Pennsylvania Advisory Opinions May 27, 1942: AGO 420 (May 27, 1942)

Advisory Opinion Text

Students holding scholarships awarded under the provisions of the Act of July 18, 1919, P. L. 1044, 24 P. S. § 2451, et seq., are entitled to the sum of one hundred dollars for four school years, during the number of such years covered by the scholarship.

Honorable Francis B. Haas,

Superintendent of Public Instruction,

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Sir: You have asked to be advised whether a student to whom a State Scholarship has been awarded may receive $100 per year for four college years if his college course is completed within three calendar years.

You have informed us that some approved colleges and universities have arranged their courses of instruction and vacations so that the students may complete a regular four-year course within a period of three calendar years; although these schools are not planning to reduce the curriculum or the tuition charge for their courses. It appears that the shortening of the normal four-year course will be accomplished by the elimination of vacations.

The Act of July 18, 1919, P. L. 1044, 24 P. S. § 2451, et seq., reads as follows:

Section 1 provides:

For the purpose of assisting worthy young men and women graduates of secondary schools of the State to obtain higher education, the State will award competitive scholarships of the value of one hundred dollars per year for four years to enable selected students to attend any institution in the State of Pennsylvania approved by the College and University Council.

Section 2 provides:

Appointments to such scholarships shall be made by the State Board of Education, and the persons entitled to such appointments shall be determined by competitive examination to be conducted under the supervision of the State Board of Education. Due notice of any examination to be held under the provisions of this act shall be given in such manner as the State Board of Education may prescribe.

Section 3 provides:

One scholarship shall be awarded to each county. In any county where there is more than one entire senatorial district, one scholarship shall be awarded for each entire senatorial district.

The act contains no specific provision concerning the situation involved here. The pertinent language of the statute relative to our problem is "The State will award competitive scholarships of the value of one hundred dollars per year for four years." (Italics ours.) Whether or not this phrase was intended to mean "a school year" or "a calendar year" must be determined from an application of the general rules of statutory construction.

In the case of Turbett Township v. Port Royal Borough Overseers of the Poor , 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 520 (1907), Judge Rice, inter alia, stated:

* * * The effects and consequences of the proposed construction of a law, as well as its reason and spirit, will be looked into in determining the legislative intent, which is the criterion by which all acts must be construed. Hence, if there is room for construction, the court will prefer that construction which is most consonant with the purpose for which the <act was passed. * * *

The following statement from the case of Big Black Creek Improvement Company v. Commonwealth , 94 Pa. 450, was also quoted in the above case:

* * * "statutes are to be construed so as may best effectuate the intention of the makers, which sometimes may be collected from the cause or occasion of passing the statute, and, where discovered, it ought to be followed with judgment and discretion in the construction, though that construction may seem contrary to the letter of the statute."

The only reported case in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which is enlightening on our particular problem is that of Keppelman v. City of Reading , 14 Pa. Dist. 61, 63 (1904) wherein Endlich, J., stated inter alia:

"One year" (no leap year being in question) means a period of 365 days from any given date; i. e., a period, the lapse of which, from a given date in one year, will bring us to the same date in the next year. That is the popular understanding of the word, and must control in the absence of sufficient apparent reason for holding that another was intended. No doubt a different meaning may be given to the word "year" in statutes, or in contracts where the context or subject-matter points to such intent. Thus, it may appear that a fiscal year is intended: Glasgow v. Rowse , 43 Mo. 479, or an official year: United States v. Dickson , 15 Pet. (U. S.) 141, or the period intervening between two elections: Inhabitants of Paris v. Inhabitants of Hiram , 12 Mass. 262, or a period ending with the fruit season: Brown v. Anderson , 77 Cal. 236, and so on. See Engleman v. State, 2 Ind. 91; Knode v. Bald-ridge, 73 Ind. 54; Thornton v. Boyd , 25 Miss. 262; Bartlett v. Kirkwood , 2 E. & B. 771. But such cases, whether of contract or of statute, are the exceptions which prove the rule, and, as all the authorities show, must be founded on something in the language of the statute or contract, or in its manifest purposes clearly displacing the rule. What is the meaning of the language used in this statute has already been seen. Is there anything in the purpose of the enactment that would warrant a construction of the word "year" in any but its popular and usual sense?

In the Permanent Edition of "Words and Phrases," Vol. 45, page 649, under the caption "School Year" we find the courts of other jurisdictions have had occasion to pass upon the meaning of this phrase.

Accordingly, we note that in the case of Brookfield v. Drurry College , 139 Mo. App. 339, 123 S. W. 86, 94, it was held that:

The word "year," when used in employing teachers, means a college or school year, and not a calendar year.

In Westerman v. Cleland, 12 Cal. App. 63, 106 P. 606, 609, it was" ruled that:

A contract of a teacher with school trustees to teach one year from July 5, 1899, at a salary of $1,000, payment to be made by requisitions upon the county superintendent of schools, was a contract to teach for a school "year."

Similarly, in a Georgia case, Long v. Wells, 198 S. E. 763, 768, it was held that:

The word "years," in provision in teachers' civil service act that teachers employed for a total period of three years should be automatically reappointed, contemplated "school years," which need not necessarily include "calendar years," or begin on July 1, 1937, the effective date of the statute. Laws 1937, p. 879, § 2.

Probably the strongest authority cited on this particular subject is that of Williams v. Bagnelle, 138 Cal. 699, 72 P. 408, 410, citing and adopting Brown v. Anderson , 77 Cal. 236, 19 P. 487, wherein it was held that:

The term "year" does not necessarily mean a calendar year. Its meaning is to be gathered from the connection in which the term is used. "The contract was with reference to school-teaching, and, in the absence of anything to the contrary, it must be construed as if the provision of the law limiting the time for which the contract could be made was inserted in it, and that the term 'year' meant a school year, Pol. Code, § 1878, which begins the 1st day of July and ends on the 1st day of June."

It would, therefore, appear that the meaning of the word "year" in our statutes is to be ascertained from the context of the language which the legislature used in providing for state scholarships

In our mind there can be no doubt of the fact that-in passing the act with which we are concerned, the legislature intended that it be "for the purpose of assisting worthy young men and women graduates of secondary schools of the State to obtain higher education." In construing the phrase "* * * scholarships of the value of one hundred dollars per year for four years to enable selected students to attend any institution in the State of Pennsylvania approved * * *" if the announced purpose of the act be kept in mind, it appears clear that the legislature did not intend to require that the four years of education be acquired in four calendar years, but rather in four school years.

Because of the present national emergency it is most advantageous for those students attending colleges and universities to complete their courses of study in less than four calendar years, which is the ordinary period of time for the completion of their courses. It is common knowledge that throughout our Commonwealth and Nation, colleges, universities, technical schools, medical colleges, and the many other various graduate schools, to meet the demands upon their student personnel during the present emergency, have arranged their courses of study to run through vacations. This allows a student to finish his course sooner, although he puts the same time in his classes. Under this state of facts students are actually completing four ordinary school years, although by omitting vacations, they complete their courses within the shorter period of three calendar years.

Certainly it cannot reasonably be argued that the recipients of State scholarships are only entitled to receive their one hundred dollar scholarships for four calendar years. Such conclusion would result in discrimination against the winners of such scholarships under present conditions, because they would be deprived of one year's scholarship, if they avail themselves of the same rights that their fellow classmates have, of finishing their schooling in a shorter period, in order to be available for whatever service they can render our Nation in its present struggle to preserve its democracy, and all of its other heritages.

It is both logical and consistent with the purposes of the act to conclude that the phrase "one hundred dollars per year for four years," means "one hundred dollars per school year for four school years." This not only would be consistent with the purposes of the act, but it also would be equally consistent with the prime purpose in our present daily lives, to be most effective in all our efforts relative to our national defense.

The Act of May 20, 1921, P. L. 1014, § 1, 24 P. S. § 884, provides that the Act of July 18, 1919, P. L. 1044, establishing the scholarships, shall be administered by the State Council of Education, and that the Council shall make all regulations necessary to carry on its proper work and affairs. In the absence of such regulations, there is nothing in the Act of 1919, P. L. 1044, which prohibits the granting of scholarships to students of one hundred dollars per year, for each school year. In fact, such an action is in keeping with the express purpose of the act.

It is our opinion, and you are accordingly advised, that students holding scholarships awarded under the provisions of the Act of July 18, 1919, P. L. 1044, 24 P. S. § 2451, et seq., are entitled to the sum of one hundred dollars for four school years, during the number of such years covered by the scholarship.

Very truly yours,

Department of Justice,

Claude T. Reno, Attorney General.

George J. Barco, Deputy Attorney General.