Pennsylvania Advisory Opinions June 08, 1942: AGO 425 (June 08, 1942)

Advisory Opinion Text

Medical Education and Licensure—Medical institutions—Approval—Students— Medical and surgical course of less than 4 years—Act of June 3, 1911, P. L. 689—Sec. 4:

The State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, under the provisions of Section 4 of the Medical Practice Act of June 3, 1911, P. L. 639, as amended, July 19, 1935, P. L. 1329, may approve a medical institution which allows its students to complete the required graded medical and surgical course of four years, each of which shall be of not less than thirty-two weeks of not less than thirty-five hours each week, within a period of less than four calendar years.

Honorable Francis B. Haas,

Superintendent of Public Instruction,

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Sir: You have asked us whether a medical institution may be approved by the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure if it allows its students to complete the required graded medical and surgical course of four years, each of which shall consist of not less than 32 weeks of not less than 35 hours each within a period of less than four calendar years.

We understand that some of the medical institutions have arranged their courses of instruction and vacations so that medical students may complete a regular four-year course within a period of approximately three calendar years; although these institutions are not planning to reduce their curriculum. It appears that the shortening of the normal four-year course will be accomplished by the elimination or shortening of vacations.

Section 4 of the Medical Practice Act, the Act of June 3, 1911, P. L. 639, 63 P. S. § 403, provides that a medical institution which is approved by the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure for certification purposes, among other requirements, must "have a graded medical and surgical course of four years each of which shall be of not less than thirty-two weeks of not less than thirty-five hours of each week, of actual work in didactic, laboratory, and clinical study."

While the provisions of the act are not explicit concerning our problem, nevtrehless, the meaning of the phrase "four years" may be determined from an application of the general rules of statutory construction.

In Turbett Township v. Port Royal Borough Overseers of the Poor , 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 520 (1907), Judge Rice stated:

* * * The effects and consequences of the proposed construction of a law, as well as its reason and spirit, will be looked into in determining the legislative intent, which is the criterion by which all acts must be construed. Hence, if there is room for construction, the court will prefer that construction which is most consonant with the purpose for which the act was passed. * * *

The following statement taken from Big Black Creek Improvement Company v. Commonwealth , 94 Pa. 450 (1880), was also quoted with approval in the above case:

* * * "statutes are to be construed so as may best effectuate the intention of the makers, which sometimes may be collected from the cause or occasion of passing the statute, and, where discovered, it ought to be followed with judgment and discretion in the construction, though that construction may seem contrary to the letter of the statute."

The only reported case in Pennsylvania which is enlightening on our particular problem is that of Keppelman v. City of Reading , 14 Pa. Dist. 61, 63 (1904), wherein Endlich, J., stated, inter alia:

"One year" (no leap year being in question) means a period of 365 days from any given date; i. e., a period, the lapse of which, from a given date in one year, will bring us to the same date in the next year. That is the popular understanding of the word, and must control in the absence of sufficient apparent reason for holding that another was intended. No doubt a different meaning may be given to the word "year" in statutes, or in contracts where the context or subject-matter points to such intent. Thus, it may appear that a fiscal year is intended: Glasgow v. Rowse , 43 Mo. 479, or an official year: United States v. Dickson , 15 Pet. (U. S.) 141, or the period intervening between two elections: Inhabitants of Paris v. Inhabitants of Hiram , 12 Mass. 262, or a period ending with the fruit season: Brown v. Anderson , 77 Cal. 236, and so on. See Engleman v. State , 2 Ind. 91; Knode v. Baldridge , 73 Ind. 54; Thornton v. Boyd , 25 Miss. 262; Bartlett v. Kirkwood , 2 E. & B. 771. But such cases, whether of contract or of statute, are the exceptions which prove the rule, and, as all the authorities show, must be founded on something in the language of the statute or contract, or in its manifest purposes clearly displacing the rule. What is the meaning of the language used in this statute has already been seen. Is there anything in the purpose of the enactment that would warrant a construction of the word "year" in any but its popular and usual sense?

In the Permanent Edition of "Words and Phrases," Volume 45, page 649, under the caption "School Year" we find the courts of other jurisdiction have had occasion to pass upon the meaning of this phrase.

Accordingly, we note that in the case of' Brookfield v. Drurry College, 139 Mo. App. 339, 123 S. W. 86, 94, it was held:

The word "year," when used in employing teachers, means a college or school year, and not a calendar year.

In Westerman v. Cleland, 12 Cal. App. 63, 106 P. 606, 609, it was ruled that:

A contract of a teacher with school trustees to teach one year from July 5, 1899, at a salary of $1,000, payment to be made by requisitions upon the county superintendent of schools, was a contract to teach for a school "year."

Similarly, in a Georgia case, Long v. Wells, 198 S. E. 763, 768, it was held that:

The word "year," in provision in teachers' civil service act that teachers employed for a total period of three years should be automatically reappointed, contemplated "school years," which need not necessarily include "calendar years," or begin on July 1, 1937, the effective date of the statute. Laws 1937, p. 879, § 2.

Probably the strongest authority cited on this particular subject is that of Williams v. Bagnelle , 138 Cal. 699, 72 P. 408, 410, citing and adopting Brown v. Anderson , 77 Cal. 236, 19 P. 487, wherein it was held that:

The term "year" does not necessarily mean a calendar year. Its meaning is to be gathered from the connection in which the term is used. "The contract was with reference to school-teaching, and, in the absence of anything to the contrary, it must be construed as if the provision of the law limiting the time for which the contract could be made was inserted in it, and that the term 'year' meant a school year, Pol. Code, § 1878, which begins the 1st day of July and ends on the 1st day of June."

It would, therefore, appear that the meaning of the word "year" in section 4, supra, is to be ascertained from the context of the language which the legislature used.

The phrase "four years" as used in section 4, supra, is apparently subject to two proper interpretations: (1) The legislature intended that the completion of four years of academic work was to be spread out over a period of four calendar years, intending in such a case a relationship of academic years to calendar years, or (2) the term "four years" relates only to academic school years of not less than thirty-two weeks each. In our studied opinion, in view of the authorities herein before cited, it appears clear that in our case the legislature intended that the four years of education in a medical school be acquired in "four school years," and not in "four calendar years."

Because of the present national emergency it is most advantageous for those students attending colleges and universities to complete their courses of study in less than four calendar years, which is the ordinary period of time for the completion of their courses. It is common knowledge that throughout our Commonwealth and nation, colleges, universities, technical schools, medical colleges, 'and the many other various graduate schools, to meet the demands upon their student personnel during the present emergency, have arranged their courses of study to run through vacations. Under this state of facts students are actually completing four ordinary school years within the shorter period of three calendar years, although they are spending the same amount of time in class work. (Formal Opinion No. 420, dated May 27, 1942.)

One of the prime needs of the present national emergency is the availability of many more medical doctors. The contemplated course of the various medical institutions is directed to help solve this need. The proposed schedule of study will enable medical students to be-come available for earlier service to our Nation in the present struggle.

We believe that our interpretation is both logical and consistent with the intent of the legislature expressed by the language used in section 4, supra. To conclude that the phrase "four years" means "four school years" is not only consistent with the obvious intent of the legislature, but it would also be equally consistent with our prime endeavor in our present daily lives, which is to be the most effective in our every effort that we contribute to our national defense.

It is our opinion that the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, under the provisions of section 4 of the Medical Practice Act of June 3, 1911, P. L. 639, as amended, July 19, 1935, P. L. 1329, 63 P. S. § 403, may approve a medical institution which allows its students to complete the required graded medical and surgical course of four years, each of which shall be of not less than thirty-two weeks of not less than thirty-five hours each week, within a period of less than four calendar years.

Very truly yours,

Department of Justice,

Claude T. Reno, Attorney General.

George J. Barco, Deputy Attorney General.