Ohio Cases September 29, 2020: Min You v. Ne. Ohio Med. Univ.

Case Description

(Ct. of Cl. No. 2015-00747JD)

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

DECISION

On brief: Douglas M . Kehres , for appellant. Argued: Douglas M . Kehres .

On brief: Dave Yost , Attorney General, and Velda K . Hofacker , for appellee. Argued: Velda K . Hofacker .

APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio

SADLER, P.J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Min You, Ph.D., appeals from the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Northeast Ohio Medical University ("NEOMU" or "appellee"). For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} NEOMU is a public medical institution that includes a College of Medicine and a College of Pharmacy. In 2013, Charles Taylor, Pharm.D., Dean of the College of Pharmacy of NEOMU, initiated a national search for a candidate to chair the Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences. Appellant was identified as a top candidate and a finalist for the post. Appellant and Taylor negotiated the terms of employment over several telephone and email exchanges. Relevant to the instant appeal, appellant and Taylor discussed the

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creation of an endowed chair/professorship within the College of Pharmacy. According to appellant, "[she] told Dean Taylor during negotiation that I wanted to have endowment, because that was not an administrative position, but a prestigious position in academia." (Aug. 29, 2019 You Aff. at ¶ 3, attached to Pl.'s Brief in Opp. filed Aug. 30, 2019.) Appellant recalls in a phone conversation prior to accepting the appointment, Taylor said the endowment would be one million dollars, which would be funded solely by NEOMU. (Aug. 13, 2019 You Aff. at ¶ 9, attached to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt. filed Aug. 16, 2019.) Taylor denies these claims and contends appellant understood the endowed position was tied to her administrative responsibilities, and he never waived appellant's obligation to raise funds for the endowment.

{¶ 3} On November 4, 2013, Taylor, on behalf of NEOMU, sent appellant a letter offering her an appointment as department chair at the rank of tenured professor in the Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences and a non-paid appointment as associate dean for research with the College of Pharmacy. Appellee also offered to create a process to name and endow a distinguished chair/professorship in the College of Pharmacy to which appellant would be assigned. The offer letter states in relevant part:

As part of our 40th year Anniversary, the College of Pharmacy, in conjunction with [NEOMU's] Division of Advancement, will create a process to name and fully endow a distinguished chair/professorship within the College of Pharmacy to which you will be assigned. The process will begin immediately upon your acceptance of this offer with the final name of the position determined by March 31, 2014. We will contribute annual disbursements for up to a five year period to help establish the corpus. You will be expected to engage in a philanthropic initiative with the Division of Advancement to fully fund this endowment within the five year time period, at which time the name may be modified based on donor instructions. Any earnings and various restrictions will be in accordance with university polices for endowments.

(Nov. 4, 2013 Offer Letter at 2, attached to Def.'s Memo. Contra filed Sept. 13, 2019.)

{¶ 4} On November 11, 2013, appellant accepted the terms of the offer letter. In January 2014, appellant started at NEOMU as the chair of the Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences at the rank of tenured professor and the associate dean for research for the College of Pharmacy. According to appellant, in or around April 2014, Taylor said the president of NEOMU, Dr. Jay Gershen, was happy with her work, and

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Gershen would raise the endowment to three million dollars, which the president's office would fund. (Aug. 13, 2019 You Aff. at ¶ 10.) Taylor stated he was not aware of any conversation releasing appellant of her responsibility to raise funds. (Sept. 11, 2019 Taylor Aff. at ¶ 9, attached to Def.'s Memo. Contra.) Gershen also denies he told Taylor to increase the corpus of the endowment or that any amount of funds would come from the president's office. (Aug. 23, 2019 Gershen Aff. at ¶ 4, attached to Def.'s Memo. Contra.)

{¶ 5} In late 2014, a dispute arose between appellant and Taylor concerning communication with Gershen. On February 18, 2015, after both informal and formal warnings, appellant was removed from her administrative positions as chair of the Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences and associate dean for research for the College of Pharmacy. Appellant remained on the faculty as a tenured professor. Taylor sent appellant a formal letter of removal summarizing the decision. Regarding the endowed chair/professorship, Taylor wrote appellant was "hereby released from your obligation to engage with the Division of Advancement to fund an endowed chair/professorship within the College of Pharmacy and you are hereby notified that the College will not assign that position to you should one be developed." (Feb. 18, 2015 Removal Letter at 1, attached to Def.'s Memo. Contra.)

{¶ 6} On August 21, 2015, appellant filed a complaint alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) due process of law violation under the University Faculty Bylaws ("bylaws") and state and federal laws; (3) retaliation; and (4) illegal discriminatory treatment based on race, gender, and national origin. Pursuant to Civ.R. 53, the trial court appointed a magistrate to preside over the proceedings. Appellee filed its answer on April 13, 2016. On March 13, 2017, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment arguing there was no dispute of fact on all claims in appellant's complaint, and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On May 17, 2017, the trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment, which was appealed to this court.

{¶ 7} On December 6, 2018, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court against appellant for claims of due process, retaliation, and discrimination. You v . N . E . Ohio Med . Univ ., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-426, 2018-Ohio-4838. We also affirmed in part and reversed in part appellant's cause of action for breach of contract. We found appellant could not demonstrate a breach of contract claim for termination of her appointments as department

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chair and associate dean for research because the bylaws, which were incorporated into appellant's offer letter, allowed Taylor to terminate appellant from her administrative duties at will. We also concluded that cancellation of appellant's endowed distinguished chair/professorship was not addressed by the trial court, and appellee failed to demonstrate there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the claim. The case was remanded to the trial court to conduct further proceedings for the breach of contract claim as to the cancellation of appellant's endowed professorship.

{¶ 8} On August 16, 2019, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment with the trial court to address the remaining breach of contract claim. The parties filed subsequent memoranda in opposition and reply briefs to the respective motions. Appellant argued the parties contracted to create an endowed chair/professorship separate from her administrative positions as department chair and associate dean. Appellee stated the endowed position was a tool to assist appellant in her administrative functions from which she was lawfully removed.

{¶ 9} On October 16, 2019, the trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment and denied appellant's motion. The trial court determined appellant was offered two positions: department chair of Pharmaceutical Sciences at the rank of tenured professor and associate dean for research within the College of Pharmacy. The trial court found there was a contractual relationship between the parties as evidenced by Taylor, on behalf of NEOMU, offering appellant employment as stated in the written offer letter and appellant accepting that offer in writing. The trial court reasoned, based on the four corners of the agreement, the endowed position was associated with appellant's administrative appointments, which the bylaws authorize Taylor to terminate at will. The trial court also found the offer to be a distinguished university professor as described in Section (M) of the bylaws was not something Taylor was authorized to offer and nothing in the contract states the normal process was waived or circumvented. Finally, the trial court concluded that even if the contract was ambiguous, the discussions between the parties during the formation of the contract only considered the endowed position as it relates to appellant's administrative responsibilities. While appellant submitted organizational charts from NEOMU that showed at least two endowed chairs/professors that were not the administrative chairs of their departments, the trial court found this information

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unpersuasive as there was no evidence appellant was aware of these charts before entering into the contract.

{¶ 10} Appellant filed a timely appeal.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 11} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Appellee NEOM[U] on the issue of whether an endowed professorship was part of Dr. You's job offer.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 12} Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Gabriel v . Ohio State Univ . Med . Ctr ., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-870, 2015-Ohio-2661, ¶ 12, citing Byrd v . Arbors E . Subacute & Rehab . Ctr ., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-232, 2014-Ohio-3935, ¶ 5. "When an appellate court reviews a trial court's disposition of a summary judgment motion, it applies the same standard as the trial court and conducts an independent review, without deference to the trial court's determination." Gabriel at ¶ 12, citing Byrd at ¶ 5, citing Maust v . Bank One Columbus , N . A ., 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107 (10th Dist.1992).

{¶ 13} Summary judgment is appropriate when " 'the moving party demonstrates that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.' " 2454 Cleveland , LLC v . TWA , LLC , 10th Dist. 19AP-157, 2020-Ohio-362, ¶ 8, quoting Capella III , LLC v . Wilcox , 190 Ohio App.3d 133, 2010-Ohio-4746, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.), citing Gilbert v . Summit Cty ., 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, ¶ 6. "When seeking summary judgment on grounds that the non-moving party cannot prove its case, the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of the non-moving party's claims." Lundeen v . Graff , 10th Dist. No. 15AP-32, 2015-Ohio-4462, ¶ 11, citing Dresher v . Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Dresher at 293. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we must construe all evidence in a light in favor to the non-

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moving party. 2454 Cleveland , LLC at ¶ 8, citing Pilz v . Ohio Dept . of Rehab . & Corr ., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-240, 2004-Ohio-4040, ¶ 8.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶ 14} Under the sole assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred when it granted appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellant's breach of contract claim. Specifically, appellant argues the trial court erred in finding the four corners of the offer letter to be clear and unambiguous that the endowed position was administrative in nature. Appellee argues the letter only offers appellant two appointments, chair of the department as a tenured professor and associate dean. Appellee contends that based on the four corners of the offer letter, the endowed chair/professorship was a tool associated with appellant's administrative duties, which the bylaws authorized Taylor to terminate appellant at will.

{¶ 15} Interpretation of a written contract is a matter of law. Guaranteed Constr . Servs . v . Grand Communities , Ltd ., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-213, 2017-Ohio-9288, ¶ 22, citing John R . Jurgensen Co . v . Fairborn , 1st Dist. No. C-140556, 2015-Ohio-5478, ¶ 11; Taylor Bldg . Corp . of Am . v . Benfield , 117 Ohio St.3d 352, 2008-Ohio-938, ¶ 37. The purpose of contract interpretation is to determine the parties' intent. Keybank Natl . Assn . v . Columbus Campus , LLC , 10th Dist. 11AP-920, 2013-Ohio-1243, ¶ 26, citing Graham v . Drydock Coal Co ., 76 Ohio St.3d 311, 313 (1996). The intent of the parties is generally reflected in the language utilized in the agreement. Keybank Natl . Assn . at ¶ 26, citing Skivolocki v . E . Ohio Gas Co ., 38 Ohio St.2d 244, 247 (1974). "When parties to a contract dispute the meaning of the contract language, courts must first look to the four corners of the document to determine whether or not an ambiguity exists." Drs . Kristal & Forche , D . D . S ., Inc . v . Erkis , 10th Dist. No. 09AP-06, 2009-Ohio-5671, ¶ 21, citing Buckeye Corrugated , Inc . v . DeRycke , 9th Dist. No. 21459, 2003-Ohio-6321. " 'When the words used in a contract are clear and unambiguous, courts need look no further than that language.' " Altercare of Canal Winchester Post-Acute Rehab . Ctr ., Inc . v . Turner , 10th Dist. No. 18AP-466, 2019-Ohio-1011, ¶ 19, quoting Donini v . Fraternal Order of Police , 4th Dist. No. 08CA325, 2009-Ohio-5810, ¶ 16. The words used in interpreting a provision of a written contract must be read in context and given their ordinary meaning. Albert v . Shiells , 10th Dist. No. 02AP-354, 2002-Ohio-7021, ¶ 20, citing Carroll Weir Funeral Home

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v . Miller , 2 Ohio St.2d 189, 192 (1965). Common words are given their typical meaning " 'unless another meaning is clearly evident from the face or overall content of the contract, or unless the result is manifestly absurd.' " Guaranteed Constr . Servs . at ¶ 24, quoting Hope Academy Broadway Campus v . White Hat Mgt ., L . L . C ., 145 Ohio St.3d 29, 2015-Ohio-3716, ¶ 36.

{¶ 16} When determining the parties' intent in the language of the contract, a reviewing court must read the contract as a whole and give effect, when possible, to every provision in the agreement. Clark v . Humes , 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1202, 2008-Ohio-640, ¶ 12, citing Foster Wheeler Enviresponse , Inc . v . Franklin Cty . Convention Facilities Auth ., 78 Ohio St.3d 353, 361-62 (1997). " 'Only when the language of a contract is unclear or ambiguous, or when the circumstances surrounding the agreement invest the language of the contract with a special meaning will extrinsic evidence be considered in an effort to give effect to the parties' intentions.' " Albert at ¶ 20, quoting Shifrin v . Forest City Ents ., Inc ., 64 Ohio St.3d 635 (1992), syllabus.

{¶ 17} After a review of the four corners of the offer letter, we find the endowed chair/professorship provision ambiguous as to whether it is a benefit associated with appellant's administrative positions or a separate academic title. In the first two paragraphs of the letter, appellant was offered appointments as chair of the Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences at the rank of tenured professor and associate dean for research for the College of Pharmacy. The offer letter goes on to state "[appellee] will create a process to name and fully endow a distinguished chair/professorship within the College of Pharmacy to which you will be assigned." (Nov. 4, 2013 Offer Letter at 2.) While the roles of department chair and associate dean are administrative in nature, the position of tenured professor is academic and subject to a separate set of removal procedures under the bylaws. Applying the ordinary meaning to the words "chair" and "professor," it is unclear whether the endowed position refers to the administrative duties associated with appellant's appointments as associate dean and department chair, the academic responsibilities associated with appellant's role as a tenured professor, or a distinct academic title.

{¶ 18} The trial court based its ruling, in part, on the sequence of paragraphs in the offer letter to show the endowed position was a benefit for appellant's administrative responsibilities. We find the language of the offer letter does not support such an

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interpretation. While the offer to create an endowed position is placed in a later paragraph, there is no indication in the language of the agreement that it is among appellant's administrative responsibilities. While the preceding paragraph to the endowed chair/professorship provision addresses designing a faculty hiring plan, an administrative responsibility, the subsequent paragraph concerns supplemental pay for moving expenses and employee benefits, which are equally relevant to appellant's administrative and academic duties.

{¶ 19} Appellee argues "[appellant] cannot point to any language in the offer letter that promises her an endowed chair/professorship." (Appellee's Brief at 20.) We disagree. The offer letter states "[appellee] will create a process to name and fully endow a distinguished chair/professorship within the College of Pharmacy to which you will be assigned ." (Emphasis added.) (Nov. 4, 2013 Offer Letter at 2.)

{¶ 20} Appellee next argues there was no offer of the distinguished professor position because there is no way to circumvent the nomination process as stated in the bylaws. We find this argument unpersuasive. The NEOMU Bylaws Section (M), University Title of Distinction: Distinguished University Professor, states in relevant part:

(1) The title of Distinguished University Professor is a non-salaried designation that may be conferred by the University, from time to time, on individuals who have demonstrated extraordinary achievement as NEOM[U] faculty members. This represents the highest honor that the University can confer on a faculty member, and will only be awarded for truly exceptional contributions.

(2) Only full professors will be eligible for consideration. Candidates must meet the following criteria to be recommended for consideration:

(a) Documented evidence of sustained excellence in education at NEOM[U],

(b) A protracted record of distinguished scholarship spanning at least a decade,

(c) Evidence of extraordinary academic achievement that has been formally recognized by an authoritative national or international body, and

(d) Documentation from appropriate individuals external to NEOM[U] that the candidate is a premier contributor to his or her discipline or field of study.

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(3) Nominations for the title of Distinguished University Professor may originate from a Department Chair, Dean of a College, or the President.

* * *

(6) If approved by the President, the nomination will be forwarded to the Board of Trustees for consideration.

(NEOMU Bylaws Section (M), attached to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt.)

{¶ 21} Here, the offer letter creates a process for appellant to be assigned an endowed "distinguished chair/professorship." (Nov. 4, 2013 Offer Letter at 2.) The position referred to in the bylaws is a "Distinguished University Professor." While the titles are similar, the offer letter makes no reference to Section (M) of the bylaws. As such, it is unclear whether appellee is referring to the "Distinguished University Professor" as stated in the bylaws or intended to create a separate endowed position. Accordingly, we find the four corners of the offer letter ambiguous as to whether the endowed chair/professorship was a benefit associated with appellant's administrative positions or a separate academic title.

{¶ 22} Having found the offer letter ambiguous as to whether the endowed position was a benefit associated with appellant's administrative positions or a separate academic title, we now look at the parol evidence to determine the parties' intent. " 'When the language of a contract is unclear or ambiguous, or when the circumstances surrounding the agreement give the plain language special meaning, extrinsic evidence can be used to ascertain the intent of the parties.' " Campbell v . 1 Spring , LLC , 10th Dist. No. 19AP-368, 2020-Ohio-3190, ¶ 6, quoting Drs . Kristal & Forche , D . D . S ., 2009-Ohio-5671, at ¶ 22. Parol evidence is only admissible to interpret, not contradict, ambiguous terms of a contract. EFA Assocs . v . Dept . of Adm . Servs ., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1001, 2002-Ohio-2421, ¶ 45. "Extrinsic evidence can include '(1) the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the contract was made, (2) the objectives the parties intended to accomplish by entering into the contract, and (3) any acts by the parties that demonstrate the construction they gave to their agreement.' " Lutz v . Chesapeake Appalachia , L . L . C ., 148 Ohio St.3d 524, 2016-Ohio-7549, ¶ 9, quoting United States Fid . & Guar . Co . v . St . Elizabeth Med . Ctr ., 129 Ohio App.3d 45, 56 (2d Dist.1998).

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{¶ 23} While a determination whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, the meaning of words or phrases in an ambiguous contract are questions of fact. Atelier Dist . v . Parking Co . of Am ., Inc ., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-87, 2007-Ohio-7138, ¶ 17, citing Ohio Historical Soc . v . Gen . Maintenance & Eng . Co ., 65 Ohio App.3d 139, 146 (10th Dist.1989). If a contract provision has two reasonable interpretations, there remains an issue of fact as to the parties' intent. Career & Tech . Assn . v . Auburn Vocational School Dist . Bd . of Edn ., 11th Dist. No. 2013-L-010, 2014-Ohio-1572, ¶ 18, citing Salvato v . Salvato , 11th Dist. No. 2013-T-0024, 2013-Ohio-5268, ¶ 40.

{¶ 24} After reviewing the extrinsic evidence, the language employed by the parties regarding the endowed position is susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations. Appellant contends the endowed position was an academic title and not an administrative duty. Appellant has alleged "[b]y canceling my endowed professorship I was demoted, academically I was demoted." (You Dep. at 41.) Appellant supports this claim by submitting copies of organizational charts from NEOMU showing at least two endowed chairs/professors that were not the administrative chairs of their departments. Appellee argues the organizational charts were not something appellant knew when entering into the contract. Appellee contends the endowed position was "to assist [appellant] in her role as Chair and Associate Dean for Research. There was never any intent to assign an endowed chair/professorship to [appellant] should she no longer serve in her positions of Chair and Associate Dean for Research." (Aug. 15, 2019 Taylor Aff. at ¶ 6, attached to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt. filed Aug. 16, 2019.) Taylor stated "I used the word 'distinguished' in the offer letter to describe the value I placed on agreeing to allow [appellant] to create this endowment in the College where there previously were none. * * * However, if [appellant] had been confused, she could have simply asked me or read the Bylaws." (Sept. 11, 2019 Taylor Aff. at ¶ 14.)

{¶ 25} Considering the evidence in a light favor most favorable to appellant, the multiple organizational charts could provide probative evidence that appellant's endowed position was not simply a tool to assist in her administrative duties but a separate academic title. We find nothing in the record to support the trial court's claim that appellant did not know of these positions before accepting employment with NEOMU. And it could dispel appellee's contention that endowed department chairs are inherently administrative.

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{¶ 26} The preliminary email negotiations between the parties are also open to multiple interpretations. On October 17, 2013, Taylor emailed appellant a summary of their telephone discussion pertaining to the resources needed to accept the department chair position. Relevant to the instant case, the endowed position was discussed in a separate section titled "Named/Endowed Chair." (Oct. 17, 2013 Email, attached to Def.'s Memo. Contra.) Taylor suggested appellee would provide an initial corpus to initiate the endowed position, and they would work together to grow the endowment to an agreed amount. The discussion regarding the endowed position was separate from all other academic and administrative duties discussed in the email.

{¶ 27} On October 24, 2013, appellant emailed Taylor regarding the terms of employment. Relevant to the instant case, appellant suggested an endowment target of two million dollars and an initial corpus of one million dollars to fund the position. Appellant also asked whether the funds could be used to contribute to her salary and a flexible spending account for her research. While appellant notes in the email the distinguished chair/professorship title would be useful in prestige and seeking funding, it is unclear whether this was for her individual research or for the department. In response to appellant's inquiries, Taylor wrote he was unfamiliar with the requirements for shifting proceeds in an endowment and, given the "youthful" nature of the college, he may need time to fully endow the position. (Oct. 24, 2013 Email, attached to Def.'s Memo. Contra.) Taylor also wrote, "[w]ould you be amenable to the idea of creating a named chair for you to hold at the beginning (we could name it after our founding dean as an example) followed by us creating a process for you, me, and our advancement team to work toward fully endowing it over a 2-3 year period (or sooner should be [sic] identify philanthropic individuals)?" (Oct. 24, 2013 Email.) Both parties have filed affidavits that provide conflicting accounts of the subsequent telephone discussions. Appellant states prior to accepting the position, Taylor said the endowment would be one million dollars, which would be funded solely by NEOMU. (Aug. 13, 2019 You Aff. at ¶ 9.) Taylor contends appellant understood the endowment was tied to her administrative responsibilities and never waived appellant's obligation to raise funds for the endowment. Taylor also claimed that in a subsequent phone conversation, he informed appellant that endowment funds could not be used for her salary. (Sept. 11, 2019 Taylor Aff. at ¶ 12.)

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{¶ 28} Given the ambiguity in the emails between the parties and conflicting affidavits, there remains a dispute of fact as to the parties' intentions regarding the endowed position. Appellant's sole assignment of error is sustained.

{¶ 29} Appellee makes a final argument that judgment in favor of NEOMU should be affirmed because "there were no issues of material fact and that [appellant] could not establish any of the elements of a breach of contract claim." (Appellee's Brief at 28.) While appellee raised this argument in its motion for summary judgment, the trial court relied exclusively on its determination that the endowed chair/professorship was administrative and never addressed these issues in its decision.

{¶ 30} Questions not addressed by the trial court generally will not be ruled on by the appellate court. Peterson v . Martyn , 10th Dist. No. 17AP-39, 2018-Ohio-2905, ¶ 51, citing Ochsmann v . Great Am . Ins . Co ., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1265, 2003-Ohio-4679, ¶ 21, citing Mills-Jennings , Inc . v . Dept . of Liquor Control , 70 Ohio St.2d 95, 99 (1982); see also Wellman v . Salt Creek Valley Bank , 10th Dist. No. 06AP-177, 2006-Ohio-4718, ¶ 11 (remanding the case to the trial court to consider the other grounds in appellees' motion to dismiss not previously addressed).

{¶ 31} As noted above, because the Court of Claims relied exclusively on its determination that the endowed chair/professorship was administrative, the trial court did not address the remaining issues raised by appellee in its motion for summary judgment. As the trial court failed to address appellee's final arguments, we decline to rule on them at this time. Accordingly, we remand the matter for the trial court to consider the other grounds in appellee's motion for summary judgment and for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.

V. CONCLUSION

{¶ 32} For the foregoing reasons, appellant's sole assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Judgment reversed ; cause remanded .