New York Cases October 24, 2023: Sibble v. Human Res. Admin. HRA

Case Description

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ORDER OF DISMISSAL

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge.

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se , brings this action against the Human Resources Administration (“HRA”) for the City of New York regarding his applications for food stamps -formally known as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) - cash assistance, and rental assistance. By order dated July 6, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim, with 30 days' leave to replead.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co. , 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills , 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest ,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

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While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills , 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest ,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id . at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Taking all of these standards together, courts liberally construe pleadings prepared by pro se litigants and hold them “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted).

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the complaint. Plaintiff applied for SNAP benefits and cash and rental assistance. After he applied for these benefits, he alleges, “I was violated about my food stamps benefit and cash assistance and my rental assistance for me to get my city voucher to get out [of] the shelter[.]” (ECF 1, at 5.) He also alleges “it [has] been longer then a month” since the time he submitted his applications. ( Id. ) Plaintiff and his “case manager tr[ied] [to] call on the phone wait 2 hours no one answer.” ( Id. ) He also went “in person” to HRA, but no one was able to “tell me anything[ ].” ( Id. ) Finally, Plaintiff called 311, to no avail. Plaintiff indicates that he is “hungry.” ( Id. )

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Attached to Plaintiff's complaint is an HRA communication showing that Plaintiff applied for cash assistance on May 22, 2023. The communication also shows that Plaintiff was required to call HRA for his interview by June 20, 2023.

DISCUSSION

A. Human Resources Administration

Plaintiff's claims against the HRA must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York , 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York , 740 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”).

In light of Plaintiff's pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York.

B. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff's allegations that he was unable to communicate with the HRA regarding his benefits applications are construed as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under Section 1983, an individual may bring claims in federal court, asserting the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The Court also construes the complaint as asserting a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

“The two threshold questions in any Section 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process are whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty or property interest protected by the United States Constitution or federal statutes, and, if so, what process was due before plaintiff could be

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deprived of that interest.” Green v. Bauvi , 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. , 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)).

Public assistance benefits “have long been afforded constitutional protection as a species of property protected by the federal Due Process Clause.” Kapps v. Wing , 404 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970)); see also M.K.B. v. Eggleston , 445 F.Supp.2d 400, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Persons who are qualified to receive welfare benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement to such benefits.”). Applicants for benefits, no less than recipients, possess such a property interest. Kapps , 404 F.3d at 113. In the context of public assistance benefits, due process typically requires pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard. Goldberg , 397 U.S. at 260-61; Hart v. Westchester Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , No. 98-CV-8034, 2003 WL 22595396, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Where the government deprives a plaintiff of some property interest pursuant to an established procedure, procedural due process is generally satisfied so long as some form of hearing is provided before the individual is deprived of the property interest. Nnebe v. Daus , 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011). By contrast, where a person is deprived of a property right because of a random and unauthorized act, rather than through the operation of established state procedures, the Due Process Clause is satisfied if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that a “random and unauthorized” deprivation of a protected interest does not result in a violation of procedural due process, as long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy);

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Rivera-Powell v. New York City Bd. of Elections , 470 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that “[w]hen the state conduct in question is random and unauthorized, the state satisfies procedural due process requirements so long as it provides meaningful post-deprivation remedy”).

New York State law provides public assistance applicants remedies to challenge the denial of benefits, including fair hearings under N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 22 and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358, as well as an appeals process through Article 78 proceedings. These procedures have been found to be constitutionally sufficient to challenge adverse determinations in connection with government entitlement programs. See, e.g. , Banks v. HRA , No. 11-CV-2380, 2013 WL 142374, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013); Vapne v. Eggleston , No. 04-CV-565 (NRB), 2004 WL 2754673, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004).

Plaintiff does not allege that HRA denied his benefit applications. Rather, his complaint concerns his inability to reach an HRA representative, presumably to schedule an interview. At this stage, therefore, there is no indication that HRA rendered any adverse determinations regarding Plaintiff's applications. Had HRA denied his applications, Plaintiff would be required to challenge that denial by requesting a fair hearing before filing a lawsuit in federal court alleging a due process violation. Because Plaintiff does not allege that any state procedures were inadequate to challenge an adverse determination, the complaint does not state a due process claim against the City of New York. The Court therefore dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione , 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo , 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu , 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank , 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid due process claim against the City of New York, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.

Plaintiff may consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group's (“NYLAG”) Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this court. The clinic is run by a private organization; it is not part of, or run by, the court. It cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order.

CONCLUSION

The complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is dismissed for failure to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30 days' leave to replead.

A copy of NYLAG's flyer with details of its clinic is attached to this order.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.

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Cf. Coppedge v. United States , 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

SO ORDERED.