forgo[ne]” his legal status and are seeking to curry favor with government officials in Beltrami County, including Bietal. ( Id. )

• The Complaint identifies Defendant Anderson Jones as a “subordinate” to the LLBO's Family Preservation Director. ( Id. at 11.) Partridge suggests that while acting as a social worker, Jones has “ignored his oath” and apparently certain statutes. ( Id. ) Partridge also claims that “as a Platonic favor” for Eckdahl, Jones has failed to “report his boss.” ( Id. )

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For relief, Partridge asks for various amounts of punitive damages, as well as his “freedom.” ( Id. at 13.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Rather than pay this action's filing fee, Partridge submitted the IFP Application. As the Court understands this document, it indicates that Partridge is financially eligible for IFP status.

Nevertheless, under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must

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dismiss the action.” It is a plaintiff's burden to “allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction.” McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind. , 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also, e.g. , Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [federal courts'] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction[.]” (citing cases, including McNutt )); see also, e.g. , Ousley v. Glockner , No. 22-CV-1600 (WMW/DTS), 2022 WL 2905731, at *1 (D. Minn. July 22, 2022) (making same point (quoting Jones v. Gale , 470 F.3d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 2006))).

B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit describes the “arising under” standard like so:

“[T]he question whether a claim ‘arises under' federal law must be determined by reference to the ‘well-pleaded complaint.'” The well-pleaded complaint rule “provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” “Federal question jurisdiction exists if the well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”

Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P'ship v. Essar Steel Minn. LLC , 843 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see also, e.g. , Lowry v. City of Minneapolis , No. 21- CV-2189 (PJS/TNL), 2022 WL 2763757, at *3 (D. Minn. July 15, 2022) (quoting Great Lakes Gas ). Under this standard, the test for whether federal-question jurisdiction exists

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here is whether (1) “federal law creates [a] cause of action,” or (2) Partridge's rights to relief “necessarily depend[] on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”

To be sure, the Complaint invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute. ( See Dkt. 1 at 1.) But this reference is not enough to generate federal-question jurisdiction. Section 1983 states that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

As the statutory text suggests, § 1983 gives plaintiffs a procedural mechanism to bring claims under other federal laws (constitutional or statutory). It does not, however, provide plaintiffs with any substantive causes of action. See, e.g. , Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org. , 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979)); Baxter-Knutson v. Brandt , No. 14-CV-3796 (ADM/LIB), 2015 WL 4633590, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 3, 2015) (citing Tarsney v. O'Keefe , 225 F.3d 929, 939 (8th Cir. 2000)).

This is dispositive here. Partridge invokes § 1983, but gives no hint of what federal constitutional provisions or federal statutes ground his claims. As a result,

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though Partridge cites § 1983, the Complaint fails to indicate that federal law creates any cause of action in this matter, or that Partridge's rights to relief depend on resolving any substantial federal-law question.

Because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter, the Court recommends dismissing this action without prejudice. Given this recommendation, the Court further recommends dismissing the IFP Application as moot.

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RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT

IS RECOMMENDED THAT :

1. This action be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.

2. Plaintiff Brian Justin Partridge's Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs (Dkt. 2) be DENIED as moot.

NOTICE

Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate judge's proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).