North Carolina Cases April 29, 2022: Prosise v. Kijakazi

Case Description

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MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION

KIMBERLY A. SWANK, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on the parties' cross motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Catina J. Chapman Prosise (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the denial of her application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). The time for filing responsive briefs has expired, and the pending motions are ripe for adjudication. Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the motions and memoranda submitted by the parties, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE #20] be denied, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE #23] be granted, and the Commissioner's decision be upheld.

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S TATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff applied for DIB on July 6, 2017, with an alleged onset date of September 17, 2013. (R. 26, 203-04.) The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and a request for hearing was filed. (R. 26, 107, 124, 145-46.) A hearing was held on December 18, 2019, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Vanessa Lucas, who issued an unfavorable ruling on February 3, 2020. (R. 23-83.) On October 15, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (R. 1- 7.) At that time, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. On December 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant civil action, seeking judicial review of the final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The scope of judicial review of a final agency decision denying disability benefits is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen , 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; [i]t consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Craig v. Chater , 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), and Laws v. Celebrezze , 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)) (citations

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omitted) (alteration in original). “In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should not] undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Mastro v. Apfel , 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Craig , 76 F.3d at 589) (first and second alterations in original). Rather, in conducting the “substantial evidence” inquiry, the court determines whether the Commissioner has considered all relevant evidence and sufficiently explained the weight accorded to the evidence. Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers , 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997).

II. Disability Determination

In making a disability determination, the Commissioner utilizes a five-step evaluation process. The Commissioner asks, sequentially, whether the claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1; (4) can perform the requirements of past work; and, if not, (5) based on the claimant's age, work experience, and residual functional capacity can adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Albright v. Comm'r of SSA , 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). The burden of proof and production during the first four steps of the inquiry rests on the claimant. Pass v. Chater , 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th. Cir. 1995). At the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that other work exists in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id . In making this determination, the ALJ must decide “whether the claimant is able to perform

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other work considering both [the claimant's residual functional capacity] and [the claimant's] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new job.” Hall v. Harris , 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). “If the Commissioner meets [this] burden, the ALJ finds the claimant not disabled and denies the application for benefits.” Mascio v. Colvin , 780 F.3d 632, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2015).

III. ALJ's Findings

Applying the five-step, sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff “not disabled” as defined in the Social Security Act (“the Act”). As a preliminary matter, the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2018. (R. 28.) At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity from September 17, 2013, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2018, the date last insured. ( Id. ) Next, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the severe impairments of degenerative joint disease of the right knee status-post multiple surgeries, reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD), hypertension, and obesity, through the date last insured. ( Id. )

At step three, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's impairments were not severe enough, either individually or in combination, to meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. (R. 29.) The ALJ expressly considered Listing 1.02, Listing 11.02 for equivalency purposes pursuant to SSR 19-4p, SSR 19-2 in connection with Plaintiff's obesity, and SSR 03-2p in connection with Plaintiff's RSD. (R. 29-30.)

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Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and found that Plaintiff had, through the date last insured, the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; occasionally kneel, crouch, and crawl; she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; should not work at unprotected heights; and due to pain, she is limited to maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace for simple routine tasks.

(R. 30-31.) In making this assessment, the ALJ stated that she considered Plaintiff's symptoms and the evidence (both “objective medical” and “other”) based on the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017), and found Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff's symptoms “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” ( Id. ) At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work through the date last insured. (R. 34.) Nonetheless, at step five, upon considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed, namely: document preparer (DOT #249.587-018), printer circuit board screener (DOT #726.684-110), and final inspector (DOT #713.687-018). (R. 34-35.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been disabled under the Act from September 17, 2013, Plaintiff's alleged onset date, through the date last insured. (R. 35.)

I V. Plaintiff's Argument

Plaintiff contends the Commissioner erred by failing to “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusions.” (Pl.'s Mot. J. Pldgs. [DE #20] at

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4; Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n [DE #26] at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “simply conclude[ed]” she would assign great weight to opinions of two doctors who conducted consultative examinations of Plaintiff, without “articulat[ing] how the entire medical record, including the records of [Plaintiff's] treating physicians, is inconsistent with the Plaintiff's testimony regarding her functional limitations.” (Pl.'s Mot. J. Pldgs. at 6.) In contrast, the Commissioner contends the ALJ sufficiently explained how the evidence supports the RFC assessment. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Pldgs. [DE #24] at 4-8.) For the reasons explained below, the undersigned agrees with the Commissioner and recommends that the Commissioner's decision be upheld.

The RFC is an administrative assessment of “an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis” despite impairments and related symptoms. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). “A ‘regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1. In determining the RFC, the ALJ considers an individual's ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(4). It is based upon all relevant evidence, which may include the claimant's own description of limitations from

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alleged symptoms. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). If necessary, an ALJ must “explain how any material inconsistences or ambiguities in the evidence were considered and resolved.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7.

An ALJ must “include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion” in the RFC. Monroe v. Colvin , 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mascio , 780 F.3d at 636). The ALJ must specifically explain how certain pieces of evidence support particular conclusions and “discuss[ ] . . . which evidence the ALJ found credible and why.” Monroe , 826 F.3d at 189 (quoting Radford v. Colvin , 734 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013)). The Fourth Circuit has interpreted this to require an ALJ to “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion.” Monroe , 826 F.3d at 189 (quoting Cliffordv. Apfel , 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)).

“[A] proper RFC analysis has three components: (1) evidence, (2) logical explanation, and (3) conclusion [M]eaningful review is frustrated when an ALJ goes straight from listing evidence to stating a conclusion.” Thomas v. Berryhill , 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Woods v. Berryhill , 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018)). Simply put, this means an ALJ must “[s]how [her] work.” Patterson v. Comm'r of SSA , 846 F.3d 656, 663 (4th Cir. 2017) (applying same principle to an ALJ's listing analysis). Such analysis-“[h]armonizing conflicting evidence and bolstering inconclusive findings, ” Patterson , 846 F.3d at 662-is a “necessary predicate” to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings, Monroe , 826 F.3d at 189 (quoting Radford , 734 F.3d at 295). Where a court is “left to

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guess about how the ALJ arrived at [her] conclusions on [a claimant's] ability to perform relevant functions . . ., remand is necessary.” Mascio , 780 F.3d at 637.

Here, ALJ Lucas sufficiently explained how she arrived at the RFC assessment, and more specifically, why the medical opinions of the two consultative examiners persuaded her. (R. 33-34 (rationale regarding opinions of Dr. Sunny Darji, M.D. (R. 499-504), and Dr. Mark Rouff, M.D. (R. 662-67)).) ALJ Lucas credited Dr. Darji's February 2017 opinion that Plaintiff has limitations with ambulation due to knee pain and instability but did not need an assistive device. (R. 33.) Dr. Darji also noted that Plaintiff could be expected to sit normally during a full workday but would need a knee brace for ambulation. (R. 503.) ALJ Lucas also noted that Dr. Darji's findings and opinions were consistent with recent treatment notes in the record. (R. 33 (citing R. 669-717) (R. 687 is a treatment note from April 8, 2019, advising Plaintiff to limit her knee brace use to when she is walking and to remove the brace when sitting).) ALJ Lucas noted that Dr. Darji's opinion was based on a single examination but that it was also the product of a thorough examination in the doctor's area of specialization. (R. 33.) ALJ Lucas similarly found Dr. Rouff's January 2019 opinion that Plaintiff has no limitations with sitting, mild limitations with standing, and moderate limitations with walking due to right knee pain persuasive. (R. 33-34.) Both consultative examiners expressed opinions regarding Plaintiff's functional abilities that would support an RFC assessment at the sedentary exertional level with certain additional limitations. ( See R. 503-04 (Dr. Darji); R. 666-67 (Dr. Rouff).) Accordingly, by explaining why she found these opinions persuasive, ALJ Lucas

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offered sufficient explanation for the undersigned to understand how the ALJ reached the RFC assessment. See Mascio , 780 F.3d at 637. And the consultative examiners' findings and opinions, especially when considered in the context of additional record evidence, are sufficient to meet the “substantial evidence” requirement. See Craig , 76 F.3d at 589; Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. , 131 F.3d at 439-40.

Plaintiff's argument on review is not persuasive for the following reasons. First, it is clear the ALJ did not fully credit Plaintiff's statements about her symptom severity-which would preclude even sedentary-level work-because the ALJ found the opinions of the consultative examiners more persuasive. Any objection Plaintiff has regarding the failure to explain why Plaintiff's statements are “inconsistent” ( see Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n at 1) is misplaced: Plaintiff's statements are inconsistent with other medical evidence in the record, namely, the consultative examiners' reports. The undersigned is not “left to guess” at this point of analysis. See Mascio , 780 F.3d at 637. Second, Plaintiff's complaint (Pl.'s Mot. J. Pldgs. at 6) that the ALJ did not articulate how the entire medical record-“including the records of her treating physicians”-is inconsistent with Plaintiff's own statements misses the foregoing point. Moreover, Plaintiff herself identifies no record evidence that is inconsistent with the RFC assessed by the ALJ other than her own testimony. (Pl.'s Mot. J. Pldgs. at 6.) Thus, Plaintiff's argument should be rejected.

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C ONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE #20] be DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [DE #23] be GRANTED, and the Commissioner's decision be upheld.

IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on each of the parties or, if represented, their counsel. Each party shall have until May 13, 2022 , to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See

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28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C. (Dec. 2019).

A party that does not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, a party's failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline may bar the party from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).