South Carolina Cases September 10, 2024: Stevenson v. S.C. Criminal Justice Acad.

Case Description

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ORDER

Deborah Brooks Durden, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The above-captioned matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) on an administrative appeal pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2023). Christopher Stevenson (Appellant) seeks review of a decision by the Law Enforcement Training Council (LETC) of the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy (Respondent or Department) to permanently deny Appellant's law enforcement certification. Based upon the briefs submitted and the record, the Court affirms the decision of the Department.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Was the Department's ruling clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record?

2. Was the Department's ruling arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion?

3. Is S.C. Code Ann. § 23-1-250(B) a lawful basis for the Department to find misconduct for the purposes of denying a law enforcement certification?

BACKGROUND

Appellant was formerly employed by the Lancaster County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) as a detention officer. On May 29, 2023, at approximately 7:28 A.M., Appellant entered a dorm for inmates at the Lancaster County Detention Center to retrieve meal trays from the inmates. The dorm contained multiple cameras with audio recording capability which recorded the following events. During the retrieval, Appellant began searching the dorm for a missing utensil. The dorm had two bunkbeds and a table where the inmates eat. An inmate named Scott Veld Duncan (Duncan) lived in the dorm. Duncan stood beside his bunkbed while Appellant searched. As Appellant approached Duncan, Duncan made a small step to the side and slightly

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forward. Appellant then punched Duncan in the face has he walked past Duncan. Appellant did not flinch nor slow down as he punched Duncan and continued to walk past him. Duncan verbally confronted Appellant after being punched, but Appellant ignored Duncan and pushed the meal cart out of the room. Seconds later, Appellant reentered the room and spoke to Duncan before leaving again. Less than a minute later, Appellant opened the door to the dorm and called Duncan a "snitch ass." Duncan inserted his foot in the door to talk to Appellant. Appellant instructed Duncan to get back in the dorm and Duncan complied. After Appellant shut the door and left, other inmates in the dorm laughed and mentioned Appellant's accusation that Duncan was a "snitch ass." At 7:50 A.M., Duncan submitted a grievance reporting Appellant's punch and accusation that Duncan was a snitch.

On May 31, 2023, after an internal investigation, the Sheriff's Office terminated Appellant for misconduct. The Sheriff's Office timely submitted a personal change in status report of separation form (PCS form) to the Department. The PCS form stated:

[Appellant] was found to be in violation of the specific policies regarding departmental mandates for wearing and activating Body-Worn Cameras, Abuse of Authority, Conduct towards the public, Engaging in behavior unbecoming from someone in his official capacity and station.

The PCS form also provided under the section titled "Separation Information," "Termination INVOLVING MISCONDUCT as defined in S.C. Code Section 23-23-150 and/or S.C. Code of Regulations 37-025." Under the section of the PCS form requesting an indication of the nature of the alleged misconduct, the Sherrif's office wrote "The physical or psychological abuse of members of the public or prisoners, the wilfull [sic] use of excessive force in an objectively unreasonable manner[.]"

The Department notified Appellant of his right to a contested case hearing prior to the Department entering a Final Agency Decision on the allegation of misconduct. Appellant timely requested a contested case hearing, which was held on September 8, 2023. On November 7, 2023, the hearing officer issued his Findings and Recommendations. Under Recommended Findings of Fact, the hearing officer stated:

1. The allegations of misconduct against [Appellant] in the [PCS form] to the [Department] by the [Sheriff's office], is supported by the evidence adduced at the contested case hearing on September 8, 2023;

2. The [Sheriff's office] met its burden of showing by a "preponderance of evidence" that [Appellant] engaged in misconduct through the physical and

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psychological abuse on a prison[er] on May 29, 2023, as was alleged in the [PCS form] provided by the [Sheriff's office] to the [Department];

3. The [Sheriff's office] met its burden of showing by a "preponderance of evidence" that [Appellant] engaged in misconduct by willfully using excessive force which was objectively unreasonable as was alleged in the [PCS form] provided by the [Sheriff's office] to the [Department]; and

4. The allegations of misconduct against [Appellant] set forth in the [PCS form] by the [Sheriff's office] should be deemed proven by the preponderance of evidence adduced at the contested case hearing held on September 8, 2023.

Under Recommended Conclusions of Law, the hearing officer stated:

1. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 23-23-80(6), the [LETC] is authorized, inter alia , to "provide for suspension, revocation, or restriction" of law enforcement certification in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the [LETC];

2. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 37-025, [LETC] may deny law enforcement certification "based on evidence satisfactory to the [LETC] that the candidate has engaged in misconduct";

3. A review of the record in this matter discloses that there exists preponderance of evidence that [Appellant] committed misconduct, as defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 23-23-150(A)(3)(e), through his "physical or psychological abuse of members of the public or prisoners" as was alleged and reported to the [Department] by the [Sheriff's office];

4. A review of the record in this matter discloses that there exists preponderance of the evidence that [Appellant] committed misconduct, as defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 23-1-250(B), by willfully using excessive use of force in an objectively unreasonable manner as was alleged and reported to the [Department] by the [Sheriff's office]; and

5. The misconduct allegations reported by the [Sheriff's office] have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and, pursuant to the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 37-107, [LETC] may conclude that, based on the evidence adduced at the contested case hearing and applicable statutes and regulations, [Appellant] has committed misconduct; and

6. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 37-025, satisfactory evidence exists to support the [LETC]'s denial of [Appellant]'s eligibility for certification as a law enforcement officer in the State of South Carolina.

On November 21, 2023, Appellant filed a Motion in Opposition to the hearing officer's Findings and Recommendations. The Department responded to Appellant's Motion in Opposition on December 4, 2023. After receiving and reviewing the evidence, the transcript of the contested case hearing, the hearing officer's Findings and Recommendations, and the parties' respective Motion in Opposition and Response to the Motion in Opposition, the LETC held a hearing on January 24, 2024. At the hearing, the LETC heard from both parties and voted to adopt the hearing officer's Findings and Recommendations. On February 16, 2024, LETC issued its Final Agency

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Decision permanently denying Appellant's eligibility for certification as a law enforcement officer in the state of South Carolina. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case is before the Court as an appeal from a decision of the Department. Therefore, the Administrative Law Court's review of this case is in an appellate capacity under the standards of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2023), rather than as an independent finder of fact. Specifically, section 1-23-380(5) sets forth:

The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

§ 1-23-380(5).

A decision is supported by substantial evidence when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge , 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68 (Ct. App. 1984). The well settled case law in this state has also interpreted the substantial evidence rule to mean that a decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc. , 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Comm'n , 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996).

When applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency are presumed to be correct and will only be set aside if unsupported by substantial evidence. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Corp. , 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996). Furthermore, the reviewing court is prohibited from substituting its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight

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of the evidence on questions of fact. Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council , 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995). Finally, the party challenging an agency action has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters , 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.

DISCUSSION

Substantial Evidence

Appellant argues the Department's decision finding Appellant committed misconduct is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record. The Court disagrees.

S.C. Code Ann. § 23-23-150(A)(3) (Westlaw Edge through 2024 Act No. 225) defines "Misconduct," in relevant part, as "the physical or psychological abuse of members of the public or prisoners." S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 37-025 (Westlaw Edge through 2024 State Register Vol. 48, Issue 8) defines "misconduct," in relevant part, as "[p]hysical or psychological abuses of members of the public and/or prisoners." Neither "physical abuse" nor "psychological abuse" as used in Section 23-23-150(3) and Regulation 37-025 have definitions provided in South Carolina law. "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent." Hodges v. Rainey , 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). As such, a court must abide by the plain meaning of the words of a statute. Id. When interpreting the plain meaning of a statute, courts should not resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Grazia v. S.C. State Plastering, LLC , 390 S.C. 562, 569, 703 S.E.2d 197, 200 (2010). "Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning." Hodges , 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581.

"Abuse" in the context of harm to a person is defined as "[p]hysical or mental maltreatment, often resulting in mental, emotional, sexual, or physical injury. - Also termed cruel and abusive treatment. Cf. NEGLECT; CRUELTY." Black's Law Dictionary (9 ed. 2009). "Cruelty" is defined as "[t]he intentional and malicious infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage." Id. The Department found and the evidence supports the fact Appellant punched Duncan in the face without provocation. Appellant also called Duncan a "snitch" in the presence of the other inmates. Appellant reasonably should have known doing so would make Duncan fearful among the other inmates due to the suspicion elicited by

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Appellant's accusation. Therefore, the Department found and the evidence supports the fact Appellant intentionally and maliciously inflicted mental and physical suffering on Duncan. Under the plain meaning of "abuse," Appellant's conduct constituted abuse. Thus, the Department's determination that Appellant committed misconduct through his abusive conduct toward Duncan is not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record.

Abuse of Discretion

Appellant argues the Department's determination permanently revoking Appellant's law enforcement certification in the state of South Carolina for misconduct was arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion. The Court disagrees.

Regulation 37-025 states, "The [LETC] may deny certification based on evidence satisfactory to the [LETC] that the candidate has engaged in misconduct." Since the Department's finding that Appellant committed misconduct is not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record, regulation 37-025 permits the Department to deny Appellant's certification. Therefore, the Department's determination was not arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion.

Applicability of Section 23-1-250(B)

Appellant argues the Department improperly used section 23-1-250(B) to support a finding of misconduct by Appellant for the purpose of permanently denying Appellant's certification. The Court disagrees.

Section 23-1-250(B) states:

In addition to any other penalty provided by law, the wilful [sic] use of excessive force in an objectively unreasonable manner may be considered misconduct and may serve as grounds for disciplinary action against the law enforcement officer, including dismissal, demotion, suspension, or transfer.

Appellant argues section 23-1-250(B) does not specifically provide for the denial of a law enforcement certification and therefore may not be used as a grounds for denying Appellant's certification. "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent." Hodges , 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581. As such, a court must abide by the plain meaning of the words of a statute. Id. When interpreting the plain meaning of a statute, courts should not resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Grazia , 390 S.C. at 569, 703 S.E.2d at 200. "Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the

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court has no right to impose another meaning." Hodges , 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581. Section 23-1-250(B) uses the word "including" to preface its list of disciplinary actions that may be imposed on law enforcement officers found to be in violation of the statute. "Include" means "To contain as a part of something. The participle including typically indicates a partial list." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Therefore, the plain meaning of section 23-1-250(B) does not limit the potential disciplinary actions to just the ones enumerated in the statute and section 23-1-250(B) may be applied to support the denial of a law enforcement officer's certification.

Appellant also argues the fact section 23-23-150(A)(3) omits the definition of misconduct stated in section 23-1-250(B) means the legislature did not intend for the definition of misconduct in section 23-1-250(B) to apply in the context of denying certification. Section 23-23-150(A)(3)(c) states "the repeated use of excessive force in dealing with the public or prisoners" is "Misconduct" "[f]or the purposes of this section."

The sheriff or the chief executive officer of a law enforcement agency or department within the State must report to the [Department] the occurrence of any act or multiple acts by a law enforcement officer, who is currently or was last employed by his agency, he reasonably believes to be misconduct.

§ 23-23-150(B)(1). Therefore, the list of definitions of "Misconduct" in section 23-23-150(A)(3)

is a list of the conduct a sheriff or chief executive officer of a South Carolina law enforcement agency must report to the Department. However, section 23-1-250 explicitly states a willful and objectively unreasonable use of excessive force " may be considered misconduct and may serve as grounds for disciplinary action." (emphasis added). The legislative intent behind section 23-1-250 appears to be that law enforcement agencies have discretion in determining when a willful and objectively unreasonable use of excessive force constitutes misconduct, whereas the grounds for misconduct enumerated under section 23-23-150(A)(3) are unequivocally misconduct and must be reported to the Department if the sheriff or chief executive officer reasonably believes they occurred. Therefore, the Department properly found misconduct under section 23-1-250(B) supports the denial of Appellant's certification.

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ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons set forth above, the Department's decision permanently denying Appellant's law enforcement certification in the state of South Carolina is AFFIRMED .

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.