South Carolina Cases October 02, 2024: Sanford v. S.C. Criminal Justice Acad.

Case Description

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ORDER

Deborah Brooks Durden, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The above-captioned matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) on an administrative appeal pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2023). Alexander Sanford (Appellant) seeks review of a decision by the Law Enforcement Training Council (LETC) of the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy (Respondent or Department) to permanently deny Appellant's law enforcement certification. Based upon the briefs submitted and the record, the Court affirms the decision of the Department.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Was the Department's ruling clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record?

2. Did the Department err by failing to consider mitigating circumstances?

BACKGROUND

Appellant was formerly employed by the Mount Pleasant Police Department (Agency) as a police officer. On July 27, 2022, Appellant assisted Officer Rebecca Detwiler (Detwiler) with a traffic stop. After the driver of the vehicle was arrested, Appellant inventoried the items in the vehicle and produced a supplemental incident report stating, "Due to my training and experience I could also smell raw Marijuana coming from the vehicle but did not locate any material." However, Detwiler recalled discussing the traffic stop with Appellant later that night. Detwiler recalled she had asked Appellant if he found marijuana in the vehicle and Appellant confirmed he had. However, Detwiler recalled Appellant saying he did not consider the amount of marijuana he found to be a "big deal," and he subsequently disposed of the marijuana. Detwiler asked Appellant to include the discovery of marijuana in the vehicle. Months later, Detwiler reviewed Appellant's supplemental incident report in preparation for a hearing involving the traffic stop.

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Detwiler believed Appellant's statement in the report that he "did not locate any material" contradicted what he told her that night.

Detwiler contacted Officer Raymond Schoonmaker (Schoonmaker) for advice about her belief Appellant gave her contradictory information. Schoonmaker then contacted Officer Robert Matthewes (Matthewes). Detwiler, Schoonmaker, and Matthewes discussed the matter telephonically. Matthewes advised Detwiler to contact her direct supervisor. Eventually, Detwiler's concerns were referred to internal affairs and an investigation began. On October 25, 2022, Appellant was interviewed by the Office of Professional Standards (OPS). Appellant stated in the interview, "I located a bottle that had green plant material in it." When questioned about the quantity of green plant material in the bottle, Appellant stated "No, I still think it's shake." "Shake" is a term meaning "crumbs of marijuana." OPS asked Appellant if there is any reason even a quantity of marijuana as minor as shake could not be documented, and Appellant replied, "No." OPS watched Appellant's body camera footage from the traffic stop and observed green plant material in the bottle Appellant found.

On October 27, 2022, after an internal investigation, the Sheriff's Office terminated Appellant for misconduct. The Sheriff's Office timely submitted a personal change in status report of separation form (PCS form) to the Department. The PCS form stated, "[Appellant] falsely documented that he did not find narcotics during a vehicle search and review of his body camera provided evidence that he did find narcotics." The PCS form also provided under the section titled "Separation Information," "Termination INVOLVING MISCONDUCT as defined in S.C. Code Section 23-23-150 and/or S.C. Code of Regulations 37-025." Under the section of the PCS form requesting an indication of the nature of the alleged misconduct, the Sherrif's office wrote, "Willfully providing false, misleading, incomplete, deceitful, or incorrect information on document, record, report, or form, except when required by departmental policy or by the laws of this State."

The Department notified Appellant of his right to a contested case hearing prior to the Department entering a Final Agency Decision on the allegation of misconduct. Appellant timely requested a contested case hearing before the LETC, which was held on May 23, 2023. At the conclusion of the direct examination of Appellant, Appellant moved to have the Court of Common Pleas complaint he filed against the Town of Mount Pleasant put on the record. Appellant also moved to admit the notice for the hearing the parties had attended in federal court. The hearing

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officer took judicial notice of the fact Appellant had filed a lawsuit against the Town of Mount Pleasant based on an alleged improper release of personal information, that Appellant's suit was filed on June 13, 2022, and that the hearing resulted in the issuance of an order by the federal court declaring a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanding the action to state court.

On June 22, 2023, the hearing officer issued his Findings and Recommendations. Under Recommended Findings of Fact, the hearing officer stated:

1. The allegation of misconduct against [Appellant], as reported in the [PCS form] provided to the [Department] by the [Agency], is supported by the evidence adduced at the contested case hearing held on May 23, 2023;

2. The Department has met its burden by showing by a "preponderance of evidence" that [Appellant] engaged in misconduct by willfully providing false, misleading, incomplete, deceitful, or incorrect information on a document, record, report, or form as was charged in the [PCS form] provided by the [Agency] to the [Department]; and

3. The allegation of misconduct against [Appellant] as set forth in the [PCS form] by the [Agency] should be deemed substantiated by the evidence adduced at the hearing.

Under Recommended Conclusions of Law, the hearing officer stated:

1. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 23-23-80(6), the [LETC] is authorized, inter alia , to "provide for suspension, revocation, or restriction" of law enforcement certification in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the [LETC];

2. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 37-025, [LETC] may deny law enforcement certification "based on evidence satisfactory to the [LETC] that the candidate has engaged in misconduct";

3. A review of the record in this matter discloses a preponderance of evidence that [Appellant] committed misconduct, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 23-23-150(A)(3)(k), by "[w]illfully providing false, misleading, incomplete, deceitful, or incorrect information on a document, record, report, or form, except when required by departmental policy or by the law of this State", as was alleged and reported to the [Department] by the [Agency]; and

4. The misconduct allegation reported by the [Agency] has been proven by a preponderance of evidence and, pursuant to the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 37-107, [LETC] may conclude that, based on the evidence adduced at the contested case hearing and applicable statutes and regulations, [Appellant] has committed misconduct.

On July 13, 2023, Appellant filed a Motion in Opposition to the hearing officer's Findings and Recommendations. After receiving and reviewing the evidence, the transcript of the contested case hearing, the hearing officer's Findings and Recommendations, and Appellant's Motion in Opposition, the LETC held a hearing on November 13, 2023. At the hearing, the LETC heard from both parties and voted to adopt the hearing officer's Findings and Recommendations. On

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January 29, 2024, LETC issued its Final Agency Decision permanently denying Appellant's eligibility for certification as a law enforcement officer in the state of South Carolina. The Final Agency Decision also found Appellant failed to provide evidence proving the timing of the misconduct investigation and Appellant's complaint against the Town of Mount Pleasant were anything but a coincidence. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case is before the Court as an appeal from a decision of the Department. Therefore, the Administrative Law Court's review of this case is in an appellate capacity under the standards of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2023), rather than as an independent finder of fact. Specifically, section 1-23-380(5) sets forth:

The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

§ 1-23-380(5).

A decision is supported by substantial evidence when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge , 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68 (Ct. App. 1984). The well settled case law in this state has also interpreted the substantial evidence rule to mean that a decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc. , 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Comm'n , 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996).

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When applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency are presumed to be correct and will only be set aside if unsupported by substantial evidence. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Corp. , 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996). Furthermore, the reviewing court is prohibited from substituting its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council , 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995). Finally, the party challenging an agency action has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters , 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.

DISCUSSION

Substantial Evidence

Appellant argues the Department's decision finding Appellant committed misconduct is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record. The Court disagrees.

S.C. Code Ann. § 23-23-150(A)(3)(k) (Supp. 2023) defines "Misconduct," in relevant part, as "wilfully providing false, misleading, incomplete, deceitful, or incorrect information on a document, record, report, or form, except when required by departmental policy or by the laws of this State." S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 37-025(A)(9) (Supp. 2023) defines "misconduct," in relevant part, as "[t]o willfully make false, misleading, incomplete, deceitful, or incorrect information on a document, record, report, or form, except when required by departmental policy or by the laws of this State." "Wilfully" is not specifically defined with respect to police officer misconduct. "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate intent of the legislature." Hodges v. Rainey , 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). As such, a court must abide by the plain meaning of the words of a statute. Id. When interpreting the plain meaning of a statute, courts should not resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Grazia v. S.C. State Plastering, LLC , 390 S.C. 562, 569, 703 S.E.2d 197, 200 (2010). "Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning." Hodges , 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581.

"Willful" is defined as "[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious." Black's Law Dictionary (9 ed. 2009). The Department found and the evidence supports the fact Appellant knew he observed green plant matter that was likely marijuana in the suspect's vehicle,

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disposed of it, and then intentionally represented to the Agency in his supplemental incident report that he "could also smell raw Marijuana coming from the vehicle but did not locate any material." Appellant argues he did not intentionally misrepresent his findings because he only believed the "material" in the bottle was most likely "shake" and was insufficient to use as evidence. However, Appellant's reference to "material" in the supplemental incident report was in the context of describing his search for marijuana in the vehicle after smelling it. Therefore, Appellant's reference to "material" reasonably relates to the marijuana for which he was searching. Appellant admitted he believed the material in the bottle was likely "shake," which is crumbs of marijuana. Therefore, Appellant reasonably believed he found marijuana in some form, but he intentionally provided misleading information suggesting he did not find any marijuana because he determined the amount of marijuana was insignificant. Appellant provided no evidence of a departmental policy or South Carolina law supporting his conclusion that he could deny finding marijuana in his supplemental incident report despite reasonably believing he observed flakes of marijuana in the vehicle. Therefore, the Department found and the evidence supports the fact Appellant intentionally provided misleading information on a document, record, report, or form without a requirement to do so provided under a departmental policy or South Carolina law. Thus, the Department's determination that Appellant committed misconduct through his misleading statement is not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record.

With respect to Appellant's argument that evidence adduced by the LETC was untrustworthy because the investigation was retaliation for his complaint against the Town of Mount Pleasant, the LETC found Appellant failed to provide evidence proving the timing of the Agency's misconduct investigation of Appellant following Appellant's complaint was anything but a coincidence. While it may be possible to view the facts as supporting the investigation being begun as a form of retaliation against Appellant, the evidence in the record overwhelmingly supports the Department's finding that Appellant made conflicting statements and misrepresentations in his report concerning the marijuana found at the traffic stop. Thus, reasonable minds could agree with the Department's conclusion that the timing of the investigation with Appellant's complaint was a coincidence. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the Department's conclusion that the investigation and the complaint were unrelated, and the Court must presume the Department's conclusion is correct.

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Mitigating Circumstances

Appellant argues the Department's determination permanently revoking Appellant's law enforcement certification in the state of South Carolina for misconduct was arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion because the Department did not consider mitigating circumstances arising from Appellant's lawsuit against the Town of Mount Pleasant. The Court disagrees.

Regulation 37-025 states, "The [LETC] may deny certification based on evidence satisfactory to the [LETC] that the candidate has engaged in misconduct." Since the Department's finding that Appellant committed misconduct is not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record, regulation 37-025 permits the Department to deny Appellant's certification. The statute does not require the LETC to consider other circumstances of the case beyond evidence satisfactory to the LETC that the candidate engaged in misconduct. Therefore, the Department's determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons set forth above, the Department's decision permanently denying Appellant's law enforcement certification in the state of South Carolina is AFFIRMED .

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.