Tennessee Advisory Opinions January 01, 2005: TN Att. Gen. Op. 05-007

Advisory Opinion Text

The juvenile court clerk appointed and elected pursuant to the provisions of subsection (e) of this section shall receive compensation of thirty-two thousand dollars ($32,000) each fiscal

year. The juvenile court clerk shall also receive any annual raises given to county employees by the Gibson County Commission.

2000 Tenn. Priv. Acts Ch. 142, § 2(f). We assume the private act was duly adopted by the Gibson County Commission in accordance with Section 3 of the act.

Under the 1990 census, Gibson County had a population of 46,315. Tenn. Code Ann. Vol. 13, p. 185 (Supp. 2004). In 2000, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-24-102(b) provided that "general officers" in counties with a population of 35,000 to 49,999 "shall" receive compensation of $45,000. Under subsection (a) of this statute, juvenile court clerks were included among "general officers." In 2001, the legislature amended Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-24-102. 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 405. Among other changes, the amendment deleted (b) and substituted a new payment schedule. The statute now provides in relevant part:

Beginning July 1, 2001, general officers shall receive minimum compensation per year as follows:

County Population General Officers

* * * *

35,000 to 49,999 $50,805

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-24-102(b) (Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). The 2001 amendment also provides a method for calculating salary increases. Under the 2000 census, Gibson County had a population of 48,152. Tenn. Code Ann. Vol. 13, p. 185 (Supp. 2004).

The question, then, becomes under what statutory scheme the Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk should be paid — the 2000 private act or the general law at Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-24-102. As in effect in 2000, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-24-102(b) provided that general county officers, including juvenile court clerks, "shall" be compensated according to the listed schedule. The general law provides no exceptions, nor does it preserve any conflicting private acts. The 2000 private act sets a salary for the Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk considerably lower than that in the general law then effective.

It is a rule of statutory construction that a statute adopted later in time controls over a conflicting statute adopted earlier in time. Steinhouse v. Neal, 723 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tenn. 1987); Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. McReynolds, 886 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). It is also a rule of statutory construction that "where there is a conflict between a special statute and a general statute, the special statute will be given effect." State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Tenn. 1998), rehearing denied (1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 987, 119 S.Ct. 414, 142 L.Ed.2d 336 (1998). In the present case, we think a court would conclude that the 2000 private act was intended as an exception to the general law at Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-24-102(b). Absent a rational basis for the exception, the private act is constitutionally suspect because it suspends the general county official salary law. Tenn. Const. Art. XI, § 8. But a statute is presumed to be valid until it has been found

unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction. Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1977). Because of the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes, the public and individuals are bound to observe a statute though unconstitutional, until it is declared void by an authoritative tribunal. Franks v. State, 772 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tenn. 1989). For this reason, the Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk was entitled to the salary under the 2000 private act until that act was repealed or declared unconstitutional by an authoritative court.

The next question is the effect of the 2001 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-24-102, the general statutory scheme governing the compensation of county officials, including juvenile court clerks. Again, where two statutes conflict, the later in time controls. An amended act is ordinarily construed as if the original statute has been repealed and a new and independent act in the amended form has been adopted in its stead. Redmon v. LeFevre, 503 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. 1973). A repeal by implication of an earlier act by a later act will be found only when a conflict between the acts is inescapable. Knox County Association v. Knox County Board of Education, 60 S.W.3d 65, 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). In this case, we think the 2000 private act directly conflicts with the general law as amended and, in effect, adopted, in 2001. For this reason, we think a court would conclude that the 2001 amendment repealed the 2000 private act by implication. For this reason, the Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk should be paid under the 2001 act beginning July 1, 2001, when it became effective.

PAUL G. SUMMERS Attorney General

MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General

ANN LOUISE VIX
Senior Counsel

Requested by:

Honorable Cornelia A. Clark Director, Administrative Office of the Courts Nashville City Center, Suite 600, 511 Union Street Nashville, TN 37219