Oregon Advisory Opinions May 29, 1970: OAG 70-40 (May 29, 1970)

OAG 70-40.

Chapter 432, Section 2 [1969] Oregon Laws 784, codified as ORS 316.102, provides in part as follows:

"(1) A credit against taxes shall be allowed for contributions made in the taxable year to political parties and their candidates whose names are listed on official ballots in any election held in Oregon. A like credit shall be allowed for contributions made to committees and associations organized in support of or in opposition to ballot measures or questions . . ." (emphasis added)

The words "political parties and their candidates", if read alone, could be interpreted to limit the tax credit to contributions to political party candidates in general elections, as

candidates for nomination in primary contests would be their party's candidate only if successful. On the other hand, when the same words are read within the context of the statutory requirement that each candidate for nomination file a declaration, naming the major political party with which he is affiliated and pledging that he will not accept the nomination or endorsement of any other political party, the language may be construed to include primary candidates, in the sense that they are candidates for nomination by their own particul political party, and none other. See, ORS 249.221 and 249.031. Furthermore, the reference in ORS 316.102(1) to candidates whose names are listed on official ballots "in any election", would appear to extend the tax credit to contributions made to candidates in primary elections. This would be consistent with definitions found elsewhere in the statutes which describe "candidate", as a candidate for nomination or election to any elective office. See, ORS 251.510(1) and 260.010(1).

Nevertheless, since the language of the statute is subject to conflicting interpretations, it is ambiguous and leads itself to application of the rules of statutory construction in ascertaining the legislative intent. Curly's Dairy v. Department of Agriculture , 244 Or. 15, 415 P.2d 740 (1966).

Where language of doubtful import is found in a statute, the courts frequently resort to the history of the bill during its passage as an aid to interpretation. Gilbertson v. McLean , 216 Or. 629, 341 P.2d 139 (1959).

"In addition to such raw material of legislative history as previous drafts of House and Senate Bills, the courts may consider other written evidence such as committee reports, minority reports, minutes of committee meetings, and the like." State ex rel. Appling v. Chase , 224 Or. 112, 116-117; 355 P.2d 631 (1960).

ORS 316.102 is the product of HB 1572, sponsored in the 1969 Legislative Assembly by the House Committee on Elections and Reapportionment, at the request of the Secretary of State. In its original form, HB 1572 did not allow a tax credit for contributions to political parties, or contributions in respect to ballot measures or questions. It provided:

"A credit against taxes shall be allowed for contributions made in the taxable year to political candidates whose names are listed on official ballots in any election held in Oregon." (emphasis added)

The minutes of the March 24, 1969, meeting of the House Committee on Elections report that it was suggested to the committee that the bill be amended to add political parties and issues. The minutes of the April 7, 1969 meeting indicate that proponents of the bill were of the opinion that while it fulfilled a need to broaden the base of political contributions and to have more participation in the democratic process there was no reason why it should not be amended to include political parties and ballot measures as well as candidates.

The minutes of its meetings demonstrate that the House Committee on Elections was motivated by a desire to broaden the coverage of HB 1572 when it amended the bill by inserting the

words, "parties and their", after the word, "political", in the original draft, and by adding the provision for a tax credit for contributions made in respect to ballot measures or questions.

"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of the legislature and give it effect, if such meaning is constitutional. In determining the intent many things are taken into consideration: the language used, the object to be accomplished, whether a literal interpretation of the language will lead to an impossibility or an absurdity, the history behind the act, and numerous other matters, no one of which is absolutely controlling as to the legislative intent. It is from a combination of all these that the intent is reduced . . ." Fox v. Galloway , 174 Or. 339, 346; 146 P.2d 922 (1944).

Although the Oregon Supreme Court has acknowledged the universal rule that tax exemption statutes should be strictly construed in favor of the state and against the taxpayer, the court has also held that this rule of strict construction does not foreclose the application of a "reasonable" construction in order to ascertain the legislative intent. Thus, in Multnomah School of the Bible v. Multnomah County , 218 Or. 19, 343 P.2d 893 (1959), the court cited with approval the following statement by Justice Cardozo:

"Exemptions from taxation are not to be enlarged by implication if doubts are nicely balanced. (Citing authority). On the other hand, they are not to be read so grudgingly as to thwart the purpose of the lawmakers." Trotter v. Tennessee , 290 U.S. 354, 78 L.Ed. 358, 54 S. Ct. 138.

In view of the legislative history of ORS 316.102, it is concluded that to read the words, "political parties and their candidates", so grudgingly as to exclude candidates for nomination in primary elections would thwart the purpose of the lawmakers, viz: " . . . to encourage large numbers of people to contribute small amounts of money to political parties and candidates." Committee minutes, Senate Elections Committee, May 15, 1969.