Oregon Advisory Opinions March 20, 1969: OAG 69-28 (March 20, 1969)

Oregon Attorney General Opinions

1969.

OAG 69-28.

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You state:

"A candidate for city office in Jackson County at the recent general election did not file the statement of campaign expenditures provided for by ORS 260.060. The office for which the candidate contended does not pay a salary, in the normally understood meaning of that word, but it has been the practice in the city involved, that the incumbent of the office receives water from the city for his domestic household use without charge. The value of the service thus received by the incumbent would not amount to more than a few dollars per month."

You ask as follows:

"I would appreciate your opinion as to whether under this set of circumstances, the city office concerned is one to which a salary attaches so as to make mandatory the filing of the expenditure statement required by ORS 260.060."

ORS 260.010 (6), defining "public office" for the purposes of ORS 260.010 to 260.520, provides that the term

"* * * shall apply to any national, state, county, or city office to which a salary attaches and which is filled by the voters, as well as to the office of presidential elector, or presiding officer of either branch of the legislature."

The question, of course, is whether or not the fact that the incumbent of the office in question receives water

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from the city without charge renders the office one "to which a salary attaches."

In State ex rel. v. Dunbar, (1908) 53 Or. 45, 52, 98 P. 878, the Oregon court said:

"* * * A 'salary' is personal compensation provided to be paid to the officer for his own services * * * ."

In Houser v. Umatilla County, (1897) 30 Or. 486, 489, 49 P. 867, the court said, regarding a statute relating to salaries of county officials, that the word "salary" * * * means the compensation prescribed to be paid to a public officer for the personal discharge of the duty enjoined upon him by law. * * *"

In Landis v. Lincoln County, (1897) 31 Or. 424, 427, 50 P. 530, the court said that "* * * the term * * * 'salary' may be denominated 'annual or periodical wages or pay' * * *." See also Opinions of the Attorney General, 1926-1928, pp. 459-460; 1950-1952, p. 369, where we noted that the United States Supreme Court in Benedict v. United States, (1899) 176 U.S. 357, 44 L.Ed. 503, 504, said, citing Landis v. Lincoln County, supra:

"'* * * The word "salary" may be defined generally as a fixed annual or periodical payment for services, depending upon the time, and not upon the amount, of services rendered. * * * '"

From the above, it is readily apparent that a city office for which no salary is prescribed does not become an office "to which a salary attaches" merely because it has been the practice in the city to furnish water to the incumbent free of charge. Far from constituting any "compensation prescribed to be paid" as said in Houser v. Umatilla County, supra, the value of the service may be highly variable and in some cases the incumbent may, in fact, receive no such fringe benefit at all if he resides, for example, in a hotel where there is no itemized charge for water.

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We therefore conclude that the office in question is not one to which a salary attaches and therefore a candidate for such office is not required to file a statement of expenditures and contributions as provided for in ORS 260.060.