Minnesota Cases April 25, 2022: Townsend v. Schnell

Case Description

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Otha Eric Townsend, pro se.

Rachel E. Bell-Munger, Minnesota Attorney General's Office, for defendant.

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Tony N. Leung United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Otha Eric Townsend was found guilty in Minnesota state court of first-degree murder in 1994. See State v. Townsend , 546 N.W.2d 292 (Minn. 1996). The required term of imprisonment imposed for the offense under Minnesota law was at that time, as it still is today, life imprisonment. See Minn. Stat. § 609.185. That said, persons convicted under § 609.185 such as Townsend become eligible for supervised release under Minnesota law after “having served a minimum term of 30 years.” Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 4 (1992). The decision whether to grant or deny supervised release at the end of the mandatory 30-year term of imprisonment is entrusted to the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections, who may, “under rules promulgated by the commissioner, give supervised release to an inmate serving a mandatory life sentence

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under section 609.185 . . . after the inmate has served the [30 year] minimum term of imprisonment ....” Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 5 (1992).

Townsend is nearing the conclusion of his mandatory 30-year term of imprisonment on the 1994 first-degree murder conviction. In preparation for that date, an advisory panel of the Minnesota Department of Corrections conducted a hearing pursuant to Minn. R. 2940.1800 (“Rule 2940.1800”) to assess the appropriateness of Townsend being granted supervised release after his 30-year mandatory term has ended. Following the hearing, defendant Paul Schnell, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections, informed Townsend that he would be required (among other things) to stay discipline free and participate in rehabilitative programming if supervised release were to be granted once he becomes eligible. See Pl. Ex. at 6-7 [ECF No. 1-1].

Townsend brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the legality of the review determination and the process by which the review determination was made. According to Townsend, the requirement that he undergo rehabilitative programming as a prerequisite of being granted supervised release amounts to additional punishment for his offense in violation of the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution. Townsend also objects to the specific process by which the programming requirement was imposed, arguing that the Rule 2940.1800 was not in place at the time of his conviction and that the

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advisory panel therefore has no authority to make recommendations regarding the actions that prisoners serving a life sentence must complete to become eligible for supervised release. In addition, Townsend suggests that, despite the clear language of § 244.05 that the Commissioner may grant supervised release, Minnesota law mandates that persons serving a sentence for first-degree murder under § 609.185 must be granted supervised release at the end of the 30-year mandatory prison term. Townsend seeks declaratory and injunctive relief (including preliminary injunctive relief) from the programming requirement.

This matter is before the Court on Schnell's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon review of the submissions from the parties, this Court concludes that Townsend's claim is partly barred by Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and that to the extent that Heck does not bar

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the claim, Townsend has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted. It is therefore recommended that Schnell's motion to dismiss be granted and that this matter be dismissed without prejudice.

Heck established the rule that

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). Although Heck on its face bars only claims for monetary compensation, the rule of that decision has been expanded to any claim under § 1983 that necessarily calls into question the legality of the fact or duration of a prisoner's facially valid confinement, regardless of the remedy sought for that claim. See, e.g. , Sheldon v. Hundley , 83 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996); Clemente v. Allen , 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (collecting cases). Put at its most simple, Townsend cannot challenge the legality of his sentence through claims brought under § 1983 unless and until that sentence is invalidated through a more appropriate procedural vehicle.

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Schnell is correct that, insofar as Townsend argues that he is entitled to supervised release the moment that his 30-year mandatory term of imprisonment expires, Heck plainly bars substantive review of that claim under § 1983, See, e.g. , Robertson v. Sumner , 218 Fed.Appx. 548, 549 (8th Cir. 2007), as this aspect of Townsend's claim necessarily implies the unlawfulness of his continued detention, see Wilkinson v. Dobson , 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). Whatever the merits of Townsend's argument that state law compels his release after 30 years have passed, Heck precludes recovery on that claim until the time that Townsend has succeeded through a more appropriate procedural vehicle. The Court cannot declare Townsend's term of imprisonment unlawful in an action under § 1983.

That said, although aspects of Townsend's complaint and accompanying materials can be interpreted as arguing that he is entitled as a matter of Minnesota law to release as soon as his 30-year mandatory term of imprisonment expires, the complaint can also be interpreted as raising two somewhat more limited claims for relief. First, Townsend may be interpreted as arguing that, regardless of whether he is entitled to release as of a certain date, the State of Minnesota cannot impose conditions on the granting of that release, such as the completion of rehabilitative programming, that were not established by law at the time of his offense. If successful on this claim, Townsend would not necessarily be entitled to release; he would only be entitled to removal of the unlawful additional conditions imposed as a requirement for release. Heck therefore does not bar

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this aspect of Townsend's claim. See Hunter v. Owens , 375 Fed.Appx. 427, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Second, Townsend suggests that regardless of whether the commissioner may decline to grant supervised release, Rule 2940.1800 had not been enacted at the time of his offense, and therefore the advisory panel established pursuant to Rule 2940.1800 may not be involved in the process for determining his eligibility for release. Again, this aspect of Townsend's claim does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his detention, only the invalidity of the process used to determine whether he should be detained. This claim, too, is not barred by Heck .

To the extent that Townsend is successful in avoiding Heck , however, he runs into a second problem - he has not stated a claim on which relief may be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, this Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. , 511 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2008). Although the factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court may disregard legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced. See Stone v. Harry , 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).

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First, Townsend argues that, by requiring that he undergo rehabilitative programming before becoming eligible for supervised release, Schnell has imposed conditions not established by law at the time of the offense, in violation of the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution. “The States are prohibited from enacting an ex post facto law.” Garner v. Jones , 529 U.S. 244, 249 (2000) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1). “Retroactive changes in laws governing parole of prisoners, in some instances, may be violative of this precept.” Id . But to establish an ex post facto violation, Townsend must show - at the very minimum - that there has been a retroactive change in the law relevant to his case. No such retroactive change in the law has been adequately alleged. At the time of Townsend's offense, Minnesota law permitted the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections to make a discretionary decision regarding whether a person convicted of first-degree murder under § 609.185 should be granted supervised release after 30 years. See Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 5 (1992). In making that determination, the commissioner is entitled - as he was at the time Townsend committed the offense of conviction, see Minn. R. 2940.1800 (1991) - to rely upon the advice of a panel convened to review the suitability of each eligible inmate's claim to supervised release. To be sure, the statute in place at the time of Townsend's conviction did not require rehabilitative programming as a condition of parole. But then neither does the statute of today. Instead, the requirement of rehabilitative programming was imposed pursuant to the commissioner's discretionary authority to determine whether supervised release would be appropriate. And the

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commissioner has had this discretionary authority under state law at all times since Townsend committed the offense of conviction.

Nevertheless, Townsend - relying heavily on Rud v. Fabian , 743 N.W.2d 295 (Minn.Ct.App. 2007) - argues that the Minnesota Department of Corrections cannot impose treatment, specifically, as a condition of release. Rud , however, is inapposite.

The plaintiff in Rud had been convicted of multiple sexual offenses. Years after the plaintiff had been convicted and sentenced, the State of Minnesota enacted a law requiring that the commissioner establish “appropriate mental health programs and vocational and educational programs with employment-related goals.” Minn. Stat. § 244.03. The statute expressly provided that “[t]he commissioner may impose disciplinary sanctions upon any inmate who refuses to participate in rehabilitative programs.” Id . The plaintiff in Rud was ordered by the Minnesota Department of Corrections to undergo sex-offender treatment pursuant to this statute. When he refused, the plaintiff lost 90 days of good-time credit to which he otherwise would have been entitled. On state habeas review, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the treatment requirement - and the punishment of loss of good-time credit attached to the treatment requirement - amounted to a violation of the ex post facto clause. Rud , 743 N.W.2d at 302-04.

Rud differs from this matter, however, in that the plaintiff in Rud had a statutory entitlement to a specific date of release from incarceration, albeit one conditioned on good behavior. Cf. Garner , 529 U.S. at 258 (J. Scalia, concurring) (“A statutory parole system that reduces a prisoner's sentence by fixed amounts of time for good behavior

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during incarceration can realistically be viewed as an entitlement - a reduction of the prescribed penalty ....”). Townsend, by contrast, had no such legal entitlement. The punishment imposed upon Townsend at the time of his conviction and sentencing was life imprisonment. Unlike the statutory good-time-credit provisions at issue in Rud , nothing in Minnesota law entitled Townsend to supervised release at any specific point during his term of life imprisonment. Instead, the decision whether to grant or deny supervised release has always been left by statute to the discretion of the commissioner. See Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 5.

Second, Townsend suggests that whatever the result of the commissioner's review of his decision, the process by which the decision was made is unlawful because Rule 2940.1800, which establishes the advisory panel that assists in determining whether an inmate should be granted supervised release, was not enacted until after the date of his offense. As an initial matter, this assertion appears simply to be not true; a substantively identical version of Rule 2940.1800 establishing an advisory panel for assisting in decisions regarding supervised release was in effect at the time of Townsend's offense. See Minn. R. 2940.1800 (1991). But leaving this aside, even if it were true that the advisory panel had not been established at the time of Townsend's offense, Townsend has not alleged how the establishment of the advisory panel amounts to a violation of federal law. Nothing in the complaint suggests that the procedures employed by the

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State of Minnesota under Rule 2940.1800 are inconsistent with due process as guaranteed by the federal constitution. Nor does Townsend establish that the use of an advisory panel for making recommendations regarding the appropriateness of supervised release amounts to additional punishment for his offense in violation of the ex post facto clause. Because Townsend cannot establish a violation of his constitutional rights resulting from the establishment of the advisory panel, he has not stated a claim on which relief may be granted under § 1983.

Thus, to the extent that Townsend's claim is not barred by Heck , the claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Because of the application of the Heck doctrine to Townsend's claim, it is recommended that this matter be dismissed without prejudice. See Gautreaux v. Sanders , 395 Fed.Appx. 311, 312-13 (8th Cir. 2010) (modifying dismissal under Heck to be without prejudice). That said, despite the recommendation of dismissal without prejudice, Townsend is warned he will not be permitted to pursue any aspect of his claims barred by Heck until such point as his conviction or sentence becomes invalidated through a more appropriate procedural vehicle. Id . Finally, because Townsend's claims are without merit, it is recommended that Townsend's motion for preliminary injunctive relief be denied. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc.,

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640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981); Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams , 151 F.3d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that likelihood of success on the merits is “[t]he most important of the Dataphase factors.”).

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RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT :

1. The motion to dismiss of defendant Paul Schnell [ECF No. 11] be GRANTED .

2. The motion for a preliminary injunction of plaintiff Otha Eric Townsend [ECF No. 3] be DENIED .

3. This matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

NOTICE

Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate judge's proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).