South Carolina Cases January 15, 2025: Lucey v. The Town of Mount Pleasant, SC

Case Description

1

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

Heard November 1, 2024

Appeal From Charleston County R. Keith Kelly, Circuit Court Judge

Jeffrey Scott Tibbals, Sr. and Evan Patrick Williams, both of Bybee &Tibbals, LLC, of Mount Pleasant, for Appellant.

Ross A. Appel, of McCullough Khan, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondent WIN515, LLC.

Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines, Brian Lee Quisenberry, and Zachary Meade Kern, all of Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston, for Respondent The Town of Mount Pleasant.

2

PER CURIAM.

Justin O'Toole Lucey appeals from an order granting dismissal to The Town of Mount Pleasant, South Carolina (the Town) and WIN515, LLC (collectively, Respondents), arguing the circuit court erred in, inter alia , finding he lacked statutory standing. We affirm.

FACTS

On August 25, 2021, the Town's Commercial Design Review Board (DRB) granted preliminary approval to WIN515 to develop a three-story mixed-use retail and office building on its property at 515 Coleman Boulevard in Mount Pleasant. After agenda meetings, during which numerous individuals opposed the project, DRB denied final approval. Approximately six months later, the issue was placed on the agenda for DRB's June 29, 2022 meeting. By letter dated June 27, 2022, Lucey objected, arguing the Town's ordinances barred reconsideration of a denied project for one year absent substantial change, which had not occurred. DRB received numerous other letters opposing the project, primarily due to traffic and safety concerns, and a letter from WIN515's counsel, noting DRB's sole role was restricted to aesthetic matters, and it had "no jurisdiction over traffic and safety matters." DRB granted final approval by unanimous vote at the June 29 public meeting.

Lucey filed this action, seeking reversal of the final approval. WIN515 moved to dismiss the complaint. The Town filed a Notice of Opposition and memo in support of WIN515's motion to dismiss, arguing Lucey's challenge was "procedurally and jurisdictionally defective." Lucey opposed the motion.

After a hearing, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, finding Lucey (1) lacked statutory standing to appeal DRB's decision because he was not an owner of property "adjacent to and in the near vicinity of the proposed development"; (2) failed to name DRB, which was a necessary party to the action; (3) failed to timely serve DRB; and (4) failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court also denied Lucey's motion to reconsider. As to standing, the court found a June 27, 2022 letter attached to Lucey's complaint, which referenced two additional properties he owned, was not part of the record and could not be considered for

3

the first time in his motion to reconsider. The court additionally found Lucey failed to demonstrate how he was uniquely impacted by the project and failed to articulate an individualized injury; thus, the alleged harms were conjectural and hypothetical, rendering them insufficient to show the required "substantial interest" that would confer statutory standing. The court concluded Lucey's allegations of alleged harm from the project focused on traffic and safety issues, which were unsupported in the record and irrelevant in any event because DRB is a board of architectural review and traffic and safety issues are outside its purview. In addition, the court found Lucey failed to establish public importance standing. This appeal followed.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Lucey argues the circuit court erred in finding he lacked statutory standing to appeal the DRB's decision. We disagree.

"Statutory standing exists, as the name implies, when a statute confers a right to sue on a party, and determining whether a statute confers standing is an exercise in statutory interpretation." Youngblood v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 402 S.C. 311, 317, 741 S.E.2d 515, 518 (2013). "We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo." Books-A-Million, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue , 437 S.C. 640, 642, 880 S.E.2d 476, 477 (2022). However, as to factual findings of a local zoning board, our review is limited because "[t]he findings of fact by the board of appeals must be treated in the same manner as a finding of fact by a jury ...." S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-840(A) (Supp. 2024). "A jury's factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record contains no evidence reasonably supporting the jury's findings." Boehm v. Town of Sullivan's Island Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 423 S.C. 169, 182, 813 S.E.2d 874, 880 (Ct. App. 2018).

The circuit court found Lucey lacked statutory standing to appeal DRB's decision because he failed to establish he had a "substantial interest" in the project. "Standing refers to a party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right." Michael P. v. Greenville Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 385 S.C. 407, 415, 684 S.E.2d 211, 215 (Ct. App. 2009). "Standing may be by Lucey in his motion to reconsider; thus, they could not be considered. See Kiawah Prop. Owners Grp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C. , 359 S.C. 105, 113, 597 S.E.2d 145, 149 (2004) (finding an issue raised for the first time in a motion to reconsider was not preserved where the issue could have been raised prior to judgment).

4

acquired (1) by statute, (2) under the principle of 'constitutional standing,' or (3) via the 'public importance' exception to general standing requirements." Pres. Soc'y of Charleston v. S.C. Dep't of Health &Env't Control , 430 S.C. 200, 209-10, 845 S.E.2d 481, 486 (2020). Because there is a statute governing the right to appeal a decision of DRB to the circuit court, this case initially involves statutory standing. See S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-900(A) (Supp. 2024) ("A person who may have a substantial interest in any decision of the board of architectural review . . . may appeal from any decision of the board to the circuit court ....").

In Spanish Wells Property Owners Association v. Board of Adjustment of Town of Hilton Head Island , this court found a "substantial interest" by "owners of property adjacent to and in the near vicinity of the [proposed] development" in finding the appellant had standing to appeal the board's decision. 292 S.C. 542, 544, 357 S.E.2d 487, 487 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds , 295 S.C. 67, 367 S.E.2d 160 (1988). Here, we find the circuit court did not err in finding Lucey lacked statutory standing because his properties are not adjacent to or in the near vicinity of WIN515's property.

5

We decline to address Lucey's remaining issues based on our affirmance of the circuit court's finding that Lucey lacked statutory standing. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown , Inc. , 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (declining to address an appellant's remaining issues where the disposition of a prior issue was dispositive).

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.