Pennsylvania Advisory Opinions October 14, 1903: AGO 83
Collection: Pennsylvania Attorney General Opinions
Docket: AGO 83
Date: Oct. 14, 1903
Advisory Opinion Text
POLITICAL PARTIES-ELECTION LAW-PARTY NAME- BALLOT ACTS OF JUNE 10, 1893, JULY 9, 1897, AND APRIL 29, 1903.
A body of citizens nominating a candidate for Congress or a senator or a member of the House of Representatives in the General Assembly, or a judge or other candidate or set of candidates, to be voted for in only one district or county, but making no nominations for State officers who are to be voted for throughout the entire State, is entitled to a political appellation and square in the first column upon the official ballot as certified from the State Department under the Ballot Act of June 10, 1893, P. L. 412, and its supplements of July 9, 1897, P. L. 223, and April 29, 1903, P. L. 338.
It is not, however, necessary that such political appellation and square should appear in all the official ballots certified to in every district or county throughout the entire State, where no such electoral district is interested in the contest.
Office of the Attorney General, Sir: You have asked me for an opinion to guide the action of your Department on the following questions arising under the ballot act of June 10, 1893, as amended by the several subsequent acts, particularly the act of April 29, 1903:
"Is a body of citizens which nominates a candidate for Congress, or a Senator, or a Member of the House of Representatives in the General Assembly, or a judge or other candidate or set of candidates, to be voted for in only one district or county, but makes no nominations for State officers who are to be voted for throughout the entire State, entitled to a party name and square in the first column upon the official ballot as certified from the State Department under the several acts above stated?"
"And, if so entitled, must that party name and square appear in all the official ballots certified to in every district or county throughout the entire State?"
Taking these questions in the reverse order, I answer the second in the negative: Aside from the manifest objection that no electoral district in the Commonwealth is interested in local contests arising elsewhere, and that it would lead to confusion to place upon the official ballot party names or political appellations foreign to the district and thereby bewilder voters, the question is definitely disposed of by the consideration that the printing and distribution of the ballots and of the cards of instruction for the elections in each county and the delivery of the same to the election officers, and all other expenses incurred, are properly county charges, payment of which is to be provided for by each county, in the same manner as the payment of other election expenses.
It is the duty of the Secretary of the Commonwealth to prepare forms for all the blanks made necessary by the amended ballot law, and to furnish copies of the same to the county commissioners of each county, who shall procure further copies of the same at the cost of the county, and to furnish them to the election officers or other persons by whom they are to be used.
The foregoing provisions of the law clearly indicate that the official ballot to be paid for by each county or electoral district shall contain only such matter as concerns the interests of the respective electoral districts, and that the addition of any foreign or extraneous matter or the introduction of any subjects which do not directly and properly relate to the interests of each electoral district, could be properly objected to as items of expense, and if thrown out by the counties, there is no provision in the law for the payment of such expenses by the Commonwealth.
Hence I instruct you that it is not your duty to certify official ballots to every electoral district or county throughout the entire State containing party names or political appellations and corresponding squares outside of the fair and legitimate demands of each electoral district or county.
In the consideration of the first question, let me premise that the question as put is too narrow. It does not cover all of the features of the case. If, in the question put, you use the words "a party name and square" in the strict legal sense of "a party," I answer the question unhesitatingly in the negative, because "a body of citizens" is not, and cannot pretend to be "a party." But this would not dispose of the real difficulty, for the question would still remain whether such "a body of citizens," making the nominations indicated, is entitled to a square in the first column upon the official ballot, as certified from your Department, not-be it observed-under " a party name," but under "a political appellation," selected and appropriated as described in the act and its various amendments. This is the real question.
It is clear that a discussion of the matter must start with full recognition of the fact that certain legal distinctions exist between "a political party" and "a political body," or "a body of citizens or electors."
The phrases "a party Dame" and a "political appellation" have been definitely appropriated by the courts to "a political party" and "a political body" respectively, the first making its nominations by nomination certificates, and the latter by nomination papers. The courts have settled this, and it is unnecessary to do more than refer to the following authorities which are directly in point.
In the case entitled "In re Objection to Nominations of Citizens' Party," 1st Dauphin County Court Reports, page 326, Judge Stewart said : "The law recognizes a clear distinction between combinations of electors that are parties and combinations of electors that are less than parties. Combinations of electors that are parties place their candidates in nomination by filing certificates of nomination; combinations of electors that are less than parties place their candidates in nomination by filing nomination papers."
In the case entitled "In re Nomination of Jeffries," 3rd Dauphin County Court Reports, 291, Judge Weiss said: "The Fusion Party of Chester county, so designated, is composed of persons identified, some with one and some with another existing political party, with which they act in national or State affairs, or both, who unite in support of a local ticket, the candidates upon which are not pledged to the attainment of any end, or the advocacy of any public measures, which some one of the established political parties does not seek or profess to accomplish. Such an association, however, respectable in numbers, or reputable in character, is not a political party within the meaning of the act of Assembly."
These decisions are in harmony with the result reached by President Judge Pennypacker, in the case entitled "In re Certificates of Nomination of McKinley Citizens' Party," 6th Pennsylvania District Reports,.page 109. In that case, after quoting the definitions of-Webster, the Century Dictionary, Edmund Burke, and Sidgwick in his "Elements of Politics," the learned judge said: "It will be observed that the thought which is common to all of these definitions is that a party must have distinctive aims and purposes and be united in opposition to others in the community within which it exists." The learned judge after still further pointing out the distinctions between a political party and a body of electors or a political body continued: "While any body of electors in sufficient numbers may file a nomination paper, the test to be applied is, did they intend the accomplishment of but a single specific act, or did they indicate continuity of aim or policy, and give evidence of such purpose by some kind of organization." After discussing the facts of the case, the conclusion was stated as follows: "For these reasons, we think the McKinley Citizens' did not constitute a political party within the act ................. The objections are sustained."
The foregoing distinctions were stated by the courts after considering and interpreting the language of the act of the 10th of June, 1893 (P. L. 419), as amended by the act of the 9th of July, 1897 (P. L. 223). In the latter act, the different methods of nomination by nomination certificates and nomination papers are distinctly drawn, and the fourteenth section of the amending act of the 9th of July, 1897, speaks in express terms of the candidates of "each political party or body of electors," thus contrasting the phrase "political party" with the phrase "body of electors." The act then goes on to speak of "the party or political appellation" which is to be placed at the head of each column, and distinctly enacts that "there shall be printed above each column of candidates of a political party or body, a circle three-fourths of one inch in diameter, and there shall be printed around, but without the circle, the following words: Tor a straight ticket mark within this circle.' "
The right of each political party and of each political body to a circle above the party name or the political appellation of the body was thus given in distinct terms. This right was confirmed by judicial action, notably that of Judge Simonton in an unreported case occurring in Dauphin county in the year 1900, wherein after a consideration and comparison of the acts of 1893 and 1897, the judge ruled that it was the intention of the Legislature that a circle should be placed above each column on the ballot and that the insertion of the words "or body" after the words "a political party," as contained in section fourteen of the act of 1897, placed the Legislative intention beyond the reach of dispute.
A similar result was arrived at by Judge Audenried, of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas No. 4, in granting the right to a separate column upon the ballot and a circle over the Municipal League column to a group of citizens in Philadelphia, which had nominated by nomination papers candidates for the Legislature and county officers, under the name or political appellation of "Municipal League."
With distinctions and rights thus established by the courts plainly in view, the Legislature passed the act of 29th of April, 1903 (P. L. 338). This is not a complete ballot law, but simply an amendment of certain specified sections of the preceding acts. The question under discussion turns upon an interpretation of the fourteenth section of the most recent act. Before specifically considering that section, which is the controlling one, it is pertinent to observe that section four of the act of June 19,1891 (P. L. 345), expressly provided that all certificates of nomination and nomination papers shall specify: One (1) "the party or policy" which such candidate represents, expressed in not more than three words, adding "to the party or political appellation," in the case of Presidential electors, the names of the candidates for President and Vice President. Two (2), The name of each candidate nominated therein, his profession, business or occupation, if any, and his place of residence, with the street and number thereon, if any. Three (3), The office for which such candidate is nominated, "Provided, That no words shall be used in any nomination papers to describe or designate the party or policy, or political appellations, represented by the candidate named in such nomination papers, as aforesaid, identical with or similar to the words used for the like purpose in certificates of nominations made by a convention of delegates of a political party, which, at the last preceding election polled three per centum of the largest vote cast."
The foregoing provision was repeated in terms in the fourth section of the act of the 10th of June, 1893 (P. L. 419), with a reduction of the percentage of the vote cast. The same provision appears in the act of the 9th of July, 1897 (P. L. 223), with the addition to the words "convention of delegates" of the words "or primary meeting of electors or caucus held under the rules of a political party or any board authorized to certify nominations, representing a political party, which, at the last preceding election, polled two per centum of the largest vote cast." To guard against an interpretation based upon the strict meaning of the word party, the distinctions previously established are strengthened by an express provision as to the method to be pursued in settling disputes or objections as to "the party or political appellations," used in the "certificate or paper." Moreover, the third section of the act of the 9th of July, 1897 (P. L. 223), amending the third section of the act of 1893, provides a method by which bodies of electors not possessing the rank or legal rights of a political party can make nominations by nomination papers, and designates with particularity the method by which they shall adopt "a certain political appellation to designate their policy," subject to certain limitations regarding the selection of names, so that thereafter, "such political body" shall have the exclusive right to use "the said name or appellation," for the election for which said nomination or nominations are made.
All of the foregoing provisions are still in force, and constitute a part of the present ballot law, entirely unaffected by the provisions of the act of the 29th of April, 1903.
Coming now to a consideration of section fourteen of the act of April 29, 1903, the inquiry must necessarily be whether the Legislature, by fit and proper words, has modified the former distinctions of the law, and either abrogated or abolished distinctions hitherto well settled and existing; or whether, with a full recognition of such distinctions, they have changed in any manner the rights theretofore accorded by statute and decisions to political parties, making their nominations by nomination certificates, and to political bodies making their nominations by nomination papers.
I must assume for the purpose of this opinion the constitutionality of the statute, and I am equally bound to assume that the Legislature did not intend to violate any provision of the Constitution, which by section five of article first, constituting a part of the declaration of rights, expressly provides that "elections shall be free and equal; and no power, civil or military, shall,at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage."
A critical examination of the act of 29th of April, 1903, satisfies me that this constitutional equality has been carefully preserved, and that the rights of parties and of political bodies are fairly and equitably dealt with by balancing each specific provision in each specific clause. The first clause of section fourteen, in providing for the method of arrangement of the names of candidates for Presidential electors, upon the ballot, declares that they shall be arranged in party groups, as presented in the several certificates of party nomination and nomination papers. It is clear from the use of the phrases "party certificates of nomination" and "nomination papers," that the word "party," preceding the word "groups" is not to be read in the sense of awarding to a "party" rights superior to those of a "political body," because, when speaking of certificates of party nomination, the statute clearly refers to the appropriate method of making nominations, under the law, by a political party; and in speaking of nomination papers, the statute equally refers to the method appropriate, under the law, to nominations made by political bodies, which do not possess the legal characteristics of a party. This construction is still further confirmed by the proviso following the provision relating to the order in which the names of parties nominating shall appear, by expressly providing that in the ease of political parties not represented on the ballot at the last Presidential election, the order of arrangement shall be alphabetical.
The equality of right is maintained in the second clause of section fourteen by providing that at the head of each group of candidates shall be printed "the appropriate party name or political appellation," thus adopting language already fixed in meaning by judicial decision. I find the same balance maintained in the third clause, where provision is made for a square at the right of the name of each candidate for Presidential elector, in addition to the provision that at the right of the space containing the surnames of the candidates "for President and Vice President, and their party name or political appellation, there shall be a square of sufficient size for the convenient insertion of a cross mark."
The same equality of right and perfect balance are preserved in the fourth clause, by providing that the names of candidates for all other offices (that is, for offices other than than those of Presidential electors) shall, in all cases, be arranged under the title of the office for which they are candidates, and be printed in the order of the votes obtained for the head of the respective tickets of the parties or bodies nominating at the last Presidential election, beginning with the party obtaining the highest vote, provided that in the case of parties not represented on the ballot at the last Presidential election, the name of the nominees of such parties shall be arranged alphabetically, "according to the party name or political appellation." At the right of the name of each nominee or candidate shall be printed "the name or appellation" of the political party presenting or nominating him, and at the right of such "party name, or political appellation" there shall be a square of sufficient size for the convenient insertion of a cross mark.
It is clear that in all of the foregoing clauses, the phrases "party name" and "political appellation" are meant to signify the distinctions hitherto established, and there is nothing in the language of the statute, as thus far referred to, which indicates any intention to make the phrase "political appellation" an exchangeable equivalent for the phrase "party name." In fact, the phrase "party name" is separated from the phrase "political appellation" by the disjunctive conjunction "or," and thus emphasizes the absence of any intention on the part of the Legislature to deprive "a political body," claiming a "political appellation," of the right which had previously been secured to it by legislation interpreted by the courts, and to confine the right to "a party" strictly so called.
Continuing the examination of section fourteen, I find in clause five the provision that "whenever any candidate shall receive more than one nomination for the same office, his name shall be printed once, and the names of each political party so nominating him shall be printed to theright of the name of such candidates, as arranged in the same order as candidates' names are grouped, that is to say, in the order of the votes obtained by such party at the last preceding Presidential election, beginning with the party obtaining the highest vote."
This language might at first sight appear to be the introduction of a narrower thought by confining the right to "a party" strictly so called, were it not for the immediately succeeding sentences, which are as follows:
"If such candidate shall be nominated by any political party not represented on the ballot in the last Presidential election, the name of such parties shall follow the other names, and be arranged alphabetically, according to the party name or appellation. At the right of every party name, or political appellation, shall be a square of sufficient size for the convenient insertion of a cross mark."
Balance and equality of right are thus restored.
The sixth and seventh clauses are not relevant to the present discussion, relating, as they do, to blank spaces and votes upon constitutional amendments.
The eighth clause preserves equality of right by providing that the ballots shall be so printed as to give to each voter a clear opportunity to designate his choice of candidates by a cross mark in a square of sufficient size at the right of the name of each candidate, and upon the ballot may be printed instructions how to mark, and such words as will aid the voter to do this. There is nothing in this clause which disturbs the equality hitherto preserved.
The ninth clause, consists of a proviso, by which a voter may designate his choice of an entire group of candidates for Presidential electors by one cross mark in a large square, which shall be placed at the right of the names of the candidates for President and Vice President at the head of such group, and such mark shall be equivalent to a mark against every name in the group. This does not narrow the interpretation hitherto placed upon the section as thus far analyzed, because in both clauses four and five, there are express provisions by which the nominees of any political party not represented on the ballot in the last Presidential election may be placed upon the ballot, "according to the party name or political appellation," and it is observable that the- provisions of clause four relate to candidates for all "other offices," meaning thereby other offices than those of Presidential electors. The full intention of the proviso is to give the voter a substituted method of voting from that designated in the immediately preceding clause.
I come now to the proviso contained in the tenth clause or' section fourteen, which in express terms states: "That each voter may have the opportunity of designating his choice for all the candidates, as nominated by one political party, there shall be printed on the extreme left of the ballot, and separated from the rest of the ballot, by a space of at least one-half inch, a list of the names of all the political parties or groups of nominees, represented on such ballot and presenting candidates to be voted for at such election."
It might appear upon the first reading of this language that here was the introduction of a narrower thought than that hitherto expressed, and a limitation of the right to "a party" strictly so called, were it not for the introduction of the words "each voter" at the beginning of the sentence, and of the words "or groups of nominees" immediately following the phrase "political parties." The words "groups of nominees" cannot mean a printing of the names of candidates upon the extreme left of the ballot. Such an interpretation would clearly be out of harmony with the other provisions of the statute. The words themselves are indeed obscure, as was conceded by counsel on both sides upon the argument. I shall not attempt to give them a strained construction, but it is certain that the clear and harmonious provisions of the section cannot be over turned by words of doubtful import; this would be to make darkness conquer light. The meaning becomes plain once more and the balance is restored by the language which immediately follows that above quoted. It is as follows:
"Such names shall be arranged in the order of the votes obtained, at the last Presidential election, by the candidate at the head of the respective tickets of the parties or bodies nominating, beginning with the party that received the highest vote."
The introduction of the words "or bodies nominating" and the use of the disjunctive conjunction "or" clearly indicate that the phrase "bodies nominating" is not to be read in the sense of a mere repetition of the thought embodied in the word "parties" immediately preceding the word "or," but constitutes a maintenance of the distinction hitherto observed and never deviated from in the statute between "parties" and "bodies nominating."
This view is confirmed by the remaining language of the clause: "Following the names of such political parties, shall be the names of the parties or principles not presented on the ballot at the last Presidential election, arranged alphabetically, according to the party name or political appellation."
Here again appears the phrase "political appellation," contrasted with the phrase "party name," and thus is the balance or equality of right again restored.
Then follows the all important provision: "A square of sufficient size for the convenient insertion of a cross mark, shall be placed at the right of each party name or appellation. Every mark within such square shall be equivalent to a mark against every name designated by that political appellation, or party name, including candidates nominated by more than one party, or group of citizens." The question discussed is definitely answered here. This provision is more emphatic than any of those preceding, not only because of the specific directions, amounting to a mandate, that a square of sufficient size for the insertion of a cross mark "shall be placed at the right of each party name or appellation," but because of the repetition, in the provision as to the effect of such mark within the square, of the phrases "political appellation or party names." The thought is still further pointed and sharpened by the use of the concluding words "including candidates nominated by more than one party, or "group of citizens." Prom this it is apparent that the words, "group of citizens" must be contrasted with the preceding phrase "one party." To reach any other conclusion would be to throw the entire statute out of joint.
I have examined finally the instructions to be printed at the head of every ballot. "To vote a straight party ticket mark a cross (X) in the square opposite the name of the party of your choice, in the first column. A cross mark in the square opposite the name of any candidate, indicates a vote for that candidate."
I am well aware that the introduction of the word "party" between the words "straight" and "ticket" is a departure from the language of the fourteenth section of the act of 9th of July, 1897, the proviso there being that "a voter may designate his choice of all the candidates of a political party by one cross in the circle above such column, and such mark shall be equivalent to a mark against every name in the column," and that "there shall be printed above each column of candidates of a political party or body a circle three-fourths of one inch in diameter, and there shall be printed around but without the circle the following words: 'For a straight ticket mark within this circle,' " I cannot conclude that the introduction of the single word "party" in the last clause of a section consisting of twelve clauses, shall operate as a virtual destruction of all of the carefully adjusted balances established and maintained throughout ten clauses of the section, and existing throughout the entire body of the ballot law, viewing it as a whole. To put pressure upon a single word to accomplish such a result would be to over strain the statute to the breaking point.
I am well aware that it is the office of a proviso to operate as a limitation upon the generality of the preceding enacting clauses, but a proviso can never become operative as a repeal of a statute, for a proviso repugnant to the body of a statute is undoubtedly void. To hold otherwise would be to impute to a Legislature the folly of specific enactment and of immediate repeal. Repeal by implication is never favored by the courts unless the implication be so express and positive as to be unmistakable, and a proviso, moreover, even if given its full force and effect, must be limited in its operation. It cannot go to the length of annulling the statute. The Supreme Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Clark, in the case of West Branch Broom Company vs. Lumber and Land Company, 121 Pa., etc., 139, said: "It is a general principle in the construction of statutes that a proviso or saving clause, which is directly repugnant to the body of the act, will not have effect to defeat the purpose of the enactment." The same view was taken in Dugan vs. The Bridge Co., 27 Pa. S. 303.
It is self-deceptive to argue that because of a failure to nominate candidates for offices to be voted for throughout the State, a purely local body of citizens has no right to a square in the first column of the ballot in a district election A local body cannot claim to be a party in the proper sense. Limited in its purposes, limited as to the territory in which it proposes to operate, it can assert no right to nominate candidates to he voted for throughout the Commonwealth. Being a local and temporary body, it can neither create nor acquire a right to be a Slate party beyond the confines of the electoral district in which it exists. If it made such a claim, it would be futile. This has been expressly decided by Judge Simon-ton in the case of Hendly vs. Reeder, confirming the decision in Crow Anti-Combine Party Nomination Paper, 15th District Reports, 61)5, to the effect that it was not the purpose of the ballot act to enable local factions or candidates to promote their political interests by duplicating nominations for electoral and State offices. It is clear that if it can create or acquire no rights by nominating a full State ticket, it can lose no rights by its failure to do so. Its right to a square depends, not upon the boldness of its claims or its moderation and forbearance, but on the terms of the law. The law does not give the square only to parties in the strict sense, but, says that it shall belong alike to parties and to those bodies having a political appellation making nominations by nomination papers.
It follows that the incompleteness of the ticket from a general point of view does not affect its validity or legality within the district to which it properly confines itself. The statute takes a broad and equitable view, maintaining that equality of right which promotes the spirit and letter of the Constitution. It denies to no body of citizens the right which it confers on parties. It merely points out the different methods in each case by which the same right to vote is to be secured.
I, therefore, conclude, after a careful consideration of the matter, that the introduction of the word "party" in the last clause in section fourteen, embodying the instructions to be placed at the head of the ballot, does not operate to control, limit and annul the distinctions previously established by statute, by the decisions of the courts, and carefully maintained throughout the preceding clauses of section fourteen of the act of 29th of April, 1903, and existing elsewhere throughout the statutes which constitute our system of ballot law. I, therefore, instruct you that a body of citizens nominating a candidate for Congress, or Senator or Member of the House of Representatives in the General Assembly, or a judge or other candidate or set of candidates to be voted for in only one district or county, but making no nominations for State officers, who are to be voted for throughout the entire State, is entitled to a square in the first column of the official ballot as certified from your Department under the ballot act of June 10, 1893, as amended by the several subsequent acts, particularly the act of April 29, 1903.
It is not correct, however, to designate it under a "party name." It must be under a phrase consisting of not more than three words and properly selected as a "political appellation."
In the Dauphin county case which was argued before me, it is to be observed that while a full State ticket has not been nominated by the political body terming itself Anti-Machine, yet it has nominated a candidate for judge, to be voted for in the electoral district of Dauphin. A judge is beyond doubt a State officer. The term "officers," as used in the fifth section of the act of 1S93, and as repeated in the later acts, includes judges as well as Senators and Representatives in the General Assembly. Such has been the uniform ruling of this Department, notably in an opinion delivered by Attorney General Hensel in the case entitled " Certificates of Nomination Papers" delivered February 17, 1894, and confirmed by an opinion of Deputy Attorney General Reeder, entitled "In re Nomination Certificate Charles L. Hawley," delivered September 9, 1898. See Amended Ballot Law and Decisions of the Court of Dauphin County and Opinions of the Attorney General relative to the Baker ballot law, compiled by W. W. Griest, Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1902, pp. 199-206).
This is particularly true because of the express statutory provision in these words: "including those of judges and Senators." A judge is in every sense of the word a State officer, the certificate of his nomination, if made by a party, or his nomination paper, if made by a political body less than a party, must be filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and not with the county commissioners.
The judges are all paid out of the State Treasury, and the judges in Dauphin county are particularly charged by statute with the transaction of the State's business.
In making a nomination for the office of judge alone, but in failing to make nominations for State officers who are to be voted for throughout the entire State, the rights of voters can not be impaired, for the full power has not been exhausted. The case falls withm the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Gearhart township election, 192 Pa. S. Reports, page 446. There the Republican column in the ballot contained the name of only one candidate for an office, and the Democratic column contained the names of two candidates, and two persons were to be elected. It was held by the Supreme Court that a voter might make a cross in the circle at the head of the Republican column, and might also make a cross in the square opposite the name of one of the Democratic candidates for the office. Chief Justice Sterrett delivered the opinion of the court and in doing so used these words: "In the case before us, the Republican column on the ballot was incomplete. Two persons were voted for and elected to the office of supervisor. The name of only one person for that office was in said column, while the names of two persons for the same office were in the Democratic column. By voting the Republican ticket by placing a cross in the circle, the voters had not exhausted their privileges, and they therefore had the undoubted right of voting, as they did, for one candidate for supervisor in the Democratic column."
This opinion was by an undivided court, consisting of the Chief Justice, and Justices Green, Mitchell, Dean and Fell.
Applying the principle announced in this decision to the case in hand, it is clear that a voter by placing a cross in the square to the right of the political appellation Anti-Machine as printed in the left hand or first column of the official ballot, does not exhaust his privileges of voting for the candidates of the various political parties for State officers to be voted for throughout the Commonwealth. He must be careful, however, having marked his cross in the square to the immediate right of the political appellation Anti-Machine as contained in the left hand or first column of the official ballot, to mark a cross in the squares to the right of the names of the candidates of his choice for the respective State officers to be voted for throughout the entire Commonwealth. He cannot place a cross within another one of the squares to the right of the party names contained in the first left hand column of the official ballot; in other words, he cannot vote two squares in the left hand column without invalidating his vote for the candidates who would be thus duplicated.
HAMPTON L. CABSON, Attorney General.