South Carolina Cases April 19, 2021: Johnson v. Dep't of Justice

Case Description

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge

Christopher Lee Johnson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, files this action against the above-named Defendants. This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., who is authorized to make a recommendation to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned concludes that this action should be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has filed a Complaint on the standard court form. [Doc. 1.] The allegations in the Complaint are nonsensical and difficult to decipher.

In the Basis for Jurisdiction section on the Complaint form, Plaintiff indicates that the Court has jurisdiction on both federal question and diversity grounds. [Doc. 1 at 3-5.] With regard to federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiff presents a convoluted statement, citing

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various federal statutes and cases. [ Id . at 3.] With regard to diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of the State of South Carolina while Defendants are citizens of the State of New York. [ Id . at 4.] As to the amount in controversy, Plaintiff alleges verbatim as follows:

October 18th, 2014 along with another case Apple Inc. For monopoly. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have over 100 billion invested and have held me on market laundering for campaign finance on bonds and currency devaluation and harmful algorithm, stress test on inflation and deflation on Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and other targeted campaign finance abuses of Power Chase.

[ Id . at 5.]

In the Statement of Claim section on the Complaint form, Plaintiff makes various unintelligible allegations involving the named Defendants as well as Attorney General John Ashcroft, Chief Justice John Roberts, the United States Supreme Court, the Bushes, the Clintons, Donald Trump, Apple, John Podesta, James Comey, and numerous other individuals, entities, and government agencies. [ Id . at 5-7, 9-12.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests, in part, the following:

Relief sought is court and dept. of Justice orders and military justice and John Roberts of my process over torture of abuses of power so this can never happen to a[] Social Security or Sexual Assault survivor recipie[n]t ever agin or try and strike a voter in the [W]hit[e H]ouse for business . . .

[Doc. 1 at 6.]

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Further, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Further, this Court would possess the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous, even if the complaint were not subject to the prescreening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court , 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron , 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”) (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp. , 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank , 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua

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sponte , and it exists independent of the ‘defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules.”); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div. , 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing a judge may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without issuing a summons or following other procedural requirements). Accordingly, in addition to the screening requirements of § 1915(e)(2)(B), “[t]he present Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous.” Trawick v. Med. Univ. of S.C. , No. 2:16-cv-730-DCN-MGB, 2016 WL 8650132, at *4 (D.S.C. June 28, 2016) (citing Carter v. Ervin , No. 0:14-cv-00865-TLW-PJG, 2014 WL 2468351, at *3 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014); Mayhew v. Duffy , No. 2:14-cv-24-RMG, 2014 WL 468938, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2014) (exercising inherent authority to summarily dismiss a frivolous case where pro se plaintiff filed new case seeking to vacate a previously adjudicated case).

Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but the Court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett , 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott , 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton , 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can

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ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

DISCUSSION

The Complaint is subject to summary dismissal as it is frivolous and fails to allege facts to support a plausible claim for relief. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that Defendants have created a monopoly to manipulated the United States economy and currency. [Doc. 1 at 5.] Plaintiff contends he is a “hostage to the civil and criminal justice system.” [ Id . at 10.] However, it is unclear what precise cause of action Plaintiff asserts against the named Defendants.

As noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows the litigant to commence a federal court action without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. See Staley v. Witherspoon , No. 9:07-cv-195-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 1988272, at *1 (D.S.C. July 3, 2007). However, the statute provides limitations to such actions by permitting the Court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous or malicious.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). A complaint is deemed frivolous when it is “clearly baseless” and includes allegations that are “fanciful, ” “fantastic, ” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1989)).

Here, Plaintiff's Complaint contains assertions that are barely comprehensible and manifestly delusional. Presuming that Plaintiff has set forth these statements sincerely, as assertions of fact, they cannot be given credibility. A district court's review of a case for factual frivolousness under § 1915 is guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Denton .

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See Thomas v. Barri , No. 8:10-cv-0431-MBS-BHH, 2010 WL 1993881, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 1993860 (D.S.C. May 18, 2010). When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, § 1915 “gives courts the authority to ‘pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations[, ]' mean[ing] that a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations.” Denton , 504 U.S. at 32. The “initial assessment of the in forma pauperis plaintiff's factual allegations must be weighted in favor of the plaintiff, ” id. , and “[a]n in forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed . . . simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely.” Id. at 33. However, the district court is entrusted with the discretion to dismiss the case for factual frivolousness “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Id. “[A] court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are ‘clearly baseless', a category encompassing allegations that are ‘fanciful,' ‘fantastic,' and ‘delusional.'” Id. at 32-33 (citations omitted) (quoting Neitzke , 490 U.S. at 325, 328). In reviewing for frivolousness or malice, the Court looks to see whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States , 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004) (citing Neitzke , 490 U.S. 319). The Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari , 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, it is well-settled that the Court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional.” Adams v. Rice , 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994); Raiford v. FBI , No. 1:10-cv-2751-MBS-JRM, 2010 WL 6737887, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2010), Report and

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Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2020729 (D.S.C. May 23, 2011) (explaining a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”).

The present action is comprised of factual allegations that are “wholly incredible, ” and which fail to state a claim for relief. As noted, the Complaint asserts that Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights by, among other things, creating a monopoly to manipulate the United States economy. Plaintiff connects the allegations against the named Defendants to various other allegations involving various political scandals and certain economic and trade issues involving various politicians and foreign countries. The Court finds that these bare allegations clearly fall within the statute's definition of frivolity. McLean v. United States , 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are “so nutty, ” “delusional, ” or “wholly fanciful” as to be simply “unbelievable.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Simmons v. Clinton Police Dep't , No. 7:14-cv-248-BO, 2014 WL 7151242, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Dec. 12, 2014). Plaintiff's conclusory assertions fail to show any arguable basis in fact or law and Plaintiff presents no other allegations of any kind to support a claim for relief. See Neitzke , 490 U.S. at 325 (“A suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”); see also Brock v. Angelone , 105 F.3d 952, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a prisoner's claim, that he was being poisoned or experimented upon via an ingredient in pancake syrup served at his prison, was fanciful or delusional, and dismissing the appeal as frivolous with sanctions); Neal v. Duke Energy , No. 6:11-cv-1420-HFF-KFM, 2011 WL 5083181, at *4 (D.S.C. June 30, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5082193 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing action upon finding plaintiff's factual allegations were frivolous, fanciful, and

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delusional where plaintiff claimed defendants clandestinely placed a GPS device in her car while it was in the shop for repairs and that she was being stalked by the defendants, noting the allegations were “made without any viable factual supporting allegations and appears to be the product of paranoid fantasy”); Feurtado v. McNair , No. 3:05-cv-1933-SB, 2006 WL 1663792, at *2 (D.S.C. Jun. 15, 2006) (noting that frivolousness encompasses inarguable legal conclusions and fanciful factual allegations), aff'd , 227 Fed.Appx. 303 (4th Cir. 2007). In any case, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support a claim for relief or any basis for this Court's jurisdiction.

Plaintiff has likewise failed to make any specific allegations against any of the named Defendants to support a cause of action. See Potter v. Clark , 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton , No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).

Finally, Plaintiff has already filed other actions in this Court, asserting similar allegations to those he makes here. See Johnson v. Apple Inc. , No. 6:17-cv-2149; Johnson v. Apple Inc. , No. 6:15-cv-1348; and Johnson v. Apple Inc. , No. 6:19-cv-02548. Those actions were summarily dismissed. “Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to [section] 1915(e). Generally, a lawsuit is duplicative of another one if the parties, issues and available relief do not significantly differ between the two.” Cottle v.

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Bell , No. 00-6367, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Given the similarities between the allegations in the prior actions and those in the present action, Plaintiff's claims in this action should be dismissed as duplicative. See, e.g., Harrison v. South Carolina , 126 Fed.Appx. 100, 101 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also Shaw v. Byars , No. 9-12-cv-2830-RBH, 2012 WL 6138325, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 11, 2012) (dismissing action as duplicative where remedies were available in the identical action); Noonsab v. N.C. Gov't , No. 5:16-CT-3122-FL, 2016 WL 7650591, at *1 (E.D. N.C. July 8, 2016), aff'd , 669 Fed.Appx. 664 (4th Cir. 2016) (same).

In light of all the foregoing, this case should be dismissed as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and for failure to state a claim under which relief may be granted pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Thomas v. Berry , No. 8:10-cv-698-MBS-BHH, 2010 WL 4008333, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 27, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 4007189 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2010); Shuler v. Neely , No. 3:11-cv-182-RJC, 2011 WL 9879176, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 19, 2011).

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) without issuance and service of process.

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IT IS SO RECOMMENDED .

Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

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Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. , 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce , 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).

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Notes:

See Michau v. Charleston Cty. , 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court's dismissal of two complaints pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B), even though the plaintiff was not a prisoner, because the plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis).

The undersigned finds that, in light of all of the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in his Complaint and that allowing Plaintiff to amend his pleadings would be futile. This is so because, on the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff's allegations are frivolous. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the District Court decline to give Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Workman v. Kernell , No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 n.7 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018); Young v. Santos , No. GLR-16-cv-1321, 2018 WL 1583557, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2018); McSwain v. Jobs , No. 1:13-cv-00890, 2014 WL 12672619, at *1 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 6, 2014) (“[G]iven the preposterous and frivolous nature of [the plaintiff's] complaint, it would be a waste of limited judicial resources to give him an

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